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Addressing the global ﬁnancial crisis has required ﬁscal intervention on a substantial scale
by governments around the world. The consequent buildup of public debt, in particular its
sustainability, has moved to center stage in the policy debate. If the Asia and Paciﬁc region
is to continue to serve as an engine for global growth, its public debt must be sustainable.
Public Debt Sustainability in Developing Asia addresses this issue for Asia and the Paciﬁc
as a whole as well as for three of the most dynamic economies in the region: the People’s
Republic of China, India, and Viet Nam.
The book begins with a discussion of the reasons for increased attention to debt-related
issues. It also introduces ﬁscal indicators for the Asian Development Bank’s developing
member countries and economies. The sustainability of their debt is assessed through extant
approaches and with the most up-to-date data sources. The book also surveys the existing
literature on debt sustainability, outlining the main issues related to it, and discusses the
key implications for the application of debt sustainability analysis in developing Asia. Also
highlighted is the importance of conducting individual country studies in view of wide
variations in deﬁnitions of public expenditure, revenues, contingent liabilities, government
structures (e.g., federal), and the like, as well as the impact of debt on interest rates. The
book further provides in-depth debt sustainability analyses for the People’s Republic of
China, India, and Viet Nam.
Public Debt Sustainability in Developing Asia offers a comprehensive analytical and
empirical update on the sustainability of public debt in the region. It breaks new ground
in examining characteristics that are crucial to understanding sustainability and offers
richer policy analysis that should prove useful for policymakers, researchers, and graduate
students.
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government budget balances and debt ratios to deteriorate across the region. The
research underpinning this book, Public Debt Sustainability in Developing Asia,
clearly illustrates the extent that the crisis response has altered ﬁscal positions in
the region and the implications for the future path of public debts.
The study also raises important questions about the techniques used to gauge
debt sustainability, demonstrating how the use of stochastic forecasting techniques
can enrich the analysis. The research contributes to the ongoing debate among
policy makers, academicians, and other practitioners on how best to assess a
country’s debt dynamics.
A dedicated team of researchers helped bring this book to fruition. Benno
Ferrarini, Raghbendra Jha, and Arief Ramayandi, the book’s editors, coordinated
the contributions of the six authors, including themselves plus Charles Adams,
Mukul Asher, and Richard Hemming. Kiseok Hong and Paul Holden provided
inputs for two articles presented as boxes. Rogelio Mercado Jr. and Olimpia
Jenneth Taja assisted with gathering needed data. Elenita Pura helped with the
country workshops, travel, and project logistics.
The two country study workshops (held in Beijing on 22 July 2011 and
Singapore on 21 November 2011) produced helpful discussion and insights.
Thanks are due to all the participants, and especially to Shasanta Bhide, Mark
Kruger, Louis Kuijs, Rajeev Malik, Ajit Ranade, T.N. Srinivasan, and Xuejin
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Hasan and Dominic Mellor provided liaison with the India and Viet Nam resident
missions, respectively, for information and assistance as needed with the country
chapters. Christopher Edmonds, Emma Veve and other colleagues of the ADB
Paciﬁc regional department provided helpful comments about debt sustainability
in the Paciﬁc.
Robert Hugh Davis, Anna Juico, April-Marie Gallega, and Vicente Angeles
of ADB’s Department of External Relations coordinated the publication with
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Routledge, Priscilla delRosario provided valuable advice on house style.Yongling
Lam was Routledge’s coordinator.
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patience, perseverance, and peace among the project contributors.
A special acknowledgement is due to Cindy Castillejos-Petalcorin for her great
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chapters, and for administrative coordination and the efﬁcient organization of
workshops and seminars.
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1 Introduction
Benno Ferrarini, Raghbendra Jha, and
Arief Ramayandi
Setting the scene
In the aftermath of the global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC), many countries engaged
in ﬁscal and monetary stimuli to revive their economies. Most central banks
sharply lowered policy interest rates, several of them to zero. Bank balance
sheets were supported through guarantees and transfers, and deep tax cuts and
public expenditure increases (ﬁscal stimulus packages) were put in place. As a
consequence, the advanced economies’ ﬁscal deﬁcits, which were 1.1% of their
gross domestic product (GDP) before the crisis, went up to 8.8% in 2009 and
dropped only marginally to 7.5% in 2010.1 The deﬁcits were expected to decrease
marginally to 6.7% of GDP in 2011 and 5.4% in 2012. In the case of emerging
market economies, ﬁscal deﬁcits and debt were low in 2007, but the ﬁscal deﬁcits
rose to 4.8% of GDP in 2009, dropped to 3.7% of GDP in 2010, and were expected
to drop further to 2.6% in 2011 and 2.3% in 2012.2
The GFC of 2008/09 had a particularly strong impact on the public ﬁnances of
advanced economies, from whose ﬁnancial sectors it had originally propagated.
Massive ﬁnancial sector bailouts and ﬁscal stimulus measures, combined with the
work of automatic stabilizers, caused ﬁscal deﬁcits and government debt ratios to
expand (Figures 1.1 and 1.2). Although ﬁscal deﬁcits have been narrowing since
2009, as stimulus measures faded and the global economy started recovering,
International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections suggest that dealing with the
consequences of large structural ﬁscal deﬁcits and the buildup of public debt
will dominate advanced economies’ ﬁscal policies well into the future.
This massive stockpiling of debt, particularly by developed countries, has led
to impacts on ﬁnancial markets because the debt is often held by banks and
other ﬁnancial institutions. Indeed, in January 2012, global ﬁnancial markets
were in turmoil after sovereign debt downgrades of Europe and the United States,
and with growing worries that the debt crisis in the eurozone was spreading from
the periphery to the core. Global capital markets have become excessively volatile
against the backdrop of growing risks to the global ﬁscal environment in a frail and
weakening world economy. As a group, advanced economies face the prospects
of debt/GDP ratios rising well into the decade spanning 2010–19, and surging
borrowing costs have forced themore troubled eurozone countries to take austerity
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Figure 1.1 General government debt/GDP ratio projections.
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: IMF (2011b).
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Figure 1.2 General government ﬁscal balance/GDP ratio projections.
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: IMF (2011a).
measures of a severity unprecedented since 1945. It is difﬁcult to envisage that
these countries will return to more manageable debt levels other than through the
painful options of prolonged stagnation, high inﬂation, partial default, or some
combination of the three.
The IMF Fiscal Monitor of September 2011 expects the general government
gross debt/GDP ratio of the United States to have crossed the 100% mark in 2011
and to reach 115% by 2016, up from 61% only 5 years ago.3 The country’s rating
downgrade by a notch from triple-A in 2011, combined with a political stalemate
over the conduct of ﬁscal policy,4 has sharpenedmarkets’ worries about the ability
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of the United States to deﬁne a viable and growth-supporting medium-term plan
that could stem rising debt ratios and growing budgetary pressures, such as in
relation to health care and age-related spending.
In the United Kingdom, the government debt ratio almost doubled in the last
5 years, from 43% in 2006 to 81% in 2011. The country is steering toward a
prolonged period of austerity, against the prospects of stalling growth and rising
borrowing needs.
Similarly, Japan’s gross debt/GDP ratio climbed from 191% of GDP in 2006 to
220% in 2010 and was expected to have reached 233% in 2011. Without serious
adjustment of the primary balance, the debt/GDP ratio is bound to climb higher
in coming years.
More worrying still, the eurozone is facing a deepening sovereign debt crisis
that has moved from Ireland, Portugal, and Greece to affect Spain and Italy, and
currently risks spilling over to France and the other countries at the eurozone’s
core. Market conﬁdence has been lost, sovereign bond yields have soared in the
crisis-ridden economies, and liquidity-starved European banks have cut lending
to each other and to the real sector. Currently, European banks’ aggregate loans
exceed their deposits so that banks have to make up the deﬁcit by borrowing in
the wholesale markets. However, because these banks have eurozone bonds on
their books and European governments with weak ﬁnances are either wary of
supporting the bonds or ﬁnancial markets perceive the banks as being unable to
support the bonds for long, investors in wholesale markets are unwilling to lend
to such banks. In response, banks are shedding assets in order to raise cash. This
is further depressing the price of the assets, thereby perpetuating the credit crunch
and adding downward pressure on economic growth in Europe and the global
economy. The outlook for 2012 is gloomy and highly uncertain, but is likely to be
a year of recession in Europe with negative spillovers onto the global economy.5
The survival of the eurozone and the bearing of this crisis on the world economy
largely hinge on decisive and concerted action by the leading European countries
and key institutions, in particular the European Central Bank and the European
Stability Mechanism.
The outlook is generallymore favorable among the emerging economies, which
as a group had less direct exposure to the toxic assets and the ﬁnancial sector
meltdown associated with the GFC.6 The emerging economies were affected
mainly through the collapse of global demand for their exports between the last
quarter of 2008 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. Output in many of the smaller and
more export-dependent countries contracted, but growth quickly resumed asworld
trade rebounded after the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. The larger emerging economies
were more resilient to the global downturn, and their growth slowed less as a
result. Crisis-related discretionary ﬁscal stimulus, although substantial in some
emerging economies, did not have the proportions experienced in the advanced
economies, and because the automatic stabilizers were relatively undeveloped in
emerging economies, they played a limited role in increasing structural deﬁcits.7
As a result, emerging economies as a group experienced less deterioration of
ﬁscal deﬁcits in 2008/09 than did the more developed economies (Figure 1.1),
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and only a temporary increase of the debt ratio (Figure 1.2). Against the prospects
of continuing robust growth and despite the ﬁscal pressures associated with the
GFC, the latest World Economic Outlook projections suggest that by 2017 the
average public debt ratio in emerging economies will fall well below its pre-GFC
level (IMF 2011b).
Nevertheless, emerging market economies continue to face signiﬁcant down-
ward risks deriving from their exposure to the vicissitudes of the battered advanced
economies. For example, the IMF (2010) estimates that the higher debt burden
of the advanced countries, which is projected to rise to about 110% of GDP by
2015, could lead their long-term growth rates to drop by as much as 0.5% per
annum. The study further notes that although developing countries’ budgetary
and current account deﬁcits have been shrinking since the GFC, they have done
so at a lower rate than expected. Moreover, countries are likely to ﬁnd it difﬁcult
to build the political consensus necessary to lower debt/GDP ratios through tax
reform and reducing or rationalizing expenditure. Ultimately, debt sustainability
in the developing world remains highly exposed to the vulnerabilities facing the
global economy, including the downward risks to economic performance from a
Europe-led debt crisis and recession.
Public debt in developing Asia after the global ﬁnancial crisis
As a region, developing Asia8 has weathered the GFC remarkably well.9 Its
exposure to the toxic assets that originated in western ﬁnancial markets was
limited.Most of theﬁnancial systemsof the region’s economieswerewell prepared
for the crisis. The ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans was generally
low, banks were well capitalized, and most countries had minimal credit lines
to western banks. Also, macroeconomic fundamentals were generally sound,
having been profoundly reshaped after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis 1997/98. By the
time the GFC hit, external accounts in the region were mostly in surplus, many
countries had piled up huge foreign currency reserves, and their debt positions
were mostly low and manageable. Although sound fundamentals shielded the
region from direct contagion through the GFC, Asia’s strong export orientation
made it highly vulnerable to the collapse of international trade. The more open
economies of East and South Asia—such as Hong Kong, China; the Republic of
Korea; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand—were hardest hit, and their output
contracted signiﬁcantly from the second half of 2008 until the ﬁrst quarter of 2009
(ADB 2009b). Imports also contracted, due to the large proportion of regional
trade in parts and components supporting global supply chains.
Amid the dramatic fall in exports, business and consumer conﬁdence declined,
dampening private investment and consumption.Withweak domestic demand and
the inability to “export their way out of the GFC,” governments were left to act as
the consumer of last resort. Across developing Asia, governments implemented
measures to stimulate aggregate demand through ﬁscal and monetary expansion.
The ﬁscal stimulus packages were geared mostly toward public spending, rather
than tax cuts, and spending concentrated mainly on infrastructure projects and
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less on social protection programs and transfer spending (Appendix, Table A1.1).
The size of these stimulus packages was largely unprecedented in Asia, given the
region’s limited history of countercyclical stabilization.10
Sound macroeconomic fundamentals along with good monetary and ﬁscal
management just prior to the onset of the GFC, as well as the benign conditions
prevailing in the global economy, led to the emergence of strong buffers in many
of the countries. Consequently, they were able to put in place solid ﬁscal stimulus
packages and yet emergewith relatively robust debt positions. Indeed, in the period
leading up to the onset of the GFC, the region was characterized by excess (rather
than deﬁcient) net saving,11 which it was exporting to the rest of the world through
large current account surpluses.12 Moreover, as Anderson, Silva, and Velandia-
Rubiano (2011) point out, many countries in the region had used the period leading
up to the GFC to diversify their portfolio, reduce their share of external debt, step
up their debt management capacity, and increase the maturity of their debt.
The size and impact of the policy response by the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) overshadowed other interventions in the region. The economy’s crisis
measures during 2008–10 exceeded CNY4 trillion (about $576 billion), mostly
in the form of investment to boost aggregate demand and close infrastructural
gaps. Due to the PRC’s central role as an assembly hub within the regional
production networks, its massive economic stimulus lifted both domestic and
regional demand at a time when global external demand was failing. The PRC’s
extraordinary resilience during the global meltdown—its economy grew by 7.3%
in 2008, slowed to 6.8% in 2009, and rebounded to 9.6% in 2010—beneﬁtted its
closest network trading partners in East and Southeast Asia and its global trading
partners, such as Brazil and Germany (ADB 2011a).
The region’s high resilience to the GFC, supported by decisive policy
interventions, enabled it to weather the global meltdown well, with regional GDP
slowing by merely 0.7% in 2009, down from 6.7% in 2008. Developing Asia
was the ﬁrst world region to emerge from the global turmoil in 2010, when it
staged a spectacular V-shaped recovery and regional output expanded by 9%
(ADB 2011b).13 Fiscal intervention to stem the global turmoil raised the average
public debt ratio in the region by about 5% in 2009, thus breaking a period of ﬁscal
consolidation that began in the aftermath of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis (Figure 1.3).
However, despite the temporary upward spike in the debt ratio, the gradual fading
of ﬁscal stimulus measures and strong output growth in 2010 and 2011 caused
debt ratios in the region to resume a downward path.
Figure 1.3 also suggests that, on average, debt ratios in developing Asia will
be declining through to 2016. Underlying this projection are the latest Asian
Development Outlook (Asian Development Bank [ADB]) and World Economic
Outlook (IMF) macroeconomic forecasts and ﬁscal policy assumptions (ADB
2011b, IMF 2011b), which are indeed compatible with falling debt ratios for most
economies in the region. This is certainly not the case for all economies, but by
and large the outlook on future debt dynamics in the region appears benign.
The broad objective of the analysis in the subsequent chapters of this book is to
assess the foundations underlying the apparently benign outlook for developing
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Figure 1.3 Developing Asia: average government debt ratio.
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Asian Development Bank database.
Asia, with particular focus on economy-speciﬁc vulnerabilities and global risk
factors that may undermine the sustainability of public debt. The timeframe of
debt projections is the medium-term, up to 2016. The analysis will thus focus
mainly on the key macroeconomic assumptions underlying debt ratio projections
for the region, particularly with regard to the growth and interest rate forecasts
underlying public debt projections. For example, the analysis will show that most
economies are vulnerable to a signiﬁcant narrowing of the interest rate–growth
differential, a scenario that is conceivable in the presence of a global economic
environment mired in low growth and with substantial ﬁnancial fragilities and
spillover risks in some areas.
Owing to the medium-term focus of the analysis, structural factors that are
likely to introduce a signiﬁcant upward pressure on the regions’ ﬁscal budgets
and debt ratios in the longer term are not considered. For example, health care,
pension spending, and social safety nets will have to expand because developing
countries’ abilities and needs to accomplish the expansion will increase with
economic development and rising social pressures. The related ﬁscal outlays will
add signiﬁcant pressure on general government budgets across the region, shifting
debt ratios upward. The analysis of such factors would be far beyond the scope of
this project, and is unlikely to have a signiﬁcant bearing on the debt projections
over the medium term considered in the subsequent chapters.
The analysis thus mostly evolves within the framework of debt sustainability
analysis (DSA) suitable for medium-term projections, as it has been applied by the
IMF,World Bank, and regional development banks, including ADB. The analysis
is mainly aimed at offering an interpretative key to the methods and concepts
underlying DSA, as well as to the results from its application. Toward that end,
the following chapters frequently highlight stylized aspects of DSA, instead of
adhering to the stricter terms and guidelines of its application as typically applied
to ofﬁcial DSA exercises, such as those found in IMF Article IV documents.
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Thus, the analysis in this book must be clearly distinguished from, and has
no bearing on, any input ADB would ofﬁcially provide for country DSA. The
authors of Chapters 4, 5, and 6 were speciﬁcally asked for analyses that go
beyond the mechanics of standard DSA, particularly as necessary to highlight
speciﬁc areas of vulnerability and risk factors that DSA is ill-suited to represent.
The analyses performed for the three economy-speciﬁc studies—for the PRC,
India, and Viet Nam—highlight their speciﬁcities and a level of nuance that is
not typically part of DSA. Through a mixed approach that includes conceptual,
empirical, and country studies, this book aims at addressing some of the issues in
depth, including crucial aspects concerning hidden liabilities, institutional factors,
and macroeconomic volatility. The book does not claim to be comprehensive, but
rather aims to shed some light on the sustainability of the public debt in major
subregions of developing Asia and on their economies’ readiness to meet the
challenging prospects of a difﬁcult global economic environment.
Structure of the book
Public debt sustainability. Chapter 2 reviews the concept of public debt
sustainability assessment from both a theoretical and practical perspective. It
emphasizes the need to have a uniﬁed analytical approach to assessing debt
sustainability and to recognize the sharp differences across economies in the
region with respect to a wide variety of relevant factors, including data, ﬁnancial
institutions, projections of future tax and expenditure, liquidity experience, and
exposure to global ﬁnancial markets (as well as several other factors). In view
of this, the importance of assessing the sustainability of individual countries
is underscored.
Fiscal indicators. Chapter 3 reviews ﬁscal indicators for developing Asia since
the mid-1990s and projects debt ratios over the medium term, up to 2016.
Econometric and simulation analysis is applied to assess the role played by ﬁscal
policy and the macroeconomic environment in determining the debt dynamics
in the region. The robustness of debt forecasts in the region is assessed against
scenarios of less favorable macroeconomic conditions, whether deriving from a
gradual narrowing of interest rate–growth differentials or temporary shocks to
the debt dynamics that have hitherto beneﬁtted the conduct of ﬁscal policy in the
region.
People’s Republic of China. Chapter 4 analyzes the sustainability of public debt
in the PRC, with particular focus on the measurement of hidden liabilities. The
chapter askswhether there ismore to PRC government’s debt position and outlook
than the ofﬁcial numbers suggest, and in particular if theymask a debt problem that
poses a serious threat to growth. The chapter then assesses the potential beneﬁts
from greater ﬁscal transparency about the nature and extent of hidden liabilities,
both for informed policy decisions in view of the ﬁscal risks that the debts pose
and to avoid the possibility of ill-guided speculation about government debt.
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India. Chapter 5 assesses the sustainability of India’s public debt. The focus is
mainly on the challenges the country faces in terms of ﬁscal responsibility and
debt management at the central government and state levels. Issues discussed
relate to the optimal location of the debt management ofﬁce, the implications
that the evolution of the corporate debt and municipal bond markets have for
debt sustainability, the tackling of differences of debt sustainability capacities
among the states, and the preparation for deregulating savings banks’ interest
rates. In addition, the importance of increased policy emphasis onmacroeconomic
management, particularly ensuring ﬁscal sustainability and ﬁnancial stability,
is discussed.
Viet Nam. Chapter 6 focuses on the sustainability of public debt in Viet Nam
since it began the process of economic (Doi Moi) reforms in the late 1980s. The
analysis suggests that economic reforms went well, due to ﬁscal consolidation
and responsibility so that public debt in Viet Nam was manageable until about
2000. Then the public debt deteriorated, but the authorities have concentrated
on correcting the issue. Their efforts appear to have succeeded and Viet Nam’s
public debt is, once again, at manageable levels. However, Viet Nam has
measurement issues, as does the PRC. In particular, attention is needed to
a possible understatement of contingent liabilities in the banking sector, the
impact of interest rates on the budget, and exchange rate and rollover risks.
Conclusion. Chapter 7 summarizes the outlook for debt sustainability in devel-
oping Asia and highlights the issues with assessing debt sustainability in the
region. It also discusses aspects of public debt sustainability speciﬁc to developing
economies in the Paciﬁc subregion, which differ somewhat from the main focus
on market-access countries in the previous chapters.
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Notes
1 As noted in several sources, for example, IMF (2010, 2011a).
2 See also Baraga and Vincelette (2011).
3 Unless indicated otherwise, all data in this section are from the IMF Fiscal Monitor
(IMF 2011a).
4 As an indication of the political stalemate, in late 2011 a United States (US)
Congressional “supercommittee” could not agree on measures to reduce the US deﬁcit
by $1.2 trillion over the next 10 years. This amount, while sounding large in nominal
terms, is only 0.6% of US GDP—less than 25% of the $5 trillion in cuts and less than
3% of federal government spending, respectively, over this period.
5 The Asia Economic Monitor (ADB 2011c) forecasts growth of only 0.5% for Europe
in 2012. Other agencies have forecast outright recession. World Bank (2012) forecasts
that 2012 will be a year of turbulence and lower growth, particularly for the advanced
economies, but also for the emerging market economies.
6 With the notable exception of developing Europe, where several countries were hit hard
by the GFC through ﬁnancial contagion.
7 For further reading on the role of automatic stabilizers, see ADB (2009b).
8 Throughout the book, “developing Asia” refers to the ADB developing members:
Afghanistan; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Bhutan; Brunei Darussalam;
Cambodia; China, People’s Republic of; Cook Islands; Fiji; Georgia; Hong
Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Kazakhstan; Kiribati; Korea, Republic of; Kyrgyz
Republic; Lao People’s Democratic Republic; Maldives; Malaysia; Marshall Islands;
Micronesia, Federated States of; Mongolia; Myanmar; Nauru; Nepal; Pakistan; Palau;
Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Samoa; Singapore; Solomon Islands; Sri Lanka;
Tajikistan; Taipei,China; Thailand; Timor-Leste; Tonga; Turkmenistan; Tuvalu;
Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; and Viet Nam. In this chapter and book, the terms “developing
Asia” and ADB’s developing members often pertain to a speciﬁc subsample of
countries, depending on the context and availability of data.
9 The impact of the GFC on developing Asia and the region’s subsequent recovery has
been traced closely in the Asian Development Outlook (ADO) reports, on which this
section draws (ADB 2009a, 2010a, 2011a).
10 Hur et al. (2010) explain the relative inexperience in the region by pointing out
policymakers’ penchant to maximize output growth rather than minimize output
volatility. Monetary and ﬁscal policy in the region typically has been pursuing
noninﬂationary macroeconomic stability, to facilitate a high-growth environment and
the ultimate goal of poverty reduction. Furthermore, the strong growth performance
over a prolonged period of time by many countries in developing Asia rendered
countercyclical output stabilization less important than in the advanced countries.
11 Net saving is deﬁned as the difference between saving and investment.
12 For an extensive discussion on the patterns of saving in Asia, see ADB (2009a).
13 According to the convention adopted for ADB’s Asian Development Outlook, the
regional growth rate is computed as an average weighted by countries’ gross national
product adjusted for purchasing power parity. Consequently, the PRC and other large
economies are major contributors to the regional growth performance.
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2 Analytical approaches to assessing
public debt sustainability
Raghbendra Jha∗
Introduction
Chapter 1 notes that the debt implications of the global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC)
of 2008/09 have been less severe in the Asian and Paciﬁc economies than in
developed market economies. Anderson, Silva, and Velandia-Rubiano (2011)
review the reasons that 24 emerging market economies (EMEs) fared better than
developed countries during the GFC.1 They argue that sound macroeconomic
fundamentals along with good monetary and ﬁscal management just prior to
the onset of the GFC, as well as the benign conditions prevailing in the global
economy, led to the emergence of strong buffers in many of the EMEs, so that
they were able to put in place strong ﬁscal stimulus packages and yet emerge
with relatively robust debt positions. Many of the EMEs had used the period
leading up to the GFC to diversify their debt portfolio, reduce their share of
external debt, and increase the maturities of their debt. The EMEs’ overall debt
management capacities had improved considerably in the decade prior to the GFC.
The continued availability of multilateral aid also helped. Economies with better
developed bond markets outperformed those with thin bond markets.
This relatively sanguine backdrop, however, does not necessarily translate into
an optimistic outlook for the future. Anderson et al. (2011) mention two reasons
for this. First, the world debt situation worsened considerably in 2011, with many
countries in Europe as well as the United States (US) facing huge debt burdens that
they are ﬁnding hard to service. Moreover, many large commercial banks have
substantial exposure to debt, which weakens their balance sheets and leads to
a deterioration of the external borrowing environment for the Asia and Paciﬁc
region. Thus, particularly in the current global situation, proper management
of public debt remains crucial for its own sake and for ﬁnancial stability (Das
et al. 2011).
∗ I am grateful to Arief Ramayandi, Charles Adams, Mukul Asher, and Richard Hemming for
their advice on the contents of this chapter. Particular thanks are due to Benno Ferrarini for his
extensive comments on an earlier draft. However, the author is solely responsible for the views
expressed here.
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Second, the low interest rate regime and accommodative monetary policy
pursued in many Asian and Paciﬁc economies during the GFC have ceased to
be sustainable in the face of the recovery in this region and incipient inﬂation.
Moving from a low interest rate regime to one with a higher rate, and from an
accommodative to a restraining monetary stance, would be difﬁcult, particularly
if debt stocks were large.
Hence, there are important reasons to inquire deeply into the sustainability of
public debt in the Asia and Paciﬁc region and to explore the implications of new
challenges to debt sustainability that have emerged in the aftermath of the GFC.
This chapter provides an analytical background to testing for the sustainability of
public debt and reviews some pertinent issues.
The next section discusses why the ﬁscal deﬁcit matters and how it is measured.
Then section three articulates the basic notions of public debt dynamics and
ﬁscal sustainability. Section four discusses some methodological aspects of
debt sustainability analysis (DSA), in particular two key approaches to DSA as
discussed in recent analyses (such as IMF 2008, Adams et al. 2010, and Adams
and Ferrarini 2010), and points out some shortcomings of these tests.2 Section
ﬁve presents an overview of some recent issues in analyses devoted to debt
sustainability, including the relevance of separating external from internal debt, an
evaluation of the risk of meeting debt service obligations, including using value-
at-risk (VaR) models, problems with debt dilution, an analysis of ﬁscal stress
and quantiﬁcation of ﬁscal stress thresholds, the impact of the composition of
debt, broader interpretations of sovereign debt crises, and the quality of revenue
and expenditure data. Finally, section six underscores the need for country-level
studies of debt sustainability and concludes.
Why does the ﬁscal deﬁcit matter and what does it measure?
The ﬁscal deﬁcit of a government is deﬁned as the excess of government
expenditure over government revenue.3 At any point in time, the accumulated
value of this deﬁcit is the public debt. Thus, the deﬁcit is a ﬂowwhereas the debt is
a stock. High ﬁscal deﬁcits impinge on the economy in several ways. A high ﬁscal
deﬁcit alters the allocation of resources between the private and the public sectors.
In the public sector, a ﬁscal deﬁcit might favor some forms of spending over
others, again distorting market forces. In several developing and emerging market
economies, public expenditures on wasteful, often poorly targeted, subsidies
on food, fertilizers, petroleum, and the like gain higher proportions of state
expenditure as the ﬁscal deﬁcit rises. This process also builds up expectations of
future government expenditure patterns and thus alters the allocation of resources
between the present and the future. A high ﬁscal deﬁcit can, by raising interest
rates, lead to enhanced debt service payments and thus accentuate distortions
in the distribution of income.4 Higher debt service charges reduce the amount
of investment the public sector can make, and hence lower potential economic
growth. This detracts from efforts to raise living standards, lower poverty, and
service the debt.
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That economic growth is central to poverty alleviation is widely accepted.
Hence, a particularly important question is: “What is the impact of the ﬁscal deﬁcit
on the rate of growth, particularly in developing countries?” In the neoclassical
model of economic growth in the tradition of Solow, over the long run, the
level of income can be altered by ﬁscal changes (relative to some initial ﬁscal
policy stance). However, in the long run, economic growth will return to its
initial rate. Further, since the mid-1980s, the new endogenous growth models
have added new insights on the effects of ﬁscal policy on economic growth.
Indeed the endogenous growth theory has proposed a number of channels through
which ﬁscal policy could have “permanent” growth effects. Thus, ﬁscal policy
could have enduring effects on growth rates and on levels of income. Gemmell
(2004) reviews the literature on this issue and the applicability of this analysis
to developing countries. He ﬁnds some tentative evidence that ﬁscal deﬁcits may
affect growth in such countries. Although he qualiﬁes this evidence, the overall
conclusion is that ﬁscal adjustments are likely to yield signiﬁcant gains, such as
consistently ensuring that an intertemporal budget constraint is satisﬁed. It is even
more important to ensure that the ﬁscal deﬁcit is adjusted in a cogent program of
tax and expenditure reform.
Using a threshold regression model of the impact of debt on economic growth,
Caner, Grennes, and Koehler-Geib (2011) show that, for their full sample of 101
countries (75 developing and 26 developed) for the period 1980–2008, there are
well-deﬁned levels of public debt, beyond which debt starts having deleterious
effects on economic growth. This critical level is 77% of gross domestic product
(GDP) for the full sample and 64% of GDP for the developing country sample.
Hence, the critical value of public debt is lower in developing and emergingmarket
economies.5
Although the ﬁscal deﬁcit is a clear accounting concept to articulate, its
conceptual foundation as an economic entity can be controversial. Tanzi (1993)
argues that this conventional measure of the deﬁcit fails to recognize that different
tax and expenditure categories have different types of effects on aggregate demand.
For example, an excess of expenditure on infrastructure creates productive
capacity and promotes economic growth and will hence have a different impact
than an excess of expenditure due to consumption subsidies. Tanzi also notes that
the level of public expenditure determines national income, a major component of
which is expenditure, which then determines tax revenue, at least in part. Hence,
there are important problems of mutual endogeneity. In view of this, the notion of
a “full employment budget surplus” was deﬁned and used during the Kennedy–
Johnson presidencies in the US—a period of full employment. The deﬁcit was
pinned with reference to the employment of an important scarce factor—labor, in
the case of the US. In the context of developing and emerging market economies
in the Asia and Paciﬁc region, the availability of credit in “hard” currencies may
be a more binding constraint than labor supply.
Tanzi (1993) also discusses difﬁculties arising from the variations in sources
of ﬁnancing the deﬁcit. In developing countries, sources of ﬁnancing have
included central bank ﬁnancing, commercial bank ﬁnancing, domestic sale of
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government bonds to cover deﬁcit, and foreign ﬁnancing. Each has different
macroeconomic consequences. Central bank ﬁnancing raises the monetary base
and the money supply. This blurs the distinction between monetary and ﬁscal
policies, compromising the mutual independence of the two policies and thus
reducing overall policy effectiveness (Jha 2003). Foreign ﬁnancing will raise the
cost of servicing external debt, whereas domestic bond issues will raise interest
rates. Further difﬁculty arises because some sources of ﬁnance are available only
under particular circumstances. For example, a country with a thin bond market
can hardly afford to issue government bonds to cover the ﬁscal deﬁcit and may
have to rely on central bank ﬁnancing or some such measure. If a country with a
large external debt attempts to ﬁnance its deﬁcit by external borrowing, it will be
able to do so only in the short term and at high interest rates. This would make
it difﬁcult to ﬁnance the external debt and may put pressure on the currency
(Jha 2004). In developed countries, bond markets are much better developed
and deﬁcits are largely ﬁnanced by ﬂoating bonds that domestic residents and
foreigners can buy.
Another issue with the ﬁscal deﬁcit is its sensitivity to the business cycle.
Thus, during a cyclical downturn, revenues are likely to fall because incomes
drop and public expenditures are likely to rise because of automatic stabilizers
(such as welfare and unemployment beneﬁts). The reverse is likely to happen
during a cyclical upturn. Hence, there is merit to designing a measure of the ﬁscal
health of an economy that would adjust for these cyclical swings. The resulting
deﬁcit has been referred to as a cyclically adjusted ﬁscal deﬁcit. Similarly, because
inﬂation affects the real values of government assets and liabilities asymmetrically,
some authors call for an inﬂation-adjusted measure of the deﬁcit. However, even
cyclically adjusted and inﬂation-adjustedmeasures of the deﬁcit are only imprecise
indicators of the true deﬁcit because capital gains and losses on government
assets and liabilities are not included in the conventional ﬂow of funds accounts.
Examples of the gains and losses include changes in relative prices (such as
changes in mineral prices) and in the real value of nominal debt during an episode
of inﬂation (Buiter 1985, 1993).6
In many developing countries, particularly those in which public investment
has played a signiﬁcant role (e.g., the South Asian countries), a distinction is
made between revenue or current account deﬁcit and capital account deﬁcit.
The former is the deﬁcit on expenses of a recurrent nature after netting out
investment expenditure. The latter is the deﬁcit on account of public activities
in building up national assets. All else being equal, a large revenue or current
account deﬁcit is a greater cause for concern than a capital account deﬁcit
of equal magnitude. However, some authors have argued that the distinction
between capital and current account expenditures is often artiﬁcial, and would
be meaningful only if all capital account expenditures were productive in nature.
In practice, even some capital account expenditures associated with capacity
building might be wasteful—for example, if the project in question had not
been evaluated carefully, involves equipment that is highly capital intensive or
has an unduly import-intensive bias, or is, in some other way, inappropriate for
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the economy. Bhatt (2010) argues that the composition of public expenditure
can have a signiﬁcant impact on prospects for economic growth and, ultimately,
on public debt. In particular, all else being equal,investment-oriented public
expenditure has a lower impact on the public debt than does public investment
geared toward consumption.
Accounting for arrears is another issue that has been discussed in the literature,
particularly in the case of foreign debt. When debt is rescheduled, for example,
it is hard to decide whether the debt has gone down. And, if the government
delays paying some domestic debts (e.g., the public wage bill) but takes in all its
revenues, does ﬁscal deﬁcit go down? This question becomes particularly relevant
during a period of high inﬂation when delaying payments denominated in nominal
terms can have a signiﬁcant impact on the real value of the payments and the
accounting deﬁcit.
Another challenge to computing the ﬁscal deﬁcit arises when governments are
multilayered or the debt is the responsibility of more than one agency. Typically
in federal structures, deﬁcits of the central, state, and lower levels of government
are included in the computed measure of the national deﬁcit. Nevertheless,
other government agencies may be running a deﬁcit that is not included in the
measured ﬁscal deﬁcit. Examples include deﬁcits of central banks, deﬁcits of local
(particularly municipal) governments, and the so-called “oil pool” deﬁcit where
payments for petroleum imports exceed what is collected from consumers. The oil
pool deﬁcit can become very large when international oil prices rise sharply and/or
the domestic currency depreciates against the US dollar. Often the government
issues temporary “oil bonds” to shift part of the burden of adjustment to the
future, but such transactions are not reﬂected in the ﬁscal deﬁcit. There are the
so-called “contingent liabilities” such as bailouts of failing ﬁnancial institutions.
Thus, the computed ﬁscal deﬁcit may not be an entirely accurate measure of the
true deﬁcit.
An additional complication arises when, in trying to forecast the future value
of the ﬁscal deﬁcit, the forecast values of revenue and expenditure are assumed
to be riskless. If, for example, a government’s revenues are perceived to be risky,
even if its ﬁscal deﬁcit is low, the government may have difﬁculty borrowing
and the perceived problem of insolvency can lead to a liquidity crisis. This issue
is pursued further in the section “Issues in debt sustainability analysis,” which
discusses ﬁscal stress.
Public debt dynamics and ﬁscal sustainability
Analyzing the sustainability of public debt
In the very long run, the government should not be a net debtor. “The ﬁscal
policy stance can be regarded as unsustainable if, in the absence of adjustment,
sooner or later the government would not be able to service its debt” (IMF 2011).
Unsustainable debt levels can lead, and have led, to major disruptions in economic
activity and to reorientations of priorities in an economy.7 Therefore, clear
Analytical approaches to assessing public debt sustainability 19
indicators of debt sustainability are essential and policies that ensure continued
debt sustainability must be pursued. Consequently, the analytics of ascertaining
debt sustainability and their application to recent data from the major Asian and
Paciﬁc economies are the primary focus of this book. The current section develops
the simple analytics of sustainability for domestic and external deﬁcits and
applies them to a spectrum of developing economies. For a review of alternative
approaches to the sustainability of the ﬁscal deﬁcit, see Cuddington (1997), Chalk
and Hemming (2000), de Haan and Zelhorst (1990), Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel
(1993), Hakkio and Rush (1991), Issler and Lima (2000), Sargent (1999), and
Trehan and Walsh (1991); and, for more recent discussions, see Adams et al.
(2010) and Adams and Ferrarini (2010).
DSAs are almost exclusively concerned with market-access countries rather
than overseas development assistance countries (see Chapter 3). The track record
of DSAs in predicting actual debt crises has been rather poor (IMF 2003a).
Wyplosz (2007), in an insightful review of the mechanics and performance of
DSA, argues that one of the principal reasons for DSA’s poor performance is the
so-called “impossibility principle”—DSA is based on past data but needs to make
judgments about the future value of debt. Wyplosz (2007: 25) notes that DSA is
valid only “within the bounds of the underlying guesses” and argues that standard
DSA is biased in the direction of discovering sustainability. In summarizing the
logic behind some of these tests, this section closely follows Adams et al. (2010)
and Adams and Ferrarini (2010).
Consider a government ﬁnancing the excess of its expenditure over its revenue.
Assume that the central bank does not ﬁnance any part of the public debt. In that
case, the excess of government expenditure over government taxation must be
ﬁnanced by government borrowing, that is, by issuing bonds. In other words we
have the identity
Rt −Gt = −[Bt+1 −Bt], t = 1, . . . ,N , (2.1)
where Rt is revenue, Gt is expenditure, and Bt is one period of public debt, all at
time t.
Because bonds carry an element of interest payment (a ﬂow) whereas the public
debt is a stock, it is useful to separate all central government interest payments
from Gt and concentrate on the primary surplus, PSt . Primary government
spending may be denoted by G∗t , so that PSt = Rt − G∗t , and thus bond issue
in period t + 1, can be written as
Bt+1 = rBt −PSt, t = 1,2,3, . . . ,N , (2.2)
where r is the nominal one period interest rate and rBt is the interest payment
on the last period’s bonds. The interest payment on the last period’s bonds less
the government’s current primary surplus must be covered by issuing new bonds.
Equation (2.2) also states that if the primary surplus is zero, public debt will grow
at the nominal rate of interest. Difference equation (2.2) can be solved forward
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through time to yield
Bt =
∞∑
j=0
r(t,t+j)−1 PSt+j + lim
T→∞(t, t +T )
−1Bt,T+1, (2.3)
where r is the discount factor between periods t, t + j and is deﬁned as
j∏
k=0
rt+k ,
and Bt,T+1 is terminal or very long-term debt. An initial notion of sustainability
is that Bt,T+1, discounted at a positive rate, should approach zero as T becomes
arbitrarily large.
Alternatively, the revenue, expenditure, and bond issue terms can be expressed
as ratios of GDP. In that case the sustainability condition of equation (2.3) would
be reinterpreted to say that the terminal nominal rate of interest should be no
larger than the rate of growth of nominal GDP. Both these conditions would rule
out a situation, known as “the Ponzi game condition,” where government debt is
rolled over by issuing new debt. So long as Ponzi games are not being played,
any public debt that does not exceed the discounted stream of future surpluses
will ﬁnd willing buyers and no default will occur. Conversely, a default is said to
occur when this condition is not satisﬁed.
A succinct and convenient way to articulate the no-Ponzi game condition is
in terms of the interest rate–growth differential (IRGD).8 Consider a situation of
public debt where the government is running a ﬁscal deﬁcit that is ﬁnanced by
issuing bonds, thus accumulating further debt. If the interest paid on this debt
is lower than the growth rate of the economy (IRGD < 0) then, all else being
equal, the debt will stabilize below the current level. Then, assuming unchanging
elasticity of government revenue with respect to GDP, government revenue will
grow at a faster rate than the rate at which debt is being accumulated. Hence,
public debt would be lower in steady state. The opposite conclusion holds for the
situation in which IRGD > 0.
Associated with the need for the IRGD to be less than zero is the notion of debt
stabilizing primary balance. Let the change in the debt/GDP ratio be deﬁned as
bt = bt − bt−1,
where bt is the debt/GDP ratio. This difference will go up to the extent that
IRGD > 0 and will fall if the primary surplus (i.e., if the surplus without interest
payments) is positive. In other words
bt = bt − bt−1 = rt
1+ gt bt−1 −
gt
1+ gt bt−1 − pst =
θt
1+ gt bt−1 − pst,
where θt is the IRGD, pst is the primary surplus/GDP at time t, r is the interest rate,
and g is the GDP growth rate. Fiscal sustainability over a horizon can be judged
according to whether the path of debt is stabilizing or explosive. Then, deﬁne b∗
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as the level to which this stable debt/GDP ratio gravitates. For debt to stabilize at
this level, the primary surplus/GDP today must exactly pay for the IRGD in the
last period, that is,
ps∗t =
θt
1+ gt b
∗
t−1.
Thus, debt stabilization requires the primary surplus to be obtained today.
However, as Chapter 3 makes clear, eventually for efﬁciency, the IRGD should
turn out to be positive for any economy close to steady state. So long as the IRGD
is negative and the debt/GDP is falling, rational agents will have the incentive to
borrow at low interest rates and ﬁnance higher consumption and rollover debt.
This is the “modiﬁed golden rule” efﬁciency condition discussed in Blanchard
and Fischer (1989).
What is the evidence on the sign of the IRGD in EMEs and low-income
countries in comparison to developed market economies? Escolano, Shabunina,
and Woo (2011) show that the IRGD is persistently negative in the case of EMEs
and low-income countries, but it is usually positive in the case of mature market
economies. Data reported by Escolano et al. (2011) indicate that, during the
period 1966–2010, themean real interest rate was 3.16% for advanced economies9
whereas their average growth of real GDP was 2.58%, giving the real interest rate
minus the growth rate of real GDP at 0.58% and an average IRGD of 0.63%. In
the case of all EMEs and for the same time period, the average real interest rate
was 0.97% whereas the average growth rate of real GDP was 4.47%, giving the
real interest rate minus the growth rate of real GDP at −3.50% and an average
IRGD of −3.07%. Further, they show that the IRGD is positively correlated with
income per capita. If this position were accepted uncritically, two conclusions
would follow. First, as incomes in EMEs catch up with those in developed market
economies, debt sustainabilitywould becomeharder to attain in theEMEs. Second,
so long as the IRGD is negative there would be little reason to be concerned about
debt sustainability because increments to debt would be more than made up by
increases in revenue, that is, there would be little reason to be concerned about
debt sustainability in EMEs.
However, Escolano et al. (2011) argue that the real interest rate in many
EMEs is artiﬁcially low as a result of ﬁnancial repression and other factors that
deliberately undervalue the cost of capital.10 The true cost of capital is typically
much higher than that reported in many of the EMEs. As capital markets are
liberalized in the EMEs and become integratedwith global capitalmarkets, EMEs’
interest rates are likely to more accurately reﬂect the cost of capital and, hence,
climb sharply. Two conclusions follow from this. First, in the case of EMEs, the
IRGD may turn from negative to positive both because of the catch-up effect of
per capita income growth as the EMEs grow faster than the advanced economies
and as a consequence of relaxing the ﬁnancial controls in the EMEs. Second,
there is no room for complacency about the public debt situation in EMEs,
because the fact that the IRGD is negative may largely be a function of repressed
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capital markets. It follows, then, that the IRGD criterion is not an adequate
method for assessing debt sustainability and other approaches are needed.
The representation of debt sustainability given by equation (2.3) has some
limitations, including:
• the difﬁculty of applying it,
• insufﬁcient government control over future revenues,
• the insufﬁciency of past data for predicting future outcomes, and
• issues determining the appropriate levels of debt vis-à-vis debt sustainability.
The sustainability condition implied by equation (2.3) is hard to apply in practice,
for two reasons. First, because the condition holds for an inﬁnite time, one
can always argue that any current deﬁcit, no matter how large, can be met by
sufﬁciently large primary surpluses in the future. Conversely, no matter how large
the current primary surplus, it can always be overwhelmed by large deﬁcits in
the future. Second, the sustainability condition is silent on what the relationship
between revenues and expenditures should be in the future and, in particular,
places no constraints on this relationship. Nevertheless, satisfying equation (2.3)
remains the basic sustainability condition. Practical assessment of sustainability
is often said to be an art rather than a science.11
A further limitation of the standard analysis is that in some cases the
government has only partial control over its future surpluses andmay hence face an
illiquidity issue, even before an unsustainable level of debt is reached (Besancenot,
Huyn, and Vranceanu 2004). However, equation (2.3) should be interpreted as a
risk-free measure where future primary surpluses are viewed as being certain.
In practice, because revenue could be lower or higher than expected, or both,
the government may face a solvency issue, even before the level of debt implied
by the long-run value of equation (2.3) is reached. Particularly in the case of
market access countries, potential buyers of the public debt would foresee the
emergence of insolvency and refuse to buy the debt, even at levels much below
those predicted as sustainable by equation (2.3), as noted in Bordo (2008). This
implies that, after accounting for risk, the sustainable level of debt is lower than
the level given in equation (2.3). At this lower level of debt, the country may ﬁnd
it difﬁcult to acquire credit even though its debt, as such, may be sustainable. As
a result, the country could face a liquidity crisis. A frequently cited example is
the Mexican default of 1995, although Mexico’s debt in 1993 was quite low at
30% of GDP. In fact most so-called debt crises of the recent past—for example,
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997/98—have actually been solvency and liquidity
crises. Bordo (2008) argues that many ﬁnancial crises in the US (e.g., those of
1857, 1893, 1907, 1929–33, and the GFC of 2008/09) had similar origins.
Two other limitations of the standard DSA should be mentioned. First, it
is important to restate that DSA assesses whether the effects of past policies
encapsulated in a path of primary balance imply a sustainable debt path in future.
In fact, because data from the past are being used, nothing substantial can be said
about actual debt sustainability in the future (IMF 2008). Further, the DSA tests
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for the sustainability of the debt path but does not determine the level at which this
debt settles. For example, the debt path may be sustainable, but the level at which
the debt settles may be unacceptably high. Servicing such high levels of debt
may take an unacceptably large share of the government’s current expenditure
and divert resources from other important efforts such as measures to enhance
economic growth or reduce poverty.
Methodological aspects of debt sustainability analysis
Because the foregoing DSA tests often yielded ambiguous results, therefore
alternative tests have been developed. The two broad classes of such tests are
static and dynamic tests. Failed public debt auctions are a static test for debt
sustainability and one indicator of debt servicing difﬁculties and the potential that
public debt may be unsustainable (ADB 2009).12 If a government ﬁnds it difﬁcult
to auction its debt at expected terms or has to sell it at deep discounts, then it is
assumed that the market perceives that the government is having trouble ﬁnancing
its expenditure.
This book deals explicitly with dynamic tests. Adams et al. (2010) provide a
lucid account of these tests. This sectiondiscusses the time series andﬁscal reaction
function (also called “primary balance”) tests, while paying the greatest attention
to the latter. The two tests can be complementary and several authors have used
both to assess debt sustainability. Stress tests are also used in conjunction with the
primary balance and ﬁscal reaction function tests.
Time series properties of the public debt
The time series approach tries to assess whether the stock of public debt and/or
the public debt/GDP ratio are stationary in a time series. If the debt stock shows
explosive behavior, that is, the debt/GDP ratio has a unit root, then itwould indicate
that debt is not sustainable.13
A straightforward way to model public debt as a proportion of GDP and assess
the sustainability of a public debt situation is to start from the governmental
intertemporal budget constraint. This is written in nominal terms as
Gt −Tt + rtBt−1 = Bt −Bt−1, (2.4)
where Gt is the value of government expenditures (purchases of goods and
services plus transfer payments),Bt is the government debt at the end of period t,Tt
is the government’s tax revenue, and rt is the one-period rate of interest payable on
the government debt. Equation (2.4) states that, in the absence of money ﬁnance,
the government budget deﬁcit must be ﬁnanced by new debt.14 Hence
bt = (1+ rt)(1+πt + yt)−1bt−1(ωt −ψt), (2.5)
where the lowercase letters denote the ratio of the corresponding uppercase
variables to nominal GDP: bt = Bt/PtYt ; ωt =Gt/PtYt ; and ψt = Tt/PtYt ; with P
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being the price level and Y being real GDP. The equation πt = Pt −Pt−1
Pt−1
is the
rate of inﬂation and yt = Yt −Yt−1
Yt−1
is the rate of growth of real GDP. In the
derivation of equation (2.5), the relation used is
PtYt = (1+πt)(1+ yt)Pt−1Yt−1 ≈ (1+πt + yt)Pt−1Yt−1.
The primary deﬁcit—the deﬁcit without interest payments—expressed as a
percentage of GDP is [(ωt − ψt)] = (−pst). The sustainability of the ﬁscal
deﬁcit is intimately related to this primary deﬁcit. Sustainability is essentially
an intertemporal question over an inﬁnite horizon. Every temporary deﬁcit can
be sustainable so long as it is matched by an adequate future surplus. So, if
the primary deﬁcit keeps growing, the ﬁscal deﬁcit will not be sustainable. In
other words, for the deﬁcit to be sustainable, in the long run, revenue and deﬁcit
have a one-to-one relation so that the primary deﬁcit does not grow out of
bounds. This is the intuition behind the tests for sustainability developed in a
number of studies. Recent advances include permitting structural breaks in the
revenue and expenditure series as well as in the relationship between them, as
in Jha and Sharma (2004).15 This is because the existence of a cointegrating
relationship between revenue and expenditure depends on whether the series have
structural breaks.
A difﬁculty with time series approaches is that they are “backward looking”
and do not work with estimates or forecasts of future revenue and expenditure
(Adams et al. 2010). Therefore, the approaches implicitly assume that the
future will unfold much like the past. Finally, the time series approach gives
little guidance about the kind of ﬁscal reaction needed to assure that debt will
be sustainable.
Fiscal reaction function tests
These tests use past behavior to model and estimate a ﬁscal reaction function
of the government. The approach attempts to test whether policy responds to
the accumulation of debt. Work in this area was initiated by Bohn (1998), who
sought to assess the sustainability of the public debt by examining it in a time
series context (for the US). He shows that although the US debt/GDP ratio has a
unit root, and is thus potentially unsustainable, corrective action exists because the
primary surplus rises whenever the debt/GDP ratio rises. Hence, so long as there is
such a corrective policy response, the debt could (ultimately) become sustainable.
This was an initial articulation of the ﬁscal reaction function.
Bohn (1998) used the following simple ﬁscal reaction function:
pst = ρbt +β0 + εt . (2.6)
In this equation, bt stands for the debt/GDP ratio, pst stands for the primary
surplus/GDP ratio, and εt is an error term. This function is used to study the US
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ﬁscal policy in the period 1916–95, with the primary surplus as the dependent
variable and debt as the independent variable. However, Bohn argued that this
simple theoretical regression might omit some problems, and the empirical
research should be based on amore practicalmodel. Therefore, Bohn expanded his
analysis to include the Barro (1974) tax-smoothing model to support the simple
ﬁscal reaction function above. Bohn therefore included temporary government
spending (g˜) and a business indicator (y˜) in the model. The Bohn (1998) extended
model is, therefore
pst = ρbt +β0 +βGg˜t +βY y˜t + εt . (2.7)
Bohn indicates that this model ﬁts the US data well and that the ﬁscal policy of
the United States up to 1995 was sustainable.
Following from this,Khalid,Malik, andSattar (2007) estimate theﬁscal reaction
function for Pakistan using the vector autoregression technique with three main
variables: ﬁscal deﬁcit, output gap, and inﬂation. Turrini (2008) estimates the
ﬁscal reaction function for the eurozone in good and bad times with the business-
cycle adjusted ﬁscal balance as the dependent variable and lag of dependent
variable, debt, output gap, and some political and dummy variables as independent
variables. Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009) adopt this method to estimate the
ﬁscal reaction for the European Union with two main variables: the primary
balance/GDP ratio (pst), and the debt/GDP ratio (bt). Afonso and Hauptmeier
also use output gap, ﬁscal rule indicator, institutional, political, and other control
variables. More recently, Egert (2010) includes some business cycle variables as
independent variables.
In a study of the Brazilian debt data, de Mello (2007) extends this model to
include the monetary factor. With the monetary factor, the ﬁscal reaction function
in de Mello has the following form:
pst + (rt + gt)bt−1 = bt +mt + (πt + gt)mt−1, (2.8)
where pst is the primary balance/GDP ratio, gt is the real GDP growth rate, rt is
the real interest rate, mt is a monetary base/GDP ratio, and πt is the inﬂation rate.
Then, de Mello assumes m = 0 and imposes the “no Ponzi game condition” to
estimate the empirical model:
pst = α0 +α1pst−1 +α2bt−1 +α3Ct + εt, (2.9)
where Ct represents various control variables, α represents coefﬁcients, and εt is
an error term.
In general, this ﬁscal reaction function has the same functional form as that
in Bohn (1998). Results show the strong statistical signiﬁcance of the lags of
primary balance and debt in the ﬁscal reaction function. However, other variables,
including lag of output gap and inﬂation, do not show the same statistical
signiﬁcance in the test. Later, de Mello (2007) extends the paper to establish
ﬁrm cointegrating relationships between the key variables.
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Budina and Wijnbergen (2008) consider a simple ﬁscal model for the closed
economy. The novelty in their analysis is the explicit consideration they give to
the role of issuing money. In their opinion, the seigniorage revenue (the difference
between the value of issued money and the cost of issuing money) is a source of
income for governments and should, therefore, be added to the government budget
constraint. Thus, the empirical model they estimate has the form
bt = bt−1(1+ r)− (pst +σt), (2.10)
or, equivalently,
bt−1 = pst +σt
1+ r +
bt
1+ r ,
where pst is the primary surplus/GDP ratio, r is the interest rate, and σt is
seigniorage. From this budget constraint, Budina and Wijnbergen (2008) derive
the initial sustainable debt level as
b0 =
∞∑
1
pst +σt
(1+ r)t . (2.11)
Thus, for sustainability, the initial debt should equal all the discounted primary
surplus and seigniorage in the future. The de Mello (2007) and Budina and
Wijnbergen (2008) papers, which include the monetary factors, provide good
estimation results.
Burger et al. (2011) emphasize the role of policy reaction to the evolution of
public debt and estimate a novel ﬁscal reaction function for South Africa. They
aim to assess how the current primary balance/GDP ratio responds to the one
period lagged public debt/GDP ratio. This notion is motivated by Bohn (2007).
The simple debt dynamics may be written as
Bt = Bt−1 + rBt−1 −PSt, (2.12)
where Bt is the debt in period t, PSt is the primary balance in period t, and r is
the interest rate. From equation (2.12), an expression for the change in the level
of indebtedness measured against GDP can be derived and written as

Bt
Yt
= r− g
1+ g
Bt−1
Yt−1
− PSt−1
Yt−1
, (2.13)
where Y is GDP, r is the interest rate and g is the growth rate of GDP. Time
subscripts have been omitted from r and g.
For a constant debt/GDP ratio, one can set the left hand side of equation (2.13)
equal to zero and solve for the primary surplus thatwill lead to a constant debt/GDP
ratio. This is
PSt
Yt
= r− g
1+ g
Bt−1
Yt−1
. (2.14)
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If the initial debt/GDP ratio is acceptable, equation (2.14) gives the primary surplus
response to debt needed in the last period that is required tomaintain this acceptable
debt/GDP ratio. This is similar to the analysis of debt stabilizing primary surplus
already discussed, but the innovation in this approach lies in working with the fact
that the required primary surplus is not observed. Accordingly, in terms of actual
values of variables, equation (2.14) is rewritten as
PSactualt
Y actualt
= β∗ B
actual
t−1
Y actualt−1
+ εt, (2.15)
where actual refers to actual values, β∗ is a parameter to be estimated, and εt is a
random error term. On average,
β∗ = (r− g)
(1+ g) . (2.16)
The estimated formof equation (2.16) carries terms indicating inertia in adjustment
and is written as
PSactualt
Y actualt
= β1 +β2
PSactualt−1
Y actualt−1
+β3
Bactualt−1
Y actualt−1
+β4(yˆ)t + εt, (2.17)
where yˆt is the current growth rate of output and β4 indicates the response of
the ﬁscal authority to current stabilization pressures. This equation is a simpliﬁed
version of the ﬁscal reaction function that Burger et al. (2011) estimated.16
This book uses standardDSAas elaborated inAdams et al. (2010) and discussed
at length in Chapter 3, Appendix 3.4. Their ﬁscal reaction function is written as
pst = ρbt−1 +βτt + εt, (2.18)
where pst is the primary surplus/GDP ratio, τ denotes temporary (stationary)
inﬂuences on the primary balance/GDP ratio,17 ε is a random error term, and β
and ρ are parameters to be estimated. If 0 < ρ < 1, the current primary surplus
responds positively to the debt in the last period, and the larger the ρ is, the stronger
is this response. If, however ρ = 0 (i.e., the estimated value is insigniﬁcant) or
is negative (and signiﬁcant), then the primary surplus either does not respond
or actually tends to exacerbate the debt. Hence, β measures the response of the
primary surplus to these temporary factors. The variance of possible debt outcomes
will rise as the weight given to stabilization rises vis-à-vis debt. Such a reaction
function could be used to forecast actual primary surpluses and primary surpluses
desired to maintain debt sustainability.18 Further reﬁnements of this could result
in the development of leading indicators of debt vulnerability.
One shortcoming of this approach is that it focuses exclusively on current
response to past debt, which may or may not be a good guide to the sustainability
of the debt at least in the short run. If the growth rate of the economy is higher
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than the interest rate, the debt may be sustainable, even if ρ is near zero (see the
earlier discussion on the IRGD). However, in the long run, equation (2.18) needs
to be satisﬁed with 0 < ρ < 1 for sustainability to hold. In that case, the long-run
expected value (E) of the debt ratio can be written as
E(bt) =
[−τ¯ + (1−ρ)cov(1+ θ,bt−1)
ρ(1+ θ)− θ
]
, (2.19)
where θ is the IRGD (assumed to be positive in the long run), cov stands for
covariance, and τ¯ stands for the long-run value of τ .
The International Monetary Fund’s approach to debt
sustainability analysis
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides a comprehensive discussion of
the deﬁnitions, dynamics, and sustainability analyses of public sector debt and
of external debt used in Adams et al. (2010) and in this book (IMF 2008). The
following provides a brief overview of the IMF discussion.
Total public debt evolves according to the following equation:
Bt+1 =
[
(1+ )(1+ r f )BFt
]
+ (1+ rd )BDt −PSt+1,
whereBt+1 is total debt in period t+1,  = et+1 − et
et
is the change in the exchange
rate with e being the nominal exchange rate (i.e., units of domestic currency
per dollar), r f the interest rate on foreign debt, BFt the debt denominated in
foreign currency, rd the interest rate paid on domestic debt, BDt debt denominated
in domestic currency; and PS the primary surplus—that is, revenue minus
expenditure excluding interest paid on the debt. Thus, debt goes up when foreign
currency debt increases, foreign interest rates rise, and the domestic currency
depreciates. Total debt also rises when domestic debt and interest paid on domestic
debt rise. Debt falls when the primary surplus rises.
Typically, DSA is conducted for the debt/GDP ratio. So the last displayed
expression is divided to get
bt−1 = (1+ )(1+ r
f )
(1+ g)(1+π) bft +
(1+ rd )
(1+ g)(1+π)bdt − pst+1,
where lowercase letters represent correspondinguppercase letters dividedbyGDP,
that is, g is the rate of growth of real GDP and π is the rate of price inﬂation,
typically of the GDP deﬂator. Rearrangement leads to the expression
bt+1(1+ g +π + gπ) = (1+ )(1+ r f )bft + (1+ rd )bdt
− (1+ g +π + gπ)pst+1.
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Using bt = bft +bdt and expanding the right hand side of the foregoing expression
yields
bt+1(1+ g +π + gπ) = bt + (1+ r f )bft + (r f bft + rdbdt)
− (1+ g +π + gπ)pst+1.
Sometimes data on debt denominated in domestic and foreign currencies are not
consistently available but, on average, φ may be the share of total public debt
held in foreign currency, that is, (bft = φbt); 1 ≥ φ ≥ 0. Further, let the weighted
average of the interest rate on debt be rˆ =φr f + (1−φ)rd . Rearranging and letting
rˆ = r f gives the ﬁnal form of the IMF type of ﬁscal reaction function:
bt+1 − bt = 1
(1+ g +π + gπ) [rˆ−π(1+ g)− g + φ(1+ rˆ)]bt − pst+1.
(2.20)
Because the denominator of the ﬁrst term in the right hand side of this expression
is unambiguously positive, debt goes up, all else being equal, whenever the
weighted interest rate goes up, the home currency depreciates, and the share of
debt denominated in foreign currency goes up. Debt falls with rises in inﬂation,
the growth rate, and the primary surplus.
The IMF DSA considers the evolution of debt using the foregoing equation
under a business-as-usual scenario, given forecasts of means of π,g, rˆ,,φ,
and pst .
In actual practice, the ﬁscal reaction function is used to trace the time path of the
debt/GDP ratio. The country chapters of this book use the same procedure. Using
baseline forecasts for the variables on the right hand side of the ﬁscal reaction
function, the debt/GDP ratio for the near future (usually up to 5 years) is also
forecast. This permits conjectures about whether future debt will stabilize or grow
excessively.
Stress tests
The projections are also supplemented with forecasts of the debt/GDP ratio in
case the variables on the right hand side of the ﬁscal reaction function are subject
to shocks (usually half of the standard deviation of the forecast values) from the
values implied in the baseline projections. This gives rise to the fan-chart analysis,
as explained in Chapter 3 and shown in Chapters 4–6 of this book.
International organizations such as the Asian Development Bank, IMF, and
World Bank have conducted further tests to see how the current ﬁscal policywould
impact debt sustainability or to ascertain the gap between the surplus today and
that required to attain sustainability. To make this operational, the proportionate
change in the debt/GDP ratio (bt) is written as
bt = θt − pst
bt
, (2.21)
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where θ denotes the IRGD and pst is the primary balance/GDP ratio. Then,
given assumptions about the future behavior of pst and θt , the time paths of
bt and bt are charted. If the paths are “explosive,” then the debt is said to
be unsustainable as it might violate the terminal condition in equation (2.3).
Alternatively, a “sustainable” path of bt is assumed and the associated path of
pst is calculated.19
In the stochastic analysis and the projections for the future, one should try
to build in a response of the interest rate to levels of debt and/or deﬁcit.
Higher levels of government borrowing will, all else being equal, put upward
pressure on interest rates, because this would involve additional government
borrowing from limited “loanable” funds, and would thus make government
borrowing and future debt sustainability more difﬁcult to attain. Better forecasts
of revenue and expenditures are needed. For example, projected population
demographics could be used to determine future liabilities for pensions and
health care.
While this book considers sustainability of public debt, denominated in
both domestic and foreign currency, it does not consider external aspects of
sustainability because to do so would involve the current account of the economy
as well. Thus, the analysis in Chapter 3 discusses the impact of a negative
IRGD on ﬁscal dynamics in the Asia and Paciﬁc region and introduces the
notion of debt stabilizing primary balance. Chapter 3 then conducts DSA
for 24 of ADB’s developing members and performs stress tests of the debt.
Results of the stress tests are then compared with results from stochastic
simulations.
IMF (2008) lists some limitations of the stress tests. For example, they do not
permit any interaction among the variables. Thus, projections of one variable (such
as the interest rate) are changed but the projections of all other variables are kept
unchanged. Further, even though many of the variables involved in the DSA are
endogenous, very few variables are permitted to be endogenously determined
in the stress tests. Only interest payment on the debt, public sector revenues
(determined by GDP), and debt stocks are endogenous. Hence, both the DSA
and the stress tests are subject to some limitations.
Issues in debt sustainability analysis
This section surveys the literature on several key issues that are relevant to DSA
but are not within the scope of this book.
Sustainability of external debt
An important question is whether external debt should be treated separately from
domestic debt in DSA. Kraay andNehru (2006)make a case for separate treatment
and argue that many heavily indebted poor countries are in debt to foreign
governments rather than private creditors. The extant literature (Reinhart et al.
2003) shows that a country’s history of not repaying debt and of macroeconomic
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instability drives market perceptions and thus inﬂuences the possibility of default.
Kraay and Nehru further show that even contemporaneous factors inﬂuence the
possibility of debt default and argue that a common single debt sustainability
measure for internal and external debt may not be appropriate, because domestic
institutions play a key role in determining the possibility of debt distress. Hence,
they favormultiple indicators of debt sustainability. They argue that a debt distress
episode involves one or more of the following conditions:
• The sum of interest and principal arrears is “large” compared to the stock of
debt outstanding.
• The country is receiving debt relief from multilateral or bilateral creditors.
• The country is receiving balance-of-payments support from the IMF.
Kraay and Nehru (2006) use a probit speciﬁcation to model the determinants of
debt stress:
P[Yct = 1] = (β ′Xct),
where Yct is an indicator taking the value 1 with a debt distress episode and 0
otherwise for each beginning in country c at time t, Xct is a set of explanatory
variables, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and (.) connotes a normal
distribution function. Three explanatory variables are tried:
• future value of debt service obligations,
• a World Bank measure (country policy and institutional assessment scores)
of the policy environment, and
• real GDP growth as a proxy for shocks.
The principal result is that countries with high debt service obligations, poor
policy environments, and negative GDP growth shocks are likely to experience
episodes of debt distress. However, this approach is able to explain only 23.4%
of the probability of debt distress, which is not a stellar performance.
Blurring of the distinction between domestic and external debt
However, Panizza (2006) argues that in practice the distinction between internal
and external debt can be blurred. The three aspects to the distinction between
domestic and external public debt are:
• typically, domestic debt is denominated in local currency, whereas external
debt is denominated in foreign currency;
• domestic debt is usually owed to domestic residents, whereas external debt
is owed to foreigners; and
• the place of issuance and legislation of the debt contract is a domestic court
in the case of domestic debt, but it is a foreign court for external debt.
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However, Panizza shows that there can be considerable blurring of the distinction
between domestic and external debt in the ﬁrst two criteria—for example, with
open capital accounts, foreigners may buy domestic debt and domestic residents
may buy debt of foreign countries.
In the not-too-distant past, many developing countries borrowed domestically
only when all avenues for external debt were exhausted, essentially because
domestic debt markets were not well developed. However, most developing
countries currently opt for a mix of domestic and foreign debt. Hence, it becomes
important to ascertain theoptimalmixof suchdebt aswell as tomodel the dynamics
of total debt. All else being equal, most developing countries would prefer to use
long-term domestic debt rather than short-term external debt; however, they may
not have deep enough bond markets to absorb sufﬁcient domestic debt. This often
leads to domestic commercial banks becoming captive holders of large shares of
domestic debt. Similarly, if foreign interests are allowed to purchase domestic
debt, it may thus be converted to external debt. Another consideration is that
the development of a market for domestic debt may crowd out the market for
corporate bonds.
The upshot of the argument is that the traditional dichotomy between domestic
and external debt does not have much validity in a world with open capital
accounts. Further, the tradeoffs between domestic and external debt accentuate the
artiﬁciality of this distinction. This distinction will be further blurred as EMEs’
domestic debt is traded in international bond markets. Hence, as suggested by the
IMF (2003a, 2007), total debt sustainability needs to be analyzed. This, however,
is beset with data difﬁculties, as meaningful aggregates of domestic and external
debt may be hard to construct for many developing countries. In any case, and as
indicated earlier, considerations of sovereign debt involve the current account of
the economy as well and are, hence, outside the scope of this investigation.
Evaluating the risk of meeting debt sustainability obligations
Celasun, Debrun, and Ostry (2006) argue that DSA must account for the risk
associated with meeting debt sustainability conditions. The notion of government
solvency must be consistent with the necessity to honor current and future
ﬁnancial obligations, including providing public goods into the indeﬁnite future
and contractual payments such as pensions andmedical beneﬁts. Thus, two notions
of solvency can be deﬁned:
• The intertemporal budget constraint condition. The present value of all
government disbursements, including payments of principal and interest
on inherited sovereign debt as well as noninterest expenditure, should not
exceed the present value of all revenues.
• The primary balance condition. The primary balance (the present value of
future revenues net of noninterest expenditures) should at least cover the
existing public debt.
Analytical approaches to assessing public debt sustainability 33
What is an appropriate strategy for meeting the solvency constraint? Clearly,
solvency cannot be met by defaulting or through high inﬂation tax that reduces
the real value of the debt,20 or forced restructuring of the debt. At the same
time, forecasting future revenues, expenditures, and interest rates over the long
horizon for which debt sustainability is typically assessed is usually difﬁcult.
Hence, when there is uncertainty, assessing solvency requires making judgments.
But, the validity of these judgments is also uncertain.21
Thus, the DSA exercise must account for the risk accompanying it, and a DSA
that accounts for risk becomes a probabilistic exercise. Celasun et al. (2006)
provide a useful methodology for conducting such a risk analysis. They argue that
extant DSAs are incomplete because they do not take solvency risk into account.
In particular, extant DSAs ignore the correlation between shocks and the joint
dynamic response of the variables relevant to debt dynamics (e.g., GDP growth,
interest rate, and exchange rate). Further, extant DSAs ignore the response of
ﬁscal policy to the simulated economic developments. Finally, risk is difﬁcult to
qualify given that individual stress tests used in DSA have near zero probability
of occurrence.
Celasun et al. (2006) improve on the extant methodology by including three
elements. First, they develop an unrestricted vector autoregression model that
models the comovements between determinants of debt dynamics (e.g., GDP
growth, interest rate, and exchange rate). On the basis of this, they derive the
joint distribution of shocks to the unrestricted vector autoregression model. They
then project the debt dynamics.
Second, they model an explicit ﬁscal reaction function so that the endogeneity
of ﬁscal policy is explicitly accounted for. This is estimated using panel
data for 34 EMEs for the period 1990–2004. The estimation can be adjusted
to accommodate country-speciﬁc information on future policies. Of course,
country-level ﬁscal reaction functions can be estimated as in Burger et al.
(2011).
Finally, the simulated economic scenario from the ﬁrst step is interacted with
the ﬁscal reaction function from the second step to generate paths of public
debt and associated magnitudes of key macroeconomic variables such as interest
rates, exchange rates, GDP growth, and ﬁscal policy. Repeated simulations of the
interaction of the three blocks generate frequency distributions of the forecasts,
and 95% conﬁdence intervals around median forecasts for each of the variables
can be generated. This gives a “fan-chart” of forecasts. Celasun et al. (2006)
apply this technique to analyses for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and
Turkey. However, as Wyplosz (2007) argues, the fan-chart analysis has at least
two signiﬁcant drawbacks.22 First, it is too complex to be administered in many,
particularly developing, countries, so that the employment of exogenous shocks
(as in the previous section) remains useful. Second, the results from the fan-chart
analysis are only as good as the quality of the data used in the analysis, the econo-
metric technique used, and the relevance of past data for the evolution of debt in
the future.
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Value-at-Risk models
Closely related to the approach evaluating the risk of meeting debt service
obligations is the value-at-risk (VaR) approach, which models the value of a
risky asset and the conﬁdence with which this value is held for different time
horizons.23 The VaR approach tries to measure the risk associated with holdings
of different portfolios, including public debt. For a given portfolio, VaR is the loss
expected to be exceeded during x% of t-day holding periods. Values of x and t
are exogenously ﬁxed and are typically 1%, 2%, and 5% for x and a month or less
for t. For any given t, the loss suffered will rise as x falls.
Three methods are typically used to determine the VaR of a portfolio:
• In the historical simulation approach, historical data onmarket rates and prices
are used to construct future portfolio proﬁts and losses over the period t.
Given this, one reads off the loss that is exceeded only x% (exogenously
determined) of the time.
• The delta-normal approach assumes that underlying market factors have
a multivariate normal distribution. Using this assumption, the approach
determines the distribution of portfolio proﬁts and losses and assumes that this
is normal as well. The expected change in portfolio value is then computed
over the predetermined t and, if x = 5%, computes VaR as
VaR = −{[Expected change in portfolio value]
− 1.65[standard deviation of change in portfolio value]}
This computation uses the fact that, for the normal distribution, outcomes less
than or equal to 1.65 standard deviations below the mean occur only 5% of
the time.
• Finally, the Monte Carlo simulation approach is similar to the historical
simulation approach. The principal difference is that instead of using
historical data for the simulation, one chooses a statistical distribution that is
assumed to approximate the possible changes inmarket forces. Unfortunately,
however, prior reasoning does not favor any one of these methods over the
remaining two.
The VaR approach can be used to assess the riskiness of a portfolio that consists
of public debt and indicates the market’s view of holding such debt.
Problems with debt dilution
The term “debt dilution” refers to a situation in which the government, by issuing
new debt, demonstrates a lack of commitment to decreasing the value of debt
issued in the past. Hatchondo, Martinez, and Padilla (2011) study the welfare
implications of this situation. They argue that the possibility of being able to dilute
debtmay lead to excessive issuance of short-termdebt. This, in turn, could increase
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the possibility and/or severity of sovereign debt crises. Expanding on the work of
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Eaton and Fernandez (1995), the empirical and
simulation model of Hatchondo et al. suggests that, even without commitment
to future repayment policies and without the contingency of sovereign debt,
eliminating debt dilution would lower the default risk by 86%, the mean spread
by 92%, and the spread volatility by 71%. Hence, debt dilution should not be
used to avoid an emerging sovereign debt crisis, or at least should be used only in
exceptional circumstances.
Assessing ﬁscal stress
Fiscal stress is deﬁned as a situation of extreme government funding difﬁculties.
Such difﬁculties can arise from a variety of sources, including contingent liabilities
that become a ﬁscal burden, drastic falls in public revenue, and unaddressed
expenditure commitments such as high and rising retirement commitments.
Further difﬁculties may arise from market perceptions that the composition of
the debt makes the government susceptible to default.
Fiscal stress testing is designed to measure and give early warning signs of
the inability to pay off sovereign debt and, hence, of risk to ﬁscal sustain-
ability. Baldacci et al. (2011) describe three factors that impact this risk of
nonsustainability:
• whether ﬁscal policies currently being followed, or anticipated to be followed,
satisfy standard tests for sustainability,
• whether these tests are subject to error because macroeconomic assumptions
behind the sustainability tests have been belied, and/or because there have
been unanticipated shocks to contingent liabilities and
• whether extraneous ﬁscal factors exist, such as current account imbalances
and global ﬁnancial market risk increasing the chances of a ﬁnancial crisis.
A good measure of ﬁscal stress would provide early warning signs about the
potential realization of one or more of the foregoing risks.
Fiscal stress is formally deﬁned as an episode of one or more of the following:
public debt default and/or restructuring; the need for large-scale ﬁnancial support
from international lending organizations; hyperinﬂation; and drastically enhanced
ﬁnancing problems, such as spikes in sovereign bond spreads. Baldacci et al.
(2011) claim that the ﬁscal stress index (see the following section) can be used to
assess ﬁscal stress both over time and across economies.
Prior literature on this topic varies in the deﬁnitions of what constituted a
crisis, the methodology used for quantifying a crisis, and the set of indicators
employed. Further, two approaches to modeling stress are used in the literature.
The “signaling” approach identiﬁes a critical threshold beyond which a set of
composite indicators signals a crisis. In the multivariate approach, a panel or
cross-section analysis is conducted using probit or logit models with the dependent
variable taking a value of 1 if there is a crisis and 0 otherwise. The determinants
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Table 2.1 Deﬁnition of ﬁscal crisis across advanced and emerging market economies
Event Criteria Advanced Economies Emerging Economies
Public debt
default or
restructuring
Failure to service
debt as payments
come due, as well
as distressed debt
exchanges
Standard & Poor’s
deﬁnition
Standard & Poor’s
deﬁnition
Large ﬁnancing Large IMF-supported
program
Access to 100%
quota or more
Access to 100%
quota or more
Implicit/internal
public debt
default
High inﬂation rate Inﬂation greater than
35% per annum
Inﬂation greater than
500% per annum
Extreme
ﬁnancing
constraint of
the sovereign
Sovereign yield
pressure
Sovereign spreads
greater than 1,000
basis points or
2 standard
deviations from
the country
average
Sovereign spreads
greater than 1,000
basis points or
2 standard
deviations from
the country
average
IMF = International Monetary Fund.
Source: Baldacci et al. (2011).
of such a crisis are then modeled. Berg and Patilo (1999) and Berg et al. (2005)
provide evidence that the multivariate models outperform the signaling model for
in-sample and cross-country forecastswhereas the signalingmodel performs better
for out-of-sample forecasts. Hence, neither approach is unambiguously superior.
Baldacci et al. (2011) combine the following ﬁve criteria to denote a situation of
ﬁscal stress: debt default or restructuring, implicit default, recourse to exceptional
ﬁnancing, sharp deterioration in market access, and sharp spikes in borrowing
costs as reﬂected in government bond yield pressures. The last is designed to
capture short-term ﬁnancing constraints. Table 2.1 outlines the characteristics of
ﬁscal stress that Baldacci et al. use for empirical purposes.
Fiscal stress thresholds
To deﬁne when an episode of ﬁscal stress has occurred, a threshold must be
chosen. As the threshold lowers, the chances that a noncrisis episode will be
labeled a crisis episode increase, and the opposite happens as the threshold is
increased. In interpreting episodes of ﬁscal stress, both Type I and Type II errors
can occur. The lower the threshold, the greater the chance that an actual stress
episode would be captured, that is, a Type II error will occur. However, as the
chance that a noncrisis episode will be labeled a crisis episode increases, so
does the chance of Type I errors. The opposite happens if a high threshold level
is chosen.
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Baldacci et al. (2011) deﬁne an indicator variable at time t, dt , as follows:
dt =
{
1 for ∀j, if xt−1 > C
0, otherwise
,
where xt is a ﬁscal indicator that rises with crisis probabilities and C is a ﬁxed
cut-off point for xt . Baldacci et al. deﬁne the signal/noise ratio, SNR(C), as
SNR(C) =
TP(C)
NC
FP(C)
NNC
,
where TP(C) is the number of correctly classiﬁed crisis observations and NC is the
number of actual crisis observations, so that the numerator of this expression is the
percentage of correctly classiﬁed observations (1 minus the probability of Type II
error), FP(C) is the number of noncrisis events classiﬁed as “crisis” (i.e., false
positives), andNNC is the number of noncrisis events so that the denominator is the
percentage of incorrectly classiﬁed noncrisis events (Type I error). The optimal
threshold is chosen so as to minimize SNR(C). Baldacci et al. (2011) compute a
ﬁscal stress index in two steps. First, if an indicator crosses its chosen threshold it
is given a value of 1 and weighted proportionately to its predictive power. Second,
the overall ﬁscal stress index is computed as
Overall index =
∑
g
θg
∑
i
θi,gdi,
where θi,g is the weight of each individual indicator, i, in group g, θg is the weight
of the group, and di is a dummy that takes the value 1 in case of a crisis event and
0 otherwise.
Baldacci et al. (2011) ﬁnd that ﬁscal stress has grown quite rapidly during the
GFC. Further, ﬁscal stress has increasedmore rapidly in advanced economies than
in EMEs. They compute weighted ﬁscal stress indexes for advanced economies
and EMEs, with purchasing power parity–GDP as weights. They ﬁnd that this
index is higher in 2011 in the developed economies than in EMEs—whereas the
emergingmarket index has risen it is still below the level reached during the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis of the late 1990s.
Composition of public debt
As indicated earlier, Bhatt (2010) argues that, all else being equal, the composition
of public expenditure can have an important impact on the evolution of public
debt. The paper develops a theoretical model of the impact of productive (capital-
related) and unproductive expenditure on public debt and estimates the model
using time series data for India. Bhatt ﬁnds that the share of capital expenditure in
public expenditure has an inverse long-run relationship with the public debt. The
paper suggests that this share can be used to forecast public debt in the future.
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Broader interpretation of sovereign debt crises
Failure to satisfy the sustainability tests discussed does not mean that a ﬁscal crisis
will occur, and a country may have a sustainability crisis even if it satisﬁes all the
conditions for sustainability—a good example is the Mexican debt crisis of 1993.
Hence, the question is: What is the set of economic and political conditions that
are associated with the occurrence of a crisis?
Manasse and Roubini (2009) indicate that at least three types of crises can
inﬂuence each other: a liquidity crisis, an insolvency or a nonsustainability crisis,
and a macroeconomic crisis involving the exchange rate. A major implication
is that unconditional thresholds (e.g., for debt/output ratios) have little value for
assessing the probability of default. Depending on the values of countries’ liquidity
and macroeconomic and exchange rate risks, a high debt/output ratio may not lead
to insolvency in one country, but another country may face debt default although
it has a low debt/output ratio.
Furthermore, Manasse and Roubini (2009) emphasize the joint (and sometimes
mutually reinforcing) nature of the three types of crises. For example, a country
with a low debt/output ratio may have a severe liquidity crisis, causing it to
borrow on unfavorable terms to service the debt, thus triggering a liquidity
crisis that may then become a solvency crisis. Manasse and Roubini (2009) use
the Classiﬁcation and Regression Tree analysis, a computer-based algorithm,
to identify explanatory variables, their critical values, and their interaction in
order to isolate crisis from noncrisis events. In a sample of 47 EMEs during
the period 1970–2002, they ﬁnd 10 variables to be of particular signiﬁcance to
solvency crises: (1) total external debt/GDP ratio, (2) short-term debt/reserves
ratio, (3) real GDP growth, (4) public external debt/ﬁscal revenue ratio, (5)
inﬂation rate, (6) number of years to the next election, (7) US Treasury bill
rates, (8) current account balance plus short-term debt as a ratio of foreign
exchange reserves, (9) exchange rate overvaluation, and (10) exchange rate
volatility. Most debt crises in the 47 EMEs could be classiﬁed in three categories:
insolvency (high debt and high inﬂation); illiquidity (large stock of short-
term debt relative to foreign exchange reserves); and macro and exchange rate
weaknesses manifested as a large overvaluation of the currency and negative
GDP growth shocks.
This analysis leads naturally to the conclusion that economic activity and debt
default are mutually endogenous, for example, the interest rate on public debt can
depend on the business cycle phase that the economy is going through. The next
logical step is, therefore, to pursue general equilibrium modeling of sovereign
default and business cycles. Research in this area has very recent origins (see,
e.g., Mendoza and Yue 2011).24 The core of this model is a ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation
mechanism that links sovereign debt default risk with production plans. Increases
in default risk increase the cost of ﬁnancing working capital by raising the cost
of imported inputs, which then induces a business cycle downturn. Thus, there
are feedback effects between default risk, business cycles, and the output costs
of default.
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Akyuz (2008) argues that EMEs are more prone to the effects of such
endogeneity. These economies are considerably prone to supply shocks, both
domestic (e.g., weather shocks) and foreign (e.g., oil price shocks). With inﬂex-
ible subsidies (e.g., on food and petroleum), the ﬁscal deﬁcit and, subsequently,
the debt are likely to rise in response to such shocks. Hence, a “safe” level of the
debt/GDP ratio is likely to be lower in economies that are shock-prone than in
those that are not.
Indeed some of the effects of foreign shocks may spill over into higher levels
of foreign debt. With sharply rising and volatile international commodity prices,
such risks are growing over time. In response, particularly after the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis of 1997/08 and subsequent ﬁnancial crises, many transition economies have
sharply increased their foreign exchange reserves. The cost of operating and
maintaining large reserves and, since these reserves provide low yields, the income
foregone, are intrinsic debt-related costs these economies bear. Akyuz (2008)
argues that, unless global conditions are favorable (and they have only deteriorated
since) these debt-related costs could impinge on the transitional economies’
prospects of meeting their Millennium Development Goals. (This study does not
consider sovereign debt issues further, which would involve analyzing the current
account.)
Quality of revenue and expenditure data
The extant DSAs have taken the revenue and expenditure data at face value and
thus can be extended in twomajor directions: other types of crises (e.g., a liquidity
crunch) can trigger a debt sustainability crisis; and the revenue and expenditure
data can give an incomplete and perhaps even misleading picture of the debt
sustainability situation. For example, the government can have many unfunded
liabilities, such as pension payments, as well as contingent liabilities, which it may
ultimately have to meet. Appendix 3.1 in Chapter 3 summarizes the data issues
faced when doing DSA.
In this context, Chapter 4, on debt of the People’s Republic of China, argues
that, whereas its ofﬁcial public debt was 17.7% of GDP in 2009, hidden liabilities,
amounted to a further 67% of GDP. This means that total government debt was as
high as 84% of GDP. Hence, for purposes of DSA, it matters a great deal where
the line is drawn with respect to the government liabilities.
Heller (2004) provides a useful ranking of the “hardness” of different public
sector liabilities. Ofﬁcial debt is clearly the hardest government obligation. Gov-
ernment obligations become softer moving progressively to arrears; contingent
liabilities, such as deposit insurance; contractual obligations, such as public
pensions; “stand-behind obligations,” such as implicit guarantees; bailouts and
disaster relief; and constructive obligations, such as the provision of health,
education, and law and order. Chapter 4 discusses the importance of incorporating
public liabilities of different levels of hardness in the case of the People’s
Republic of China.
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It is important to be clear about what constitutes appropriate revenue and
expenditure data for a credible sustainability analysis. The boundaries of the
government sector have to be clear.Assets and liabilities at all levels of government
have to be included in the analysis. In this context, Liu andWaibel (2011) indicate
that the period leading up to theGFCwas also one of greater decentralization in the
Asia and Paciﬁc region. As subnational governments are increasingly responsible
for public expenditure, they are therefore running up larger deﬁcits. In December
2009, the debt of Indian states amounted to as much as 29% of GDP. Hence,
subnational debt crisis could occur. In the face of this, many countries have
instituted rules for subnational debt accumulation (subnational debt issues are
discussed in Chapter 5).
Liu and Waibel (2011) argue that subnational governments may be able to
circumvent rules on debt accumulation by, for example, showing some elements
of debt as off-budget items. Hence, any DSA must be cognizant of these
possibilities.
Further, the government may be responsible for liabilities such as unfunded
pensions, deﬁcits of state-owned enterprises, central bank liabilities,25 and
contingent liabilities,26 which need to be brought into the fold of public
expenditure. In the case of external debt, the exchange rate to be used for valuation
must be clear. What can justiﬁably be termed tax and nontax revenue must also
be clear, especially if tax evasion and avoidance are widespread.
Conclusions: the importance of country studies
Developments in the international economy in the aftermath of the GFC and
the resulting policy responses have led to substantial increases in debt holdings
across economies, whether developed, emerging market, or developing. The
sustainability of public debt has suddenly been called into question in several
countries. Unsustainable public debt can have broad consequences for ﬁnancial
stability and for the real economy. Hence, it is imperative to assess the prospects
for debt sustainability in the Asia and Paciﬁc region.
The present chapter brieﬂy discusses the role of the ﬁscal deﬁcit in the economy
and reviews the current literature on debt sustainability, including literature on
time series, ﬁscal reaction function, and stress tests. The chapter outlines in
some detail the IMF approach to its DSA. It then outlines some old and some
emerging issues inDSAnot addressed by the standard analysis and emphasizes the
need to have both a uniﬁed analytical approach to assessing debt sustainability and
to recognize the wide differences among countries in a variety of relevant factors,
including data, ﬁnancial institutions, projections of future tax and expenditure,
liquidity experience, and exposure to global ﬁnancial markets. Such differences
highlight the importance of individual country assessments of debt sustainability.
Thus, this chapter provides the context for the following empirical and individual
country chapters.
Some of the most signiﬁcant differences across countries in several areas
relevant to DSA are as follows. First, the deﬁnition of the “government sector”
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differs across countries as does their treatment of the deﬁcit/debt magnitudes
of different levels of government. When forecasting future public revenue
and expenditure, a differentiated approach should be adopted across countries
in view of their varying circumstances. Some countries, for example, have
pending privatization programs to complete (the proceeds of which could add
to revenue); similarly, countries’ treatments of contingent liabilities and practices
for unfunded liabilities vary.
Further, in DSA, attention needs to be given to the composition of public debt—
whether it is concessional or not; whether public capital expenditure has played a
signiﬁcant role in its evolution; and whether a signiﬁcant proportion of the debt
is owed to foreigners, in which case the exchange rate at which the debt is valued
and the expected time path of the exchange rate becomes relevant. All these vary
quite signiﬁcantly across countries. Often, reporting of data and, hence, the extent
of imputation required differ across countries.
In addition, ﬁscal policy rules and practices may differ across countries. For
example, a country with a hard ﬁscal policy rule that the ﬁscal deﬁcit may not
exceed a speciﬁc percentage of GDP may more realistically be expected to attain
debt sustainability, all else being equal, than a country without such a rule. And
among countries that follow ﬁscal rules, the efﬁcacy with which these ﬁscal rules
are implemented may vary. Different countries may follow different practices for
expenditures they can move off-budget in order to meet the requirements of the
ﬁscal rule.
Differences may also arise in countries’ experience with debt adjustment and
with their debt management capacities. Some countries may be more committed
to pursuing debt adjustment than others. The ease of pursuing a policy of attaining
sustainable debt will be inﬂuenced by how credit rating agencies rate individual
countries’ debt proﬁles, for example, DSA will be impacted if a country is
transitioning from concessional to market-based debt issuance. The sustainability
of a country’s debt will be impacted by its external ﬁnancial position as well as
by its liquidity position.
Developments in international debt and ﬁnancial markets will impact different
countries differentially, and they will also respond differently. Hence, while
emphasizing a uniﬁed framework for DSA (see Chapter 3), nuanced individual
country studies can better reﬂect the differences in country circumstances,
histories, and approaches (Chapters 4–6).
Notes
1 These 24 economies (Brazil; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa
Rica; Arab Republic of Egypt; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Kenya; Malaysia; Mexico;
Morocco; Nigeria; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; South
Africa; Sri Lanka; Thailand; Turkey; and Uruguay) accounted for 60% of the world’s
population.
2 See also Chalk and Hemming (2000) and IMF (2003b, 2011). For critical reviews of
DSA see Wyplosz (2007) and Akyuz (2008).
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3 Fiscal deﬁcit is also sometimes called the “budgetary deﬁcit.” The deﬁcit includes
servicing of public debt. If interest payment on the public debt is removed, the result is
often called the “primary deﬁcit.”
4 Wyplosz (2007) argues that when the exchange rate depreciates faster than prices,
the domestic currency value of foreign debt rises. A similar conclusion holds for a
situation in which interest rates rise faster than inﬂation and debt servicing becomes
a bigger burden.
5 However, debt is not uniformly undesirable at all levels. Adams and Ferrarini (2010)
argue that, in developing countries when real interest rates are negative (presumably
because of high inﬂation) and rates of return on public investment are positive,
increased debt may well be merited.
6 More recent arguments along the lines suggested by Buiter include those by Easterly
(1999), who argues that ﬁscal adjustment can be illusionary. In particular, this would
be the case when such adjustment lowers the public debt but leaves unchanged the net
worth of the government. In other words, governments may ﬁnd ways of maintaining
their consumption even when they are actually involved in a process of reducing
public debt.
7 Even rapid accumulation of domestic debt, as a result of high ﬁscal deﬁcits, can have
consequences such as the emergence of severe macroeconomic problems, and can
impede control of the ﬁscal deﬁcit. Thus, servicing of the central government debt
is one of the largest items in the Government of India’s budget, even outstripping
major items of expenditure such as defense. High debt repayments can signal that
anticipated revenues may be at risk and/or that public expenditures may be higher
than anticipated. A perceived drop in government liquidity may lead to a solvency
crisis.
8 The IRGD is computed as
r− g
1+ g where r is the real interest rate and g is the growth rate
of real GDP. It is immaterial whether real or nominal interest rates and growth rates
are used to compute the IRGD.
9 Deﬁned as all member countries of the Organisation for Co-operation andDevelopment
(OECD) except Turkey.
10 See also McKinnon (1973). And, an erroneous belief is that “low” cost of capital will
encourage investment. In reality, with low returns, capital becomes even scarcer and
the effective price of capital rises above the mandated level.
11 For critical reviews of DSA, see Wyplosz (2007) and Akyuz (2008).
12 This corresponds to the notion of default associated bothwith risky and risk-free revenue
inﬂows. See also Jha (2004).
13 Another way economists assess debt sustainability using time seriesmethods is to check
whether government expenditure and revenue, assuming both are integrated of order 1,
(1), follow a common stochastic trend, i.e., they are cointegrated. If this is the case,
the cointegrating vector between them should be [1, –1] so that, in the long run, any
increase in government expenditure is ﬁnanced by revenue. Intuitively, then, in such
cases the debt should be sustainable.
14 For simplicity, foreign ﬁnancing of the deﬁcit is excluded.
15 See also Bohn (2007).
16 Along similar lines, IMF (2003a) uses panel data methods on a number of countries to
show that many countries do indeed satisfy this criterion. Bohn (2007) provides further
support to this argument, and UNCTAD (2009) provides a useful review.
17 The quantity τt is a summary variable with temporary factors such as the gap between
actual and potential output or temporary changes in government spending, such as due
to a natural disaster.
18 Davig and Leeper (2011) study the joint estimation and interaction of monetary and
ﬁscal reaction functions. Sharma and Jha (2012) show that rising ﬁscal deﬁcit can
often lead to reversal of reform in semi-open EMEs.
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19 Explained earlier in this chapter, in the context of the IRGD literature.
20 Abiad and Ostry (2005) provide evidence that the primary budget surplus rises with
inﬂation.
21 Hence, in the face of uncertainty, assessing solvency inherently involves making
judgments, which themselves are subject to risk; however, without uncertainty
assessing, solvency is only an “arithmetic exercise.”
22 An important difference between this fan-chart analysis and that in the previous
section is that the frequency distribution of shocks to the right hand side variables
is endogenous here and exogenously imposed there.
23 For an exposition of VaR models, see Damodar (2011) and Linsmeier and Pearson
(2000).
24 Mendoza and Yue (2011) report three interesting empirical regularities between
business cycles and default in a sample of 23 default events during 1977–2009: that
default episodes are associated with deep recessions; that interest rates on sovereign
debt peak at about the same time as output hits its trough and defaults occur, and these
interest rates are negatively related to GDP; and that the external debt/GDP ratio is high
on average, and higher than average when countries default.
25 This requires assessing, whether the ofﬁcial debt data includes bills and bonds issued
by the country’s central bank.
26 This should include covariances between contingent liabilities. Contingent liabilities
are typically very important in the areas of pensions and health care, the private ﬁnancial
system, and the nonﬁnancial state-owned enterprise sector. In addition, explicit or
implicit guarantees may be given on private domestic or foreign debt issuance, public
investment programs, and public–private partnerships. Moreover, public sector assets
in the state-owned enterprise sector could be used to retire debt under privatization
programs.
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3 Public debt sustainability
assessments for developing Asia
Benno Ferrarini and Arief Ramayandi∗
Introduction
This chapter discusses the evolution of ﬁscal balances and public debt ratios in
developing Asia from the mid-1990s to 2010 and investigates the conditions for
public debt sustainability in the region through 2016, building on the work of
Adams and Ferrarini (2010). Focus is on developing Asia—which denotes the
developing member countries (DMCs) of Asian Development Bank (ADB). The
assessment mainly comprises the broader trends and outlook for public debt and
ﬁscal indicators in Asia and its subregions, with country-level data aggregated by
geographical subdivision. The debt dynamics and prospects of a few selected
economies are discussed. An in-depth assessment of three country studies is
provided in the following chapters.
The discussion of debt sustainability analysis (DSA) methods evolves from a
practical perspective, while Chapter 2 provides a more theoretical exposition.
The aspects of ﬁscal sustainability of public debt, both domestic and foreign
currency denominated, are analyzed. (External criteria of debt sustainability
are not analyzed, because to do so would involve a broader discussion of the
balance-of-payments conditions in Asia, which is beyond the scope of this
chapter.) The main emphasis is thus on the historical and prospective evolution
of public debt indicators under alternative macroeconomic and ﬁscal policy
assumptions, which constitute the core elements of DSA within the broader
context of macroeconomic forecasting. Much of the discussion revolves around
the debt sustainability implications of a negative interest rate–growth differential
(IRGD), a key characteristic of the macroeconomic environment in Asia during
the last two decades. The extent to which responsible ﬁscal policy by governments
in the region has played a role in keeping ﬁscal position in check and debt
ratios comparably low is also analyzed at length. Less attention is devoted to
analyzing debt sustainability against thresholds, which was brieﬂy discussed in
∗ This chapter deepens and expands in several directions the empirical work in Adams and
Ferrarini (2010). The authors are grateful for helpful comments on an earlier draft by Charles Adams,
Richard Hemming, and Raghbendra Jha. However, the authors are solely responsible for the views
expressed here.
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Chapter 2; this approach is deemed of limited practical interest as the chapter
adopts a simple notion of debt sustainability that is premised on the presence
of a stable and nonexploding debt path regardless of its position relative to
thresholds. Further, Chapter 2’s main focus is debt sustainability in countries
with access to capital markets, with less emphasis on low-income countries, for
which DSA and threshold analysis have a combined role in the multilateral aid
allocation process. A discussion of these broader issues is beyond the scope of
this chapter.
The next section presents key ﬁscal indicators in developing Asia and reviews
the evolution of public debt ratios from the mid-1990s through 2010. Particular
attention is paid to the breakdown of ﬁscal positions into primary and nonprimary
components and the linkages between primary ﬁscal balances and public debt
ratios.
The third section discusses the results from econometric tests of ﬁscal
sustainability, based on panel regression techniques. Estimates of ﬁscal reaction
functions support the notion that Asia has been generally prudent in conducting
ﬁscal policy, with countries tightening their budgets as they see debt stocks rising.
The region’s record of ﬁscal rectitude provides the strongest grounds for being
conﬁdent about the long-run sustainability of public debt in the region.
Section four, on the debt stabilizing primary balance in Asia, discusses the
extent to which vastly negative IRGDs have been shaping ﬁscal dynamics in
the region. The concept of debt stabilizing primary balance is introduced, and the
impact that less favorable macroeconomic circumstances—whether in the guise
of a temporary or structural narrowing of the IRGD—are likely to have on Asia’s
debt sustainability and on ﬁscal policy space is also assessed.
Section ﬁve, on DSA based on macroeconomic forecast assumptions, projects
debt ratios aggregated byAsia’s subregions up to the year 2016. Based on the latest
ADB and International Monetary Fund (IMF) macroeconomic forecasts and ﬁscal
policy assumptions for these countries, the results indicate that current forecast
assumptions are compatible with continuing debt sustainability in the region.
Projections for all the subregions—but not necessarily all their economies—
suggest that debt ratios are either stable or declining, and the ﬁscal outlook for the
region is generally benign.
The sixth section conducts stress tests within the standard DSA framework
for eight Asian economies, and compares the results with those from stochastic
simulation methods. It is argued that stochastic analysis accounts better for the
correlation structure among the key variables determining debt dynamics and for
the uncertainty surrounding baseline projections than does deterministic analysis.
Simulation results suggest that accounting for these factors in most cases does
not change the main conclusion about economies’ debt sustainability. However,
the results suggest that, rather than a single baseline, a whole range of possible
outcomes are compatible with a country’s macroeconomic track record and the
estimated correlation structure among key variables, and not all of them imply a
favorable future debt path.
The last section summarizes the ﬁndings and concludes.
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Public debt and ﬁscal performance in developing Asia
Any assessment of public ﬁnances in relation to developing countries faces the
challenge of scarce ﬁscal and public debt data.1 The discussion in Appendix 3.1
illustrates that data scarcity is an issue for ADB’s developing members, which
are analyzed in this chapter. In the ﬁscal data set for the 45 ADB developing
members compiled for this study, 24 economies have consistent yearly data for
a comparative review over time of the main ﬁscal indicators from 1994 to 2010.
Data are grouped into ﬁve geographical subregions, following the convention
of the ADB Asian Development Outlook reports. The subregions and economies
within them are Central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, and Tajikistan); East Asia (the People’s Republic of China [PRC],
the Republic of Korea, and Mongolia); the Paciﬁc (Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands, and Tonga); South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Sri Lanka,
Nepal, and Pakistan); and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Thailand, and Viet Nam). Appendix 3.2, Tables A3.2.1 and A3.2.2 show the
data available for ADB’s developing members and the data sources used for
this chapter.
Table 3.1 summarizes the main ﬁscal indicators by subregion. The last column
indicates the degree of external indebtedness, measured as the ratio of foreign
currency denominated debt to total public debt outstanding. All indicators
represent simple averages by subregion, which are unweighted for the reasons
discussed in Appendix 3.1. Figure 3.1 compares ratios of subregional debt/gross
domestic product (GDP) and ﬁscal revenue/GDP.
To trace the evolution of ﬁscal indicators over time, Asia’s average ﬁscal data
are subdivided into ﬁve key periods: 1994–97, to assess ﬁscal positions prior to
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis (AFC); 1998–99 and 2000–06, to capture the short- and
medium-term effects of the AFC on ﬁscal performance in Asia; and 2007–08 and
2009–10, to compare ﬁscal positions before and after the global ﬁnancial crisis
(GFC).2
The ﬁscal indicators in Table 3.1 show the following about the ﬁscal perfor-
mance in the region:
• Public debt ratios across ADB developing members display considerable
heterogeneity and variation over time. According to 1994–2000 averages,
South Asia had the highest debt ratios in Asia, averaging nearly 67%. East
Asia, at about half that level, had the lowest debt ratios in the region; average
debt ratios in Central Asia, the Paciﬁc, and Southeast Asia were 40–50% of
GDP. By developing countries’ standards, public debt in Asia has thus been
low, with the notable exception of South Asia.
• The AFC represented a watershed for ﬁscal policy in the region, as many
economies experienced large ﬁscal slippages. Debt ratios across the region
rose substantially during 1998/99 and continued climbing during the early
2000s in the Paciﬁc, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Subsequently, ﬁscal
consolidation efforts and the support of high rates of economic expansion
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Table 3.1 Fiscal indicators
Subregion
and period
Public
debt
Primary
balance
Fiscal
balance
Fiscal
expenditure
Fiscal
revenue
Interest
paid
FCD
debt∗
(% of GDP) (% of
total)
Central Asia
2000–10 40.6 0.1 −0.6 24.5 23.9 0.8 . . .
2000–06 47.7 0.1 −0.9 22.1 21.3 1.0 . . .
2007–08 23.4 1.4 1.1 27.5 28.5 0.3 24.1
2009–10 32.8 −1.0 −1.6 30.1 28.5 0.6 34.3
East Asia
1994–2010 34.6 −0.4 −1.4 23.4 22.0 1.0 . . .
1994–97 25.1 −1.3 −2.3 19.4 17.0 1.0 . . .
1998–99 40.7 −2.9 −4.5 23.0 18.5 1.6 . . .
2000–06 40.9 0.4 −0.6 24.1 23.5 0.9 . . .
2007–08 27.5 1.1 0.4 26.0 26.5 0.7 11.6
2009–10 32.5 −0.6 −1.2 26.8 25.5 0.7 15.5
Southeast Asia
1994–2010 42.2 0.1 −2.0 21.9 19.9 2.1 . . .
1994–97 37.2 2.2 0.5 19.9 20.4 1.7 . . .
1998–99 42.6 −1.1 −2.8 21.0 18.1 1.7 . . .
2000–06 46.0 −0.2 −2.7 22.3 19.6 2.5 . . .
2007–08 38.4 0.3 −1.6 22.6 21.0 1.9 21.8
2009–10 41.9 −2.2 −4.5 24.7 20.2 1.8 21.7
South Asia
1994–2010 66.9 −1.0 −4.5 22.5 18.0 3.5 . . .
1994–97 65.2 −1.0 −4.3 22.9 18.5 3.4 . . .
1998–99 65.2 −1.0 −4.2 21.8 17.6 3.2 . . .
2000–06 71.3 −1.3 −4.8 22.4 17.6 3.5 . . .
2007–08 62.4 −0.2 −3.8 22.1 18.4 3.6 32.4
2009–10 61.1 −0.9 −4.6 23.2 18.6 3.6 31.7
… = data not available, FCD = foreign currency denominated, GDP = gross domestic product.
(∗) As percentage of total public debt.
Notes: Central Asia data cover only the period 2000–10. A negative sign on the primary or ﬁscal
balance indicates a deﬁcit.
Source: ADB TA7662 Database.
brought debt ratios down throughout the region. By 2007/08, debt ratios were
mostly at par with or below levels prior to the AFC.
• The GFC was transmitted to Asia mainly through the trade channel in
early 2009. The slump in global demand for Asian exports was met with
unprecedented determination by governments mounting large monetary
and ﬁscal stimulus packages to support their economies.3 As a result,
debt ratios turned up again by 2009/10, albeit less markedly than in the
immediate aftermath of the AFC (1998/99) and certainly not uniformly across
subregions.4
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• Fiscal balances across the region were mostly in deﬁcit during 1994–2010.
South Asia stands out with a sizeable deﬁcit, averaging 4.5% over the
entire period, followed by Southeast Asia (2.0%) and East Asia (1.4%).
Fiscal deﬁcits were lower in Central Asia (0.6%), favored by the price
developments in the world commodity markets and debt relief operations
since 2000 in relation to Soviet-era liabilities, and in the Paciﬁc (1.1%),
where the debt beneﬁts from a higher grant element than is the case in the rest
of Asia.
• TheAFC increased ﬁscal deﬁcits in East and Southeast Asia, whichwere both
at the epicenter of the crisis. Subsequently, ﬁscal balances improved across
the region. By 2007/08, average ﬁscal balances in East Asia, Central Asia,
and the Paciﬁc returned to surplus. Elsewhere, including South Asia, ﬁscal
deﬁcits shrank substantially.
• With the GFC came a dramatic trend reversal in the ﬁscal stance across the
entire region: by 2009–10, South Asia’s average ﬁscal deﬁcit had expanded
to 4.6%, Southeast Asia’s to 4.5%, and other parts of Asia started recording
sizeable deﬁcits from a situation of surplus prior to the crisis.
• By and large, primary balances across the region improved between 1994
and 2008. East Asia managed to turn a 2.9% average deﬁcit in 1998/99
to a 1.1% surplus in 2007/08. During the same period, Southeast Asia
transformed a 1.1% deﬁcit into a 0.3% surplus. Even South Asia managed
to rein in its deﬁcits, although it continues to stand out as the subregion
with the most persistent primary deﬁcits in Asia, and with the largest
interest bills to settle. As will be discussed at length in this chapter, primary
balances in the region reﬂect a fundamental attitude of ﬁscal responsibility
or frugality that has involved ﬁscal tightening in response to rising debt
ratios.
• Average government expenditure and revenue in large parts of Asia are in
the range of 20%–25% and thus are lower than in the rest of the emerging
world, and substantially lower than in the advanced economies.5 The Paciﬁc
economies are an exception in this regard, due to relatively large governments
and aid ﬁnancing.
• In the entire region, interest payments on public debt have been low, about
1%–3% of GDP. There is no clear tendency for interest to increase over time.
Generally, subregions with the highest debt/GDP ratios also have the highest
interest payments/GDP ratios.
• Foreign currency denominated debt (as a share of total public debt) has been
generally low in the region. In 2009/10, this share ranged from about 15% in
East Asia to about 34% in Central Asia.
Figure 3.2 provides another revealing perspective on ﬁscal positions in the region,
displaying time snapshots of the relationship between primary ﬁscal surplus and
debt stocks of each subregion. The movement from period 1 to 2 on the ﬁgure
corresponds to a substantial worsening of ﬁscal balances and debt stocks in Asia
as a consequence of the AFC. The subsequent shift, from period 3 to 4, traces the
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ﬁscal adjustment that gradually took place across the region between the aftermath
of the AFC and the onset of the GFC, which for some countries at ﬁrst involved
a further deterioration of ﬁscal balances and debt ratios well into the early 2000s.
By the onset of the GFC, ﬁscal positions had improved dramatically, but they
then deteriorated sharply in period 5, as most governments intervened to rescue
their economies with ﬁscal injections to stem the adverse effects of the global
recession.
In Figure 3.2, this pattern is most evident in the East Asia (EAA) and Southeast
Asia (SEA) aggregates. Their movements from the ﬁrst to the second periods
(EAA1 to EAA2 and SEA1 to SEA2) show a marked deterioration of primary
deﬁcits and public debt ratios due to theAFC. These eventswere followed by sharp
corrections in the economies’ balance-of-payments and ﬁscal accounts, which led
to more manageable ﬁscal balances and lower debt ratios. East Asia, in particular,
displays a major policy shift during 2000–06 (EAA3), causing ﬁscal balances
to return to surplus on average across the subregion. By 2007/08 (EAA4), ﬁscal
surpluses had further consolidated in East Asia and the debt ratio had fallen back to
just above pre-AFC levels. Figure 3.2 does not show that the ﬁscal pattern observed
for the East Asia subregion is heavily inﬂuenced by Mongolia’s recovery after a
ﬁscal crisis in the early 2000s.
Compared with East Asia, Southeast Asian countries on average entered the
AFC with a higher debt ratio and a ﬁscal surplus, rather than deﬁcit. By 1998/99,
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that surplus had turned abundantly negative and the debt ratio in most countries
kept rising well into the early 2000s. Subsequently, ﬁscal consolidation efforts
combined with favorable debt dynamics based on low interest and high growth
rates drove Southeast Asia’s average public debt ratio down close to its pre-
AFC level.
Evidence of ﬁscal consolidation between 2000 and 2008—that is, a movement
upward and leftward on Figure 3.2—is observed also in relation to South Asia,
the Paciﬁc, and Central Asia. As a result, developing Asia was on a sound
ﬁscal footing by the time it faced the GFC: except in a few countries, ﬁscal
balances in the region were generally healthy, and debt ratios were mostly low
and declining.
This trend reversed with the GFC. By 2009/10, crisis-related spending,
combined with revenue compression due to the slowdown of economic activity,
resulted in sizeable ﬁscal deﬁcits across the region. The unprecedented intensity
of the ﬁscal response by many countries caused subregional deﬁcits to fall below
the levels witnessed in connection with the AFC. By contrast, public debt ratios
rose as a result of ﬁscal stimulus, but not to the levels witnessed after the AFC. The
profoundly diverse nature of the two crises explains their different impact on the
region. Whereas the AFC originated within East and Southeast Asian economies
that were facing highly problematic external imbalances and ﬁnancial fragilities
in the years preceding the crisis, the GFC originated in the North Atlantic region
and was transmitted to Asia mainly through the trade channel. The prevalence
of sound macroeconomic conditions—including huge ofﬁcial foreign currency
reserves that hadbeenpiling up since theAFC—helpeddevelopingAsia toweather
the crisis remarkably well. Economic growth slowed in the region but did not
stall, except for a temporary dip in the smaller economies that most heavily rely
on foreign trade. Financial markets in the region felt the global credit crunch
in 2007 and 2008, but were not left crippled as they were after the AFC, and
largely normalized by the second half of 2009. Further, the healthy state of ﬁscal
positions in the region created the policy space necessary for Asian governments,
and the PRC in particular, to counter the GFC with large ﬁscal and monetary
stimulus in support of aggregate demand in the region. Although debt ratios rose
as a result, strong growth, functioning domestic sovereign bond markets, and
low interest rates also prevailing in the international capital markets have been
favoring the debt dynamics in the region, keeping debt ratios at a manageable
level in most countries.
Subregional averages, which hide a great deal of country heterogeneity, are only
roughly indicative of the debt dynamics underlying the individual countries they
represent. This is evident in Figure 3.3, which plots individual economies’ debt
ratios underlying the subregional averages (Figure 3.3 on pp. 56–57). For Central
Asia (Figure 3.3a) and the Paciﬁc (Figure 3.3c), the subregional average debt ratios
appear to be broadly representative of individual country trends, notwithstanding
the occasional outlier. One outlier is Fiji, whose debt ratio has been increasing
since the early 2000s, whereas the regional trend indicates a declining ratio for
the Paciﬁc more broadly. For the East Asian aggregate, Mongolia’s debt pattern
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stands out strongly against that of the PRC and the Republic of Korea, which
show roughly similar developments.6 Similarly, in Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s
debt trajectory stands out against that of the other countries in the subregion.7
By and large, and notwithstanding the outliers, the subregional averages appear
to represent individual countries’ public debt patterns sufﬁciently well and offer
useful insights into the broader regional historical patterns as well as differences
among Asia’s subregions.8
Fiscal reaction functions and Asia’s ﬁscal prudence
The evolution of Asia’s ﬁscal indicators since 1994, discussed in the previous
section, provides prima facie evidence of a fundamental pattern of ﬁscal prudence
in the region. Even a crude look at the historical evidence suggests that countries
in the region have generally reacted responsibly to increasing debt ratios through
ﬁscal tightening, thus reining in ﬁscal positions and lowering debt to more
manageable levels when necessary. The most recent display of ﬁscal prudence
has been the region-wide fading since 2010 of ﬁscal stimulus packages enacted in
response to the GFC.9 Moreover, medium-term ﬁscal policy plans in the region
are testimony to countries’ determination to quickly cut back primary deﬁcits to
pre-GFC levels in response to higher debt ratios during 2009 and 2010 (ADB
2011a, b).
Responsible, or prudent, ﬁscal policy constitutes the cornerstone for long-term
ﬁscal sustainability and, as such, assessing the presence of such policy represents
the most fundamental of tests in DSA. In contrast to assessment methods centered
on accounting identities that link primary ﬁscal deﬁcits to the evolution of the
debt stock ratio—which will be discussed at length below—a most basic test
of sustainability consists in determining the behavioral pattern underlying the
decision-making process for primary ﬁscal expenditure and revenue.
Bohn (1998) laid out the theoretical and empirical foundations of the approach,
which have since been established ﬁrmly in the debt sustainability literature and
practice under the labels “ﬁscal reaction functions” or “primary balance tests”
(Chalk and Hemming 2000, IMF 2003, ADB 2010a). Essentially, a ﬁscal reaction
function estimates the relationship between a country’s primary surplus and public
debt, which is assumed to express a linear decision rule running from the latter to
the former. Following Bohn (1998), the basic empirical speciﬁcation involves the
primary surplus (pst) and lagged public debt (bt−1), both as ratios to GDP, as well
as temporary factors (τt) impacting the primary balance ratio, such as swings in
government spending and the business cycle:
pst = ρbt−1 +βτt + εt εt ∼
(
0,σ 2
)
. (3.1)
The vector coefﬁcient, β, measures the primary surplus’ response to the temporary
factors included in τt , and εt is an error term with mean 0 and variance σ 2. Central
to sustainability in the context of ﬁscal reaction functions is the coefﬁcient ρ,
which measures the response of the primary balance to changes in the debt ratio.
56 B. Ferrarini and A. Ramayandi
Bohn (1998) demonstrates that a sufﬁcient condition for ﬁscal sustainability is
that ρ be positive in value and lower than unity:
0 < ρ < 1 (3.2)
A value of the response parameter between zero and unity implies that the primary
surplus increases (on average) with the debt ratio and is taken as evidence of
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debt sustainability. The closerρ is to unity, the stronger is the ﬁscal policy response
to increases in the debt ratio. A ρ value close to zero implies that higher debt
ratios lead to virtually no response, and when ρ is negative, primary surpluses
shrink as a result. In such circumstances, ﬁscal policy can lead to an explosive
debt ratio.10
Fiscal reaction functions for selected Asian economies are estimated here for
subsets of the data described in Appendix 3.1 for ADB developing members.
Results are discussed in relation to a balanced panel of the seven core Asian
economies—the PRC, the Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, andThailand. For comparison, the results from regressions on a larger,
unbalanced panel of 32 economies are reported in Appendix 3.3, Tables A3.3.1–
A3.3.4.11
Table 3.2 summarizes the core results from panel regressions of ﬁscal policy
response functions based on the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS),
ordinary least squares (OLS), and system general method of moments (SGMM)
estimations. Appendix 3.4 describes the estimation strategy and methods. Linear
models, reported in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 3.2, estimate that the primary
deﬁcit in the seven Asian economies on average narrows between 0.036% and
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Table 3.2 Fiscal reaction functions—panel regression results for seven Asian economiesa
FGLS Linear OLS SGMM FGLS Cubic OLS SGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged debt 0.0361∗∗∗ 0.0487∗ 0.0634∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗ 0.215∗ 0.206∗∗∗
−0.0109 −0.0257 −0.022 −0.0769 −0.123 −0.0542
Lagged debtˆ2 −0.00334∗ −0.00498∗ −0.00332∗∗
−0.00183 −0.00276 −0.00146
Lagged debtˆ3 2.61e-05∗∗ 3.68e-05∗ 2.15e-05∗
−1.33E-05 −1.89E-05 −1.17E-05
Lagged surplus 0.482∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗
−0.0909 −0.0863
Real GDP 0.209∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
−0.0424 −0.0474 −0.0604 −0.0517 −0.0467 −0.0617
Real expenditure −0.112∗∗∗ −0.163∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗
−0.0173 −0.0193 −0.0475 −0.0181 −0.0201 −0.0465
Constant −0.543 −2.141∗∗∗ −3.409∗∗∗ −3.114∗∗∗
−0.834 −0.339 −1.158 −0.547
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 133 126 126 133 126 126
Economies 7 7 7 7 7 7
Chi2/R2_adj 196.8 0.411 475.9 277.3 0.422 489.5
A/B Order 1 . . . . . . −1.6445∗ . . . . . . −1.6611∗
A/B Order 2 . . . . . . 0.56621 . . . . . . 0.68116
aDependent variable: primary ﬁscal surplus.
A/B Order 1 and 2 = Arellano-Bond test for ﬁrst-and second-order autocorrelation; CPI = consumer
price index; FGLS = feasible generalized least squares estimation; HP = Hodrick-Prescott; OLS =
ﬁxed effects ordinary least squares estimation; SGMM = system generalized method of moments
Blundell–Bond linear dynamic estimation.
Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗ p <0.05, ∗p< 0.1.
. . . = not available.
Notes:
• The regressions are ﬁtted to a balanced panel of seven economies (the People’s Republic of China,
the Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) with data from
1990 to 2010.
• FGLS assuming country-speciﬁc heteroskedasticity and AR(1) autocorrelated errors.
• OLS assuming ﬁrst-order autoregressive errors (AR1).
• SGMM (Arellano and Bond 1991, Blundell and Bond 1998) .
• All variables are expressed as ratio of GDP.
• Lagged debt: MA2 debt stock lagged one year. Lagged debtˆ2 is squared lagged debt and Lagged
debtˆ3 is cubic lagged debt.
• Real GDP: HP-trend deviation of real GDP.
• Real expenditures: HP-trend deviation of real government expenditure.
• Controls: World oil price indicator, non-food commodity price indicator (deviations from HP-
trend), and CPI inﬂation (two-year moving average). Coefﬁcients not reported.
• Dummies: Country and year dichotomous variables included in regression (coefﬁcients not
reported).
• Chi2/adjusted R2: Overall ﬁt statistics; Chi2 for FGLS maximum likelihood regressions, and
adjusted R2 for OLS regressions.
• A/B Order 1 and 2 indicated are the z-statistic and the corresponding probability (Prob > z).
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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0.063% in response to a 1 percentage point increase in debt ratios, allowing for
a response lag of up to 2 years. The sign and magnitude of these linear point
estimates of coefﬁcient ρ are broadly in line with the ﬁndings of previous studies
and conﬁrm ﬁscally responsible behavior in the region (IMF 2003, ADB 2010a,
IMF 2011a). Moreover, there is no single instance in Table 3.2 of coefﬁcient ρ
taking on a negative sign, or of primary ﬁscal balances in Asia having responded
perversely to rising debt.
The statistical signiﬁcance of the response parameter estimates varies across
the alternative speciﬁcations in Table 3.2, but always within commonly accepted
levels. Signiﬁcance is highest for the FGLS (column 1) and SGMM (column 3)
models, which accommodate the actual time series structure underlying the data
better than OLS estimation (column 2). Also consistent across the three models
are the estimated coefﬁcients of real GDP and expenditure deviations, which
turn out with the expected sign and are both economically and statistically highly
signiﬁcant. That is, a positive shock to the cyclical component of output (realGDP)
is found to raise primary surplus by a factor of 0.21 to 0.27 on average, while an
increase of real expenditure above its trend is estimated to lower contemporaneous
primary ﬁscal surplus by an average factor of 0.11 to 0.16.
Speciﬁc to SGMM regression is the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable
among the regressors. Column 3 of Table 3.2 shows that the coefﬁcient of lagged
primary ﬁscal surplus is estimated at 0.482 and is highly signiﬁcant. Fiscal
policy is thus found to have a strong degree of inertia, causing the sign and
magnitude of primary budgets in one year to depend substantially on previous
years’ budgetary outcomeanddecisions.This shouldbeno surprise, as government
budget plans typically run over several years, and many government revenue and
expenditure items are largely ﬁxed or irreversible in the short term. As a result,
ﬁscal responsibility as measured by coefﬁcient ρ typically affects the primary
surplus only within the narrow margins of feasible adjustments, except during
exceptional periods of ﬁscal distress that may force governments to abruptly
reverse past decisions.12
To allow for the possibility that the ﬁscal reaction function might be nonlinear
in shape, columns 4–6 of Table 3.2 report the estimation results of cubic models.13
FGLS, OLS, and SGMM estimates again are highly consistent in conﬁrming the
existence of nonlinearities in the response function, which causes the intensity
of ﬁscal policy adjustments to vary with the level of debt a country faces. To
illustrate this relationship, Figure 3.4 displays the cubic ﬁscal reaction function
estimated by FGLS in column4,which is shown as a black line relating the primary
surplus ratio to the lagged public debt ratio.14 In contrast to a linear function, the
intensity of ﬁscal adjustments along the cubic function is shown to ﬁrst decrease
until the debt ratio reaches about 45%, and to then accelerate as the debt ratio
approaches higher levels. Put differently, the evidence is that countries facing
either low or high debt ratios, such as up to 20% of GDP and from 70% up,
implement the stronger primary ﬁscal balance adjustments. By contrast, countries
with debt ratios in the medium range tend to react less forcefully to changes in
public debt. This particular pattern of ﬁscal reaction in the region is corroborated
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by splined linear regression analysis, shown in Figure 3.4 as the dashed line in
light gray.15 Intuitively, this ﬁnding is compatible with a segmentation of Asian
countries into three groups: those that are highly adverse to anything other than
extremely low public debt ratios; others that are compelled to forcefully stem high
and rising debt ratios that may risk spiraling out of control; and a third group that
lies in between, characterized by a more relaxed ﬁscal response to changes to debt
deemed manageable without strong corrective action.
However that may be, the regression analysis in this section unambiguously
corroborates the presence of a profoundly responsible and prudent conduct of
ﬁscal policy in the region, which tends to keep debt ratios generally low, or keeps
them from rising uncontrollably at higher levels. On average, countries that see
their public debt/GDP ratio increase tend to counteract by increasing primary
ﬁscal surpluses or reducing deﬁcits within the following two years. At the same
time, primary balances respond in a systematic way to the business cycle, as
proxied by output gaps, and to swings in primary government spending relative
to trend.
As discussed in Chapter 2 (on concepts and issues), a value for the response
parameter ρ between 0 and 1 implies that the primary surplus increases as the debt
ratio rises, which is a sufﬁcient condition for (dynamic) sustainability. Therefore,
to the extent that past behavior represents a reliable gauge of future ﬁscal behavior
in Asia, this chapter provides ground for optimism about the most fundamental,
long-term outlook of debt sustainability in the region.
However, notwithstanding the role the ρ coefﬁcient plays in determining the
prospects for dynamic sustainability, the behavior of debt ratios over short- to
medium-term horizons also depends importantly on the behavior of the gap
between the interest rate on public debt and the growth rate of the economy.
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As noted in the next section, when the growth rate is above the interest rate,
the short-term debt/GDP ratio can be stabilized even when the primary balance
is in deﬁcit. In such circumstances, if the primary balance fails to increase as
debt increases—which is sufﬁcient for sustainability for a very long time when
the interest rate is above the growth rate—a stable debt/GDP ratio may still be
attained in the near term. Over the longer term, however, ﬁscal sustainability in
Asia will depend on the primary balance increasing as the debt ratio rises.
The interest rate–growth differential and the debt stabilizing
primary balance
The discussion in Chapter 2 emphasizes the crucial role played by the IRGD in
determining a country’s debt dynamics. Empirically, the impact of the IRGD on
debt sustainability in developing Asia arises most clearly in the context of the
debt stabilizing primary balance (DSPB). In terms of the notation introduced in
Chapter 2, the DSPB derives from the fundamental identity relating changes in a
country’s public debt ratio (bt = bt − bt−1) to the IRGD (θt = rt − gt) and the
primary ﬁscal surplus (pst):
bt − bt−1 = rt
1+ gt bt−1 −
gt
1+ gt bt−1 − pst
or
bt = θt
1+ gt bt−1 − pst, (3.3)
where bt is public debt, rt is the interest rate, gt is the growth rate of GDP, and
θt is the IRGD (all at time t).
Against the backdrop of medium-term assumptions about the IRGD (θt) and a
country’s ﬁscal policy path (pst), debt sustainability is judged according towhether
this scenario gives rise to a stable or “explosive” or “snow-balling” debt path over
the chosen horizon of analysis. By the same token, the debt stabilizing primary
balance (ps∗) is deﬁned as the primary surplus required to keep the debt ratio ﬁxed
at its existing level
(
b∗t−1
)
, given θt :
ps∗ = θt
1+ gt b
∗
t−1. (3.4)
The debt stabilizing primary balance (ps∗) is thus an essential element to inform
bothDSAandbudget plans on to the upper limit towhich average primary balances
may expand without causing the public debt ratio to rise.
The DSPB approach relates to the short- to medium-term with regard to ﬁscal
policy and thus abstracts from the asymptotic notion of debt sustainability as
embodied in the government budget constraint condition, discussed in Chapter 2.
Instead, the DSPB approach is ﬁrmly anchored in the practical notion that a
country’s ﬁscal policy risks spinning out of control eventually, unless it stabilizes
the debt ratio over the medium term.
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Figure 3.5 Actual and debt stabilizing primary balance (2009–10 average growth and
interest rates).
ARM = Armenia; BAN = Bangladesh; BHU = Bhutan; FIJ = Fiji; GDP = gross domestic product;
GEO = Georgia; IND = India; INO = Indonesia; KAZ = Kazakhstan; KGZ = Kyrgyz Republic;
KOR = Republic of Korea; MON = Mongolia; MAL = Malaysia; NEP = Nepal; PAK = Pakistan;
PHI = Philippines; PNG = Papua New Guinea; PRC = People’s Republic of China; SOL = Solomon
Islands; SRI = Sri Lanka; TAJ = Tajikistan; THA = Thailand; TON = Tonga; VIE = Viet Nam.
Note: Assumed GDP nominal growth rates, interest rates, public debt, and primary balance ratios at
2008–10 average.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
The basic intuition behind DSPB is illustrated in Figure 3.5, in relation to the
same sample of 24 Asian countries discussed in the ﬁrst section of this chapter.16
The horizontal axis measures countries’ actual average primary balance during
2008–10. The vertical axis indicates the debt stabilizing primary surplus that is
compatible with countries’ nominal GDP growth and interest rates, which are
also kept at 2008–10 average levels.17 The line intersecting the chart is the
locus of actual primary balances equaling the DSPB. Markers above the line
denote situations in which the DSPB is higher than the actual primary surplus.
Economies in this position will experience upward pressure on their debt ratio.
Conversely, markers below the line correspond to economies with actual primary
surplus above the level necessary to stabilize the debt ratio, causing their debt
ratios to decline.
Figure 3.5 suggests that the ﬁscal stance of the majority of Asian countries is
sustainable. More precisely, it shows that if countries’ growth and interest rates
remained unchanged at 2008–10 averages, the debt ratios of all the economies
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scattered below the intersecting line would be expected to decline. This would
include economies running large (actual) primary deﬁcits, where the debt-
increasing effect of the deﬁcitswould bemore than outweighed by a large IRGD.18
This illustrates the possibility (mentioned in the previous section) for debt ratios
to decline despite sizeable primary deﬁcits, as long as the debt dynamics are
dominated by a high growth and low interest environment. At least in the short
term, then, debt in many of the region’s economies would be deemed sustainable
regardless of whether they exercise ﬁscal prudence. However, this does not hold
true for countries above the intersecting line in Figure 3.5. For those economies,
the IRGD is not adequate to more than outweigh the ﬁscal stance, and thus they
are expected to experience upward pressure on their debt ratios. This is the case
for Armenia, Fiji, Georgia, and Malaysia and, to a lesser degree, for Thailand and
Tonga, which scatter more closely about the line.
Figure 3.6 conﬁrms that the widespread ﬁscal comfort in the region derives
mostly from an abundantly favorable IRGD, which in 2008–10 was negative
for all but one country and exceeded −10% for about half the countries in the
sample. The role of this IRGD in driving debt dynamics arises most clearly from
equation (3.3): when it is negative (θt < 0), economic growth erodes the debt
ratio more quickly than it is built up through accumulating interest. Moreover, a
sufﬁciently large IRGD erodes the debt ratio by enough to more than offset debt
accumulation through ﬁscal deﬁcits altogether, causing debt ratios to fall, as is
the case for the majority of economies in Figure 3.5.19 One example is Viet Nam,
whose 4.1% average primary deﬁcit during 2008–10 fell considerably below the
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10.2% primary deﬁcit it could run and still have its debt ratio stabilized as a result
of the large negative IRGD.
Bycontrast, a positive IRGD(θt > 0) pushes up the debt ratio, because economic
growth is insufﬁcient to counter cumulating interests. Such a case is Fiji during
2008–10, when its economic growth rate slowed to average 1.8% while it was
facing an effective interest rate of 6.3% on its public debt outstanding. This
explains why Fiji is not within the sustainable zone of Figure 3.5, despite its
average primary surpluses of about 0.7% in the 3 years prior to 2010.
Adjustments are also required by countries with negative but narrow IRGDs, if
they are insufﬁcient to counter sizeable primary deﬁcits. Armenia, for example,
would have to narrow its primary deﬁcit from an actual −4.2% in 2008–10 to
at least −0.6% for its debt ratio to stabilize. Figure 3.5 suggests that similar
adjustments would be necessary in Georgia, Fiji, and Malaysia and, to a lesser
extent, in Tonga and Thailand.
Although a large negative IRGD favors debt dynamics in the medium term, it
usually comes with its own hazards and is bound to narrow and eventually vanish
in the longer term.20 Periods of large negative IRGDs are typically associated with
the development of macroeconomic imbalances in the relevant economies, such
as large current account deﬁcits, which frequently lead to the rapid expansion of
credit; heightened vulnerability to growth ﬂuctuations; or endogenous reactions
by the interest rate to rising default risk, whether actual or perceived. Some
economies in the region showed many of these features when the AFC hit in
1998/99. More recent examples are Greece, Ireland, and Spain in 2010/11, when
a sudden drop in market conﬁdence caused government bond yields to spike
against the backdrop of a sharp slowdown in economic growth. As a result, the
IRGD in these countries turned positive after having been negative for the most
part since the creation of the euro in 1999, and governments were forced to enact
stringent austerity measures and deeply revise ﬁscal and primary balance targets
previously deemed sustainable (Escolano 2010). Except for Greece, perhaps, none
of these countries would have appeared to be at particular risk according to the
debt indicators informing DSA, but their external imbalances during the run up
to the crisis in the 2000s would have indicated risks of imbalance and possible
distress in future.
In addition, there are structural reasons for the IRGD to narrow and eventually
turn positive as countries reach a certain level of development. Upon reaching
a certain level of GDP per capita, the rate of economic expansion slows and
domestic interest rates tend to rise as ﬁnancial repression loosens and ﬁnancial
sectors deepen (Escolano 2010; Eichengreen, Park, and Shin 2011; IMF 2011a).
Eventually, dynamic steady-state growth conditions of mature economies will
require the IRGD to be positive.21
For these reasons, Asian economies will not be able to avoid a structural
narrowing of the IRGD over time and, eventually, a sign reversal, upon reaching
a certain level of development. In the meantime, these economies will be
exposed to an array of temporary shocks to their growth rate, interest rate,
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or both, which may at any time jeopardize debt dynamics previously deemed
sustainable.
To assess the region’s vulnerability to temporary shocks to the IRGD, Figure 3.7
recomputes debt stabilizing primary balances so as to account for a shock of 1
standard deviation narrowing economies’ IRGDs for the period 2000–10. As a
result, the DSPB shifts upward in Figure 3.7 (compared to Figure 3.5) for all
economies by a distance proportional to 1 standard deviation of their historical
IRGDs. To keep the debt ratio stable under this scenario, ﬁscal policy would have
to make up for a less favorable growth performance, higher interest rates, or both.
Borderline cases, such as the PRC, India, and Papua New Guinea would ﬁrst shift
outside the sustainability zone because of a narrowing IRGD, and their return
to it would require a sufﬁciently large adjustment to the actual primary balance,
implying a movement to the right on Figure 3.7. Other economies, including
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Figure 3.7 Actual and debt stabilizing primary balance with 1 standard deviation shock
on the interest rate–growth differential (shock on the interest rate–growth
differential).
ARM = Armenia; BAN = Bangladesh; BHU = Bhutan; FIJ = Fiji; GDP = gross domestic product;
GEO = Georgia; IND = India; INO = Indonesia; KAZ = Kazakhstan; KGZ = Kyrgyz Republic;
KOR = Republic of Korea; MON = Mongolia; MAL = Malaysia; NEP = Nepal; PAK = Pakistan;
PHI = Philippines; PNG = Papua New Guinea; PRC = People’s Republic of China; SOL = Solomon
Islands; SRI = Sri Lanka; TAJ = Tajikistan; THA = Thailand; TON = Tonga; VIE = Viet Nam.
Note: Assumed GDP growth rates and interest rates at 2008–10 average augmented by one standard
deviation of the interest rate–growth differential over the period. Debt and primary balance at 2008–10
average.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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that of Viet Nam, would still see their debt ratios decreasing under the given
assumptions, although their ﬁscal space would be compressed substantially as
a result.
The effects of a more drastic scenario are shown in Figure 3.8, which envisages
a sign reversal in Asian economies with negative IRGDs, so as to bring it to
positive 1% for all of them.22 In such an event—all else being equal—most
economies would shift up and out of the sustainability zone in Figure 3.8, their
return to sustainability requiring sufﬁciently sharp ﬁscal adjustments to cause a
wide shift to the right on the graph.23 Fiscal surpluses across the region would
reﬂect the new reality of positive IRGDs, with the effect that repeated ﬁscal
slippages would inevitably lead to snowballing debt ratios and the possibility
of distress in future.24 In such a scenario, ﬁscal responsibility would play a key
role in assuring Asia’s continued debt sustainability. Of course, nothing in such
a scenario could ensure that the same incentives inducing ﬁscal responsibility
would prevail in an Asia that is likely to ﬁnd itself economically and socially
transformed.
In sum, theDSPBapproach suggests thatmost economies in the region currently
fall well within the comfort zone of ﬁscal sustainability, which is in line with the
ﬁndings of earlier studies (Horne 1991; IMF 2003; Mendoza and Ostry 2007;
Adams, Ferrarini, and Park 2010). The analysis in this section also shows that the
prevalence of large negative IRGDs throughout the region has been responsible
for highly favorable debt dynamics, which overshadow the dampening effects of
Asia’s prudent ﬁscal policy on its debt ratios. However encouraging, these ﬁnding
should not be seen as grounds for complacency. Economic circumstances, such
as the interest rate on public debt being below the growth rate of the economy,
are unlikely to hold indeﬁnitely and are subject to sudden temporary reversals.
For these reasons, robust debt-stabilizing ﬁscal policies in the region would
have to aim at a stable debt ratio also if the interest rate should rise above the
growth rate.
Debt sustainability analysis based on macroeconomic
forecasts
Standard DSA projects the debt ratio based on the latest macroeconomic
forecasts and ﬁscal policy assumptions, typically over a medium-term horizon.25
Against the assumptions that concern the domestic and global macroeconomic
environments, which are exogenous to the analysis itself, DSA assesses whether
the projected path of ﬁscal policy (the baseline) is compatible with a sustainable—
that is, stable—debt ratio over a horizon of usually about ﬁve years.26 To
account for uncertainty in the forecast parameters, DSA involves a number
of stress tests. Leaving other variables unchanged, such tests involve raising
the interest rate, the growth rate, or both by 1 standard deviation above the
historical level observed for a particular country, to assess whether this would
signiﬁcantly alter the debt trajectory and the conclusions about the stability of
the ratio.27
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Figure 3.8 Actual and debt stabilizing primary balance with a positive 1% deviation on
the interest rate–growth differential.
ARM = Armenia; BAN = Bangladesh; BHU = Bhutan; FIJ = Fiji; GDP = gross domestic product;
GEO = Georgia; IND = India; INO = Indonesia; KAZ = Kazakhstan; KGZ = Kyrgyz Republic;
KOR = Republic of Korea; MON = Mongolia; MAL = Malaysia; NEP = Nepal; PAK = Pakistan;
PHI = Philippines; PNG = Papua New Guinea; PRC = People’s Republic of China; SOL = Solomon
Islands; SRI = Sri Lanka; TAJ = Tajikistan; THA = Thailand; TON = Tonga; VIE = Viet Nam.
Notes: Due to the need for different scales on the vertical and horizontal axes of Figure 3.8, its separat-
ing line is drawn more steeply than the same line in Figures 3.5 and 3.7. The interpretation of the line
remains the same.
AssumedGDP growth rate at 2000–10 average. Debt and primary balance at 2008–10 average. Interest
rate now assumed at 1% above 2000–10 growth rate.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the debt accounting mechanism underlying IMF-
style DSA relies on an equation that relates changes in the public debt/GDP ratio
(bt+1 − bt) to changes in the real interest rate (rt), the real growth rate of GDP (gt),
the rate of inﬂation (πt), the share of debt denominated in foreign currency αt , and
the exchange rate (t , expressed as local currency units per United States [US]
dollar):28
bt − bt−1 = rt−πt (1+gt )(1+gt+πt+gtπt )bt−1 −
gt
(1+gt+πt+gtπt )bt−1 +
tαt (1+rt )
(1+gt+πt+gtπt )bt−1 − pst +Zt (3.5)
Change in (primary (other
debt due to: (real interest rate) (real growth rate) (exchange rate) surplus) factors)
Other factors with a bearing on the debt ratio but not pertaining to the debt ﬂow
dynamics as such are subsumed in vector Zt . Included are mainly off-budget
68 B. Ferrarini and A. Ramayandi
(also labeled “hidden” or “below-the-line”) operations, such as debt repayments
out of ﬁnancial assets, debt relief operations, implicit liabilities that were
previously unbudgeted, or the realization of contingent liabilities adding to a
country’s debt stock (e.g., a government’s bail out of the domestic ﬁnancial sector).
For developing countries in particular, hidden liabilities tend to affect the evolution
of the debt ratio heavily and unpredictably.29
To provide an overview of IMF-type DSA projection for developing Asia,
equation (3.5) is applied to the sample of 24 Asian economies. Average debt ratio
projections are summarized in Figure 3.9, for the ﬁve subregions and an additional
aggregate of seven Asian economies: the PRC, India, Indonesia, the Republic of
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.30
Figure 3.9 shows the evolution of the subregional average debt ratios over
historical (2000–10) and projected (2011–16) time periods. Projections are based
on the latest ADB and IMF country forecasts of primary ﬁscal deﬁcits and the
rates of economic growth, interest, and inﬂation, as well as of exchange rates to
the US dollar.31 Appendix 3.5 lists the average forecast assumptions underlying
the 2011–16 baseline projection, as well as historical averages for 2000–10. With
few exceptions, the macroeconomic forecast assumptions are roughly in line with
2000–10 historical averages. The outlook for economic growth in the region is
thus strongly positive, combined with the expectation of continuing negative real
interest rates and moderate inﬂation pressures in most of the subregions. The
assumptions for ﬁscal policy in the region are somewhat less sanguine, with
primary deﬁcits expected to widen slightly in all the subregions except East Asia,
which is expected to return to a sizeable surplus during 2011–16.
Based on these assumptions, baseline debt ratio projections are derived and
are shown as dashed lines in Figure 3.9. Baseline projections show a declining
debt ratio for each subregion, which supports the view that, by and large,
public debt is on a ﬁrm path of continued consolidation across developing Asia.
Notwithstanding the GFC and the region’s ﬁscal response to it, public debt
sustainability would not appear to be at risk against the prospects of the region’s
macroeconomic and ﬁscal performance during the 5-year horizon, 2011–16.
Clearly, average subregional baseline projections do not necessarily reﬂect how
individual economies will fare, and they do not preclude that debt sustainability
may very well be at risk in some instances. Moreover, as baselines are premised
on the persistence of substantial negative IRGDs, this raises caveats similar to
those mentioned in relation to the foregoing DSPB analysis, because nothing
in the underlying DSA assumptions would rule out the possibility of a sudden,
unexpected narrowing or even reversal of the IRGDs. However, these caveats
do not invalidate the main thrust of the DSA analysis illustrated in Figure 3.8,
which yields an overly benign outlook about the medium-term ﬁscal dynamics
in the region.
Figure 3.10 reveals the main drivers of the debt ratio in each subregion during
2000–10. The effects on the debt ratio of the primary balance, the real interest rate,
the growth rate of real GDP, and the exchange rate are displayed. The percentage
change in the debt ratio accounted for by each of these items is measured on the
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Figure 3.10 Contributions to change in public debt in developing Asia (average %).
GDP = gross domestic product; Asia7 = China, People’s Rep. of; India; Indonesia; Malaysia;
Philippines; Korea, Republic of; and Thailand.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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right-hand side axis by the vertical distance from the zero line of the corresponding
marker. Drop lines below (above) the zero line correspond to effects that lower
(increase) the debt ratio. The debt/GDP ratio is shown as a line on the graphs,
measured on the right-hand side axis. By and large, the evidence emerging from
Figure 3.10 is that each subregion’s favorable debt dynamics are strongly centered
on the assumption of low real interest and high growth rates, which erode debt
ratios and more than outweigh the increase in debt from the accumulation of
primary deﬁcits and adverse exchange rate developments. Exceptions to this
pattern are the aggregate of seven economies (Figure 3.10a), where positive
average real interest rates are expected to push up the debt ratio, and the East
Asia subregion (Figure 3.10c), where ﬁscal surpluses are assumed to lower the
debt ratio during the projection period.
DSA projections are often accused of erring on the side of optimism regarding
the underlying macroeconomic forecast assumptions.32 To check the realism of
the baseline projections, Figure 3.9 includes a historical scenario (shown as a
light gray line) that projects debt ratios with key variables kept at their 2000–
10 historical averages, instead of reﬂecting the baseline assumptions. A visual
comparison between the historical scenario and the baseline indeed suggests that
the macroeconomic and ﬁscal forecasts for East Asian economies on average are
more optimistic than what historical records would merit. The opposite appears to
be the case for the other subregions, and for Central Asia the two scenarios mostly
overlap. By and large, the optimistic outlook for debt sustainability in developing
Asia is not premised on overly optimistic assumptions when measured against the
region’s historical record of macroeconomic and ﬁscal performance. Of course,
past experience is not necessarily a valid guide for expectations about the future,
and the baseline assumptions underlying Figure 3.9 may well not be substantiated
in the future.
DSA analysis only captures changes to the ratio that are accounted for by the
debt-creating ﬂows identiﬁed in equation (3.5) and typically does not account for
hidden liabilities or other debt/ﬂow reconciliations that are subsumed in factor Zt ,
unless they are explicitly foreseen and accounted for.33 The greater these factors’
inﬂuence on the debt ratio, the less will be the DSA’s capacity to correctly project
the debt ratio, even if theDSA’s other underlying assumptions are accurate. To take
this into account, the DSA in Figure 3.9 ﬁrst computes the hypothetical evolution
of the debt ratio during 2004 and 2010, according to the observed primary deﬁcits,
interest rate, inﬂation rate, growth rate, and exchange rate records. In any given
year from 2004 to 2010, the vertical distance between the hypothetical debt ratio
(shown as a dotted line) and the actual debt ratio thus provides a measure of
the factors left unaccounted for by the DSA.34 This measure is then added to the
baseline from 2011 to 2016, to revise the projection by an amount equal to the
average yearly “accounting error” in the previous ﬁve years, reversed in sign. In
Figure 3.9, the corrected baseline is displayed as a dotted line between 2010 and
2016. Although the baseline correction serves merely an illustrative purpose, it
puts into perspective the size of the average margin of inaccuracy in the baseline
projections on account of Zt .
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Apart from changes to the debt ratio on account of factors that are beyond
the debt dynamics accounted for by DSA, there is of course the possibility of
shocks to the variables underlying those dynamics. In large part, DSA consists
in assessing the likely impact of adverse shocks on the debt path and in judging
a country’s attainment of debt sustainability after the occurrence of any such
shocks. Whereas the standard DSA framework assesses risks around the baseline
through deterministic sensitivity analysis involving simple stress tests, a more
sophisticated approach involves stochastic simulations that more fully capture the
uncertainty surrounding the baseline scenario. These two approaches are discussed
in the next section, with application to DSA speciﬁcally for selected countries in
the region.
Assessing the impact of shocks in the deterministic and
stochastic debt sustainability analysis frameworks
In the standard DSA framework, the impact of speciﬁc shocks to key variables
underlying the debt dynamics is assessed through so-called “bound” or stress tests.
Leaving all the other variables underlying the baseline unchanged, a typical stress
test would thus envisage raising by 1 standard deviation above the historical level
a country’s interest rate, growth rate, or both, in order to ascertain whether this
would signiﬁcantly alter the debt trajectory and the conclusions on the country’s
debt. The main advantage of stress tests within standard DSA is that they offer
a streamlined approach that has a relatively straightforward interpretation and is
largely undemanding regarding the data input for analysis. The main disadvantage
is that the approach does not take into account the interaction among economic
variables. For example, a shock to the exchange rate is assumed to have no
effect on output or the interest rate. Further, the approach is unsuitable to account
for so-called “tail risks” (risks related to less likely but extreme events), which
constitute the main risk factor for debt sustainability.
Recent studies, mostly by IMF staff, have devised stochastic simulation
methods to improve estimates of uncertainty about the realization of debt
projections within a framework that allows for combined shocks to and feedback
among interacting economic variables. Essentially, the stochastic DSA framework
consists in a combination of vector autoregression analysis, to estimate the
correlation structure of the key macroeconomic variables with a bearing on
public debt dynamics, and Monte Carlo analysis to randomly generate frequency
distributions of the debt ratio for each year of a projection. In contrast to the
deterministic version of stress testing, which merely effects a shift in the debt ratio
as any one variable is shocked, the stochastic DSA yields a fan-chart enclosing a
range of possible debt projections associated with narrowing levels of likelihood
of occurrence.
This section compares standard deterministic with stochastic DSA based on
applications with regard to the eight Asian economies listed in Table 3.3.
Economies were chosen in order to represent each Asian subregion, within the
given constraints of availability of high-frequency data for stochastic simulation.
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Table 3.3 Fiscal characteristics of economies selected for debt sustainability analysis
Condition of primary
balance (2011–16)
Share of foreign currency denominated public debt
Low High
In deﬁcit India Viet Nam
Thailand
Relatively balanced China, People’s Rep. of Georgia
Indonesia
In surplus Korea, Rep. of Philippines
Source: Authors’ estimates.
This excludes from analysis the countries of the Paciﬁc region.Within the remain-
ing groups, the selected economies reﬂect different characteristics regarding their
ﬁscal stance and the incidence of foreign currency denominated debt, in order to
illustrate a broad range of sensitivities to the scenarios of ﬁscal and exchange rate
shocks in the analysis that follows.
Standard debt sustainability analysis stress tests
Figure 3.11 shows standard DSA debt ratio projections for each economy in
Table 3.3 during 2011–16. Baseline projections reﬂect the same ADB and IMF
macroeconomic country forecasts and ﬁscal policy assumptions underlying the
analysis in the foregoing section and, as before, the historical scenario holds the
key macroeconomic variables at their historical 10-year averages when projecting
the debt ratio. A largely benign picture of debt sustainability in the eight economies
emerges from thebaseline andhistorical scenarios,much in linewith the discussion
of subregional trends in the previous section. Indeed, the baseline debt ratio is
expected to decline in all economies but Thailand, where it is projected to increase
slightly during the 5-year horizon.With respect to the determinants of the projected
debt paths, Figure 3.12 reveals that Thailand’s debt ratio is mainly under pressure
from the persistence of relatively high primary deﬁcits. From 2013 on, Thailand’s
deﬁcits are expected to more than outweigh the debt erosion from a favorable
real IRGD. But in the other economies, highly negative IRGDs dominate the
debt dynamics, causing debt ratios to decline throughout 2011–16.35 For India
and Viet Nam, in particular, favorable interest and growth rates will be key to
keep debt ratios from rising against the backdrop of persistently high primary
deﬁcits.
Stress tests in Figure 3.11 reﬂect the outcome of 1 standard deviation increases
of the nominal interest rate or rate of inﬂation above baseline assumptions. Also
shown are stress scenarios in relation to a negative 1 standard deviation shock to the
rate of real economic growth or the primary surplus. Finally, a foreign exchange
rate shock envisages a 20% nominal depreciation of the domestic currency against
the US dollar. Each shock is introduced individually to the DSAs in Figure 3.11,
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that is, affecting one variable at a time while the other variables remain unchanged
with respect to the baseline assumptions.
By and large, the evidence from the stress tests is that shocks to output or the
nominal interest rate do not alter debt paths signiﬁcantly in most of the economies.
Debt ratios are shifted up slightly as a result of narrowing IRGDs as a result of
these shocks, but are not large enough to seriously interfere with the downward
sloping trend.36 Exceptions are Georgia and Thailand, where debt ratios increase
signiﬁcantly in reaction to a negative output shock.
An increase in inﬂation generally drives debt ratios down (Figure 3.11), as
it reduces the nominal value of outstanding debt. Debt ratio projections appear
to be most sensitive to a 1 standard deviation increase in primary deﬁcits. In
such a scenario, the debt ratio increases drastically, particularly in countries with
relatively higher deﬁcits: Georgia, India, and Thailand. Finally, the effect of a
20% (permanent) exchange rate depreciation severely jeopardizes public debt
sustainability in countries holding high shares of foreign currency denominated
debt, such as Georgia and Viet Nam.
In sum, standard stress tests identify some of these economy’s vulnerabilities
and provide some measures of the direct impact on the debt ratio of some shocks,
both ofwhich are useful for DSA and for ﬁscal planning. However, this framework
is largely unsuitable for assessing the fuller impact of shocks on the debt path
through economy-wide effects. For example, a shock increasing the interest rate
paid onpublic debtwill affect the debt ratio directly by increasing theﬁscal expense
for the interest bill, and indirectly by inducing a real exchange rate appreciation,
deﬂationary pressures, or slowing growth. The net impact on the debt ratio of the
initial shock will depend on a country’s speciﬁc economic environment and the
elasticities involved, but it is likely to diverge strongly from the direct impact on
the interest bill alone.
Stochastic simulations
The shortcomings of simple stress testing are partly overcome in the stochastic
approach to DSA, which estimates the correlation pattern among the key
macroeconomic variables to account for the basic feedback mechanism and
to reﬂect the uncertainty surrounding baseline debt projections. Essentially,
stochastic DSA relies on the estimation of a vector autoregression that captures
the correlation pattern of the (nonﬁscal) macroeconomic variables underlying
the evolution of the debt ratio. This information is then used to implement
Monte Carlo simulations. In contrast to the simple stress tests performed in the
deterministic version of DSA, the stochastic approach to DSA randomly generates
a large sample of stress tests from which frequency distributions of the debt
ratio can be derived for each year of the projection. These are then laid out
like a fan around the median projection, permitting a probabilistic assessment
of sustainability.37 (Appendixes 3.6 and 3.7 discuss the data and technical issues
related to stochastic DSA.)
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Figure 3.11 The deterministic approach to debt sustainability analysis.
e = estimate, GDP = gross domestic product, NEFD = nominal exchange rate depreciation.
Sources: Asian Development Outlook database; International Monetary Fund. World Economic
Outlook database, Article IV Debt Sustainability Assessments and Fiscal Monitor, various years.
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Figure 3.12 Annual changes in the central government debt ratios, 2011–16.
e = estimate, GDP = gross domestic product.
Note: Effect of interest rate–growth differential is computed as the difference between the effects of
real interest rate and real GDP growth.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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Figure 3.13 Stochastic approach to debt sustainability analysis (% of GDP).
DSA = debt sustainability analysis, GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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Stochastic DSA simulations for the eight Asian countries in this section
are based on quarterly data on real growth (gt), inﬂation (πt), the exchange
rate (t), and the nominal interest rate (rt). A four-variable unrestricted vector
autoregression system is estimated for each economy, to produce a variance–
covariance matrix () of the residuals (υt):
[I −A (L)]Xt = υt; υt ∼ N (0,) (3.6)
where Xt = [πt,t,rt,gt] is the variable matrix, I is an identity vector, A (L) is
a vector of lag operators, υt is a vector of residuals that is normally distributed
[N (.)] with mean 0 and variance. For each economy and year during 2011–16, a
probability distribution is generated from 10,000 randomdraws on the innovations
to each of the variables in Xt , in correspondence with the variance–covariance
structure determined by  and by taking fourth-quarter 2010 data as the initial
values.
To derive fan-charts for the DSA, the quarterly frequency distributions in
relation to the system of macroeconomic variables are ﬁrst annualized and then
combined with the baseline ﬁscal policy assumptions to yield yearly frequency
distributions of the simulated debt ratio projections. The resulting fan-charts are
shown in Figure 3.13 (see pp. 80–81), for each of the eight economies. Both 50%
and 90% conﬁdence intervals are displayed about the median of the projected
government debt ratio. For example, India’s median debt ratio is projected to
decline to about 54% in 2016, down from 67% in 2010. However, the 90%
conﬁdence interval marked by the graph’s shaded area suggests a 10% combined
probability that India’s debt ratio by 2016 will either have climbed to 71% or
plunged as low as 41% of GDP. Put differently, the broad range of possible
outcomes suggests that India’s estimated macroeconomic historical record gives
rise to a signiﬁcant degree of uncertainty about whether the variables driving
its debt dynamics will eventuate. Indeed, the range of outcomes within the 90%
interval is such that an increase in India’s debt ratio during 2010–16 could not be
excluded entirely. Other country fan-charts suggest that the same is true also for
Georgia, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
In terms of the sign of the projected changes in public debt ratios, the stochastic
projections broadly validate the realism of a country’s nonstochastic baseline
assumptions. (Baselines are shown as solid lines in Figure 3.13.) Indeed, median
stochastic debt paths and baselinesmostly point in the samedirection,whichwould
lead to roughly similar conclusions at least regarding the fundamental judgment
of a country’s debt sustainability. The only exception is Viet Nam, which displays
a baseline projection that slopes downward and a median stochastic projection
that slopes upward. Although the baseline falls well within the shaded area and
is thus consistent with the 90% conﬁdence interval of the stochastic distribution,
the standard DSA for Viet Nam appears to rest on overly optimistic assumptions
regarding its future economic development. From 2012 on, the fan-chart attributes
less than a 25% probability that the assumptions underlying Viet Nam’s baseline
will be realized. By contrast, baseline assumptions appear pessimistic for the PRC,
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India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which are closely within the upper edge of
the conﬁdence interval. The implications for the four economies’ ﬁscal plans
are that they should strengthen their ﬁscal positions in order to account for a
macroeconomic environment that may fall short of expectations.
The fan-charts are also useful for assessing the degree of association between
central government debt dynamics and changes in the structural feature of
the economy, such as medium- to long-term changes in the ﬁscal policy
stance. Figure 3.14 illustrates this point by imposing primary budget balance
throughout the projection period—that is, forcing more stringent ﬁscal discipline
on economies’ running primary deﬁcits (e.g., India and Viet Nam), and relaxing
the ﬁscal position of economies with primary surpluses (such as the Republic of
Korea and the Philippines).
More ﬁscal discipline in India signiﬁcantly changes the prospects of itsmedium-
term debt dynamics. With increased ﬁscal discipline, the path of India’s debt ratio
is likely to be brought down consistently from 2012 to 2016 for any possible
realization of the underlying macroeconomic variables within the horizon. The
case of Viet Nam also shows that more stringent ﬁscal discipline is required
to drive down the debt path, suggesting that the country needs more budgetary
discipline in order to lower its government debt ratio. The exercise on the Republic
of Korea strongly suggests that the decline in its debt path hinges heavily on its
ability to realize the projected primary surplus assumed in its baseline.38 A more
relaxed budgetary position would derail the country’s attempt to sharply reduce
its central government debt ratio. The Philippine case, on the other hand, suggests
that the country still has room to increase its central government spending, as a
more relaxed primary budget position does not seem to alter the country’s target
for reducing its debt ratio in the medium term.
In sum, stochastic DSA analysis broadly conﬁrms the conclusions based
on standard DSA in the preceding section. The outlook for debt dynamics in
developing Asia is mostly benign, and among the economies considered in this
section there is no evidence of debt ratios that suggest a clear danger of spinning
out of control during the horizon of projection. This is not, however, reason for
complacency. StochasticDSAhighlights quite clearly that the spectrumofpossible
or indeed likely outcomes is substantially broader than what simple baseline
analysis and related stress tests show. Indeed, even within the small sample of
eight economies considered in this section, fan-charts include instances where
an increase of the debt ratio is fully plausible on the basis of the underlying
macroeconomic forecasts and ﬁscal policy assumptions.
Conclusion
This chapter reviews the historical development of ﬁscal indicators in developing
Asia since the early 1990s and analyzes the main factors that will determine
the region’s ﬁscal performance during the next few years, up to 2016. The
chapter has attested to a pattern of ﬁscal responsibility among the economies in
the region. Regression analysis estimating ﬁscal reaction functions for a sample of
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Figure 3.14 Stochastic approach to debt sustainability analysis—primary budget balanced.
DSA = debt sustainability analysis, GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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24 economies conﬁrms previous ﬁndings about governments’ tendency to tighten
ﬁscal policy to counter rising debt ratios. This display of prudence has served Asia
well by keeping debt ratios under control, which constitutes the most fundamental
of determinants to ensure debt sustainability in the region over the longer term—
assuming this prudence persists despite the profound social and economic changes
Asia is undergoing.
The analysis has also highlighted the profound beneﬁts economies in the region
derive from having relied on rapid economic growth and low interest rates, which
together have tilted the debt dynamics in their favor by exerting a persistent
downward pressure on debt ratios.Under such conditions, even a less prudent ﬁscal
stance or the occurrence of occasional shocks increasing debt ratios temporarily
are unlikely to overturn the benign outlook on debt sustainability. However, one
cannot assume that negative IRGDs will persist for the longer term. IRGDs
inevitably will shrink and eventually turn positive as growth in the region will
have to slow at some point, and rapid development of the region’s economies
will have to lead to a gradual easing of the structural constraints and policies
that have been keeping domestic interest rates artiﬁcially low. Simple graphical
simulations of such a narrowing of countries’ IRGDs have shown an environment
that would bemuch less forgiving of the conduct of ﬁscal policy and the absorption
of macroeconomic shocks than has hitherto been the case for the region. In such
a scenario, Asia’s ﬁscal prudence will have to be the ultimate guarantor of ﬁscal
sustainability, as advanced countries facing positive IRGDs have been witnessing
particularly during recent times.
The discussion then moves on to highlight the main elements of IMF-style
deterministic DSA analysis, focusing on subregional aggregates rather than
individual economies. Based on the latest macroeconomic and ﬁscal policy
forecasts, DSA analysis yields overwhelming evidence of a generally benign
outlook for public debt sustainability in the region. All of Asia’s subregions
(although not necessarily each economy in the subregions) are associated with
declining or stable debt paths up to 2016, premised on the assumption of continuing
strong growth, low interest rates, moderate inﬂationary pressures, and the gradual
normalization of ﬁscal policy after regionwide expansion in relation to the
2008/09 GFC.
Finally, the results of standard DSA are compared with stochastic DSA,
which more fully accounts for the interrelations among the variables driving
debt dynamics and improves the estimates of uncertainty surrounding baseline
assumptions. The evidence arising from comparative analysis involving eight
economies in the region supports the conclusion that the ﬁscal outlook for the
region is generally benign. More generally, the ﬁndings from stochastic DSA
broadly alignwith those of standardDSA, thus validating the baseline assumptions
underlying the latter. At the same time, however, the stochastic simulations
highlight a large spectrum of likely outcomes regarding the macroeconomic
realizations driving debt ratios, not all of which are compatible with stable or
declining debt ratios as suggested by the baseline assumptions. The implication
for countries with higher risk proﬁles of public debt is thus to revise ﬁscal policy
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to be able to accommodate a future macroeconomic environment that may be less
favorable than that reﬂected in the baseline assumptions.
Appendix 3.1: Data issues
Assessing public ﬁnances in the region is a daunting challenge and huge difﬁculties
are encountered in assembling a comprehensive set of ﬁscal and public debt data
for all the developing members of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). To
the familiar problems of occasional missing observations over time and across
countries are added a number of serious shortcomings in the availability of
consistent and comprehensive ﬁscal data in some countries and, in particular,
pertaining to public debt obligations. In addition, only a very limited number
of countries publish public sector asset positions (as well as public debt data).
Consequently, ﬁscal sustainability analysis needs, for the most part, to be based
on only one part of the ﬁscal picture (liabilities rather than assets). Even in the
case of countries that report interest payments on debt, consistent data are not
generally available for the actual interest rates on public debt and the extent to
which debt may be serviced at concessional or market interest rates. Moreover,
to the extent that some countries issue public debt to “captive” local buyers (such
as local banks and pension funds), the true economic costs of servicing that debt
may be quite different from the recorded costs.
Another problem is that countries do not generally report contingent and other
hidden (off-balance-sheet) liabilities. Based on experience, these are often the
key factors in inﬂuencing ﬁscal sustainability over time, and are where the “ﬁscal
surprises” often occur. For example, much of the deterioration in ﬁscal positions
during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis was associated with bailouts of distressed banks
and other ﬁnancial institutions. The omission of contingent ﬁscal liabilities implies
that the approach adopted arguably represents the “best case” in so far as the
accounting for hidden liabilitieswould likely lead to the possibility of higher rather
than lower future debt ratios, and potentially larger threats to ﬁscal sustainability.
(Chapter 4 discusses at length the implications of hidden liabilities for public debt
sustainability for the case of the People’s Republic of China [PRC]).
At the most fundamental level, there is also the issue of how broadly or
narrowly the public sector should be deﬁned. Ideally, ﬁscal sustainability analysis
should cover all aspects of public sector operations and activities that have
ﬁscal implications, suggesting a very broad and comprehensive approach. Such
comprehensiveness is probably best achieved by focusing on the overall public
sector (including all actual and quasi state-owned enterprises and government-
linked companies), but it is frequently difﬁcult to draw the line in deﬁning the
public sector, and comprehensive data for the entire public sector are frequently
difﬁcult to obtain. Even in cases where only the (formal) government sector can be
covered, there are often issues related to the availability of data for different levels
of government (central, state, and local) and data consistency over time. There are
no simple solutions to these and related “boundary” problems in deﬁning the
public sector. And, frequently, it is necessary to base the analysis on a “narrow”
Public debt sustainability assessments for developing Asia 87
deﬁnition of government because data are not available for broader deﬁnitions of
the public sector.
For the purposes of this chapter, annual data were assembled on government
ﬁscal positions and debt (and other variables) for 45 ADB developing members,
from the early 1990s through 2010. The data were assembled from various
International Monetary Fund (IMF) country publications and reports, such as
IMF Article IV documents and Statistical Appendixes. Where possible, data
for the general government were used but, in several cases, central government
data had to sufﬁce. Government debt and ﬁscal time series were integrated with
additional data drawn from the IMF Government Finance Statistics database and
fromnational sources.Data coverage varies across countries and spans amaximum
of 21 years, 1990–2010. Macroeconomic variables were drawn from the ADB
Asian Development Outlook database, the IMF International Financial Statistics,
and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators databases. Appendix 3.2,
Table A3.2.2 provides a detailed description of the data sources underlying
this chapter.
In some cases, series had breaks or gaps, causing the panel data to be
somewhat unbalanced, with the most comprehensive time series coverage
generally occurring in the more developed economies. To avoid inconsistencies
from changing compositions of the subregional data aggregations over time, only
24 economies were retained for the descriptive analysis in this chapter. For the
regression analysis, an unbalanced panel of 32 economies was retained after
excluding thosewith interruptions in any of the time series underlying the analysis.
The panel was further narrowed to 7 core economies, for which a fully balanced
data set that includes all the relevant variables is available for regression analysis.
The descriptive overview relies mostly on country data grouped into ﬁve
subregional aggregates, deﬁned according to ADB’s geographical subdivisions
of its developing members: Central Asia, East Asia, the Paciﬁc, South Asia, and
Southeast Asia. One key question that arises when presenting and discussing the
large amounts of country data concerns the way in which subregional aggregates
are compiled. For example, ADB’s Asian Development Outlook follows the
practice of weighting relevant country measures by gross national income.
Although this is appropriate when, for example, summarizing gross domestic
product or average annual growth rates across the region, it obviously causes
averages to represent mostly the largest economies in the region, such as the PRC
(for East Asia) and India (for SouthAsia). For example, as a result of gross national
incomeweighting, an economy like the PRC inevitably ends up representingmore
than 40% of the regional average. By contrast, without applying a concept of
region-wide ﬁscal positions, it is not clear whether there is a meaningful way
to devise weights in relation to ﬁscal variables, where economy size, however
measured, has no evident bearing on its representativeness within some broader
subregional or regional aggregate. Based on these considerations, all the ﬁscal
aggregates for Asia presented in this chapter refer to unweighted simple arithmetic
averages of data of individual economies by subregion or developing Asia as a
whole, unless speciﬁed otherwise.
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Appendix 3.3: Regression analysis samples and functions
Table A3.3.1 Samples for regression analysis
Subregion/economy Asia32 Asia7 Subregion/economy Asia32 Asia7
Central Asia South Asia
Armenia  Bangladesh 
Azerbaijan  Bhutan 
Georgia  India  
Kazakhstan  Sri Lanka 
Kyrgyz Republic  Maldives 
Tajikistan  Nepal 
Uzbekistan  Pakistan 
East Asia Southeast Asia
China, People’s Rep. of   Cambodia 
Hong Kong, China  Indonesia  
Korea, Rep. of   Lao PDR 
Mongolia  Malaysia  
Paciﬁc Philippines  
Fiji  Singapore 
Marshall Islands  Thailand  
Papua New Guinea  Viet Nam 
Solomon Islands 
Tonga 
Vanuatu 
= included; Asia32 = 32 Asian economies, Asia7 = 7 Asian economies, Lao PDR = Lao People’s
Democratic Republic.
Source: Authors’ listing.
Table A3.3.2 Fiscal reaction functions—panel regression results for 32 Asian economiesa
FGLS FGLS OLS OLS SGMM FGLS OLS SGMM
Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Cubic Cubic Cubic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0302 0.0339 0.0285∗∗ −0.0818 0.0223 0.0312
debt (0.00838) (0.00846) (0.0216) (0.0214) (0.0120) (0.0546) (0.147) (0.113)
Lagged 0.00226∗∗ 0.000184 6.25e-05
debtˆ2 (0.000964) (0.00261) (0.00207)
Lagged −1.35e-05∗∗ −1.19e-06 −1.08e-06
debtˆ3 (5.27e-06) (1.46e-05) (1.15e-05)
Lagged 0.596∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗
surplus (0.0566) (0.0521)
Real GDP 0.258∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(0.0303) (0.0312) (0.0516) (0.0514) (0.0556) (0.0313) (0.0518) (0.0491)
Real −0.160∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗
expenditure (0.00986) (0.00995) (0.0169) (0.0165) (0.0330) (0.00995) (0.0171) (0.0303)
Constant −1.737∗∗ −1.811∗∗ −1.397∗∗∗ −1.859∗∗∗ −0.291 −1.312
(0.721) (0.719) (0.391) (0.382) (1.152) (0.941)
Controls No Yes No Yes No No No No
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Continued)
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Table A3.3.2 (Continued)
FGLS FGLS OLS OLS SGMM FGLS OLS SGMM
Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Cubic Cubic Cubic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Observations 488 488 456 456 481 488 456 456
Economies 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
Chi2/R2_adj 975.4 956.4 0.165 0.210 368.5 857.6 0.161 413.2
A/B Order 1 … … … … −2.4729∗∗ … … −2.4549∗∗
A/B Order 2 … … … … 0.5098 … … 0.50868
aDependent variable: primary ﬁscal surplus.
… = data not available, AR = autoregressive, CPI = consumer price index, FGLS = feasible
generalized least squares estimation, GDP = gross domestic product, HP = Hodrick–Prescott, OLS
= ﬁxed effects ordinary least squares estimation, SGMM = system generalized method of moments
Blundell–Bond linear dynamic estimation.
Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗p< 0.01, ∗∗p< 0.05, ∗p< 0.1.
Notes:
• The regressions are ﬁtted to an unbalanced panel of 32 economies with data from 1990 to 2010
(depending on data availability for individual economies; see Table A3.2.2).
• FGLS assuming country-speciﬁc heteroskedasticity and AR(1) autocorrelated errors.
• OLS: assuming ﬁrst-order autoregressive errors (AR1).
• SGMM: (Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998).
• All variables are expressed as ratio of GDP.
• Lagged debt: MA2 debt stock lagged one year. Lagged debtˆ2 is squared lagged debt and lagged
debtˆ3 is cubic lagged debt.
• Real GDP: HP-trend deviation of real GDP.
• Real expenditure: HP-trend deviation of real government expenditure.
• Controls: World oil price indicator, non-food commodity price indicator (deviations from HP-
trend), and CPI inﬂation (two-year moving average). Coefﬁcients not reported.
• Dummies: Country and year dichotomous variables included in regression (coefﬁcients not
reported).
• Chi2/R2_adj: Overall ﬁt statistics; Chi2 for FGLS maximum likelihood regressions, and adjusted
R2 for OLS regressions.
• Controls is a vector of control variables, including oil price and non-fuel commodity price indexes,
computed as deviations from the HP ﬁlter. Both variables are interacted with a dichotomous
variables taking value 1 for oil and non-fuel commodity exporting countries in the region, and
zero otherwise. As a further control, also included are CPI ratios, computed as two-year moving
averages.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Table A3.3.3 Fiscal reaction functions—spline regressions for seven Asian economiesa
Feasible generalized least squares estimation
2 splines 5 splines
(1) (2)
Lagged debt S1 0.0800∗∗
(0.0382)
Lagged debt S2 0.0638∗∗∗
(0.0197)
(Continued)
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Table A3.3.3 (Continued)
Feasible generalized least squares estimation
2 splines 5 splines
(1) (2)
Lagged debt S1 0.185∗∗
(0.0743)
Lagged debt S2 0.0621
(0.0661)
Lagged debt S3 −0.0365
(0.0604)
Lagged debt S4 0.0563∗
(0.0320)
Lagged debt S5 0.116∗∗∗
(0.0358)
Real GDP 0.159∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗
(0.0562) (0.0557)
Real expenditures −0.102∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(0.0180) (0.0177)
Constant −2.952∗∗ −4.426∗∗∗
(1.170) (1.338)
Controls No No
Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 133 133
Number of economies 7 7
Chi2 286.0 302.2
aDependent variable: primary ﬁscal surplus.
AR = autoregressive, FGLS = feasible generalized least squares, GDP = gross domestic product.
Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗p< 0.01, ∗∗p< 0.05, ∗p< 0.1.
Notes:
• FGLS: assuming country-speciﬁc heteroskedasticity and AR(1) autocorrelated errors.
• 2 splines: the distribution of the public debt ratio is split once, at the median (38.48%) of the data.
• 5 splines: the distribution of the public debt variable is split at the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th
percentiles of the data. The corresponding knots are 15.70% (20th), 29.03% (40th), 44.68% (60th),
65.04% (80th).
• This table reports the results from estimating two such spline regressions. The ﬁrst column divides
the sample of seven observations in two, according to whether they are associated with a debt
ratio below or above the median. The coefﬁcient estimates reported in the ﬁrst two rows of the
table suggest that ﬁscal response at 0.080 on average is higher in the below-median section than
it is above, at 0.064. However, more nuanced is the results of the spline regression in column 2,
where the debt ratio is split into ﬁve sections, divided by the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentiles
of the distribution of debt ratios in the sample. What emerges is a clear pattern of increasing
coefﬁcient estimates in relation to higher debt ratio segments, which roughly corresponds with
the pattern of the cubic function estimated earlier. Indeed, Figure 3.4 shows the two estimated
functions to largely overlap. The difference in the splined regression is that the ﬁscal response is
estimated to take a negative sign over themedian (3rd) segment, while the cubic function is strictly
monotonic; however, the spline estimate in relation to that particular section lacks precision. The
lack of statistical signiﬁcance in some segments along the spline (the 2nd and 3rd in this case) is
rather unsurprising given the limited sample size of 133 observation that is split into 5 segments
each with a proportionally lowered number of degrees of freedom.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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Table A3.3.4 Fiscal reaction functions—spline regressions for 32 Asian economiesa
Feasible generalized least squares estimation
2 splines 5 splines
(1) (2)
Lagged debt S1 0.00522
(0.0206)
Lagged debt S2 0.0331∗∗∗
(0.0106)
Lagged debt S1 −0.00837
(0.0285)
Lagged debt S2 0.0268
(0.0421)
Lagged debt S3 0.00499
(0.0467)
Lagged debt S4 0.0495∗
(0.0285)
Lagged debt S5 −0.00377
(0.0168)
Real GDP 0.259∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗
(0.0310) (0.0314)
Real expenditures −0.162∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗
(0.0100) (0.0100)
Constant −1.195 −0.922
(0.944) (1.059)
Controls No No
Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 488 488
Number of economies 32 32
Chi2 898.4 871.5
aDependent variable: primary ﬁscal surplus.
AR = autoregressive, FGLS = feasible generalized least squares, GDP = gross domestic product.
Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗p< 0.01, ∗∗p< 0.05, ∗p< 0.1
Notes:
• FGLS: assuming country-speciﬁc heteroskedasticity and AR(1) autocorrelated errors.
• 2 splines: the distribution of the public debt ratio is split once, at the median (46.00%) of the data.
• 5 splines: the distribution of the public debt variable is split at the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th
percentiles of the data. The corresponding knots are 28.52% (20th), 41.38% (40th), 51.47% (60th),
and 71.04% (80th).
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Appendix 3.4: Estimating ﬁscal reaction functions
The regression speciﬁcation applied in this chapter is guided by optimal taxation
theory, as in Bohn (1998). Simply put, this theory postulates that temporary
government spending and declines in income cause budget deﬁcits to temporarily
rise above normal levels and to revert to their optimal trend thereafter. In addition
to assuming a linear relationship between debt stock and primary deﬁcit ratios,
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we test for the possibility that this relationship takes a nonlinear form, evidence for
which has been found in other studies, such as IMF (2003), ADB (2010a), or IMF
(2011a). The Bohn-type regression equation augmented by quadratic and cubic
debt regressors and a set of dichotomous variables speciﬁc to the panel setting
takes the form:
psit = ρ1bit−1 +ρ2b2it−1 +ρ3b3it−1 +β1y˜it +β2g˜it +β3cit +β4dit + εit
(A4.1)
εit = ϕεit−1 + γit and γit ∼
(
0,σ 2γ
)
, (A4.2)
where:
• all variables are expressed as a ratio of gross domestic product (GDP);
• subscript i is a country (panel) indicator, and t indicates time, measured in
years;
• psit is the primary ﬁscal surplus, deﬁned as government ﬁscal income minus
expenditure;
• bit−1 is the two-year average debt stock lagged one year with respect to the
primary balance;
• b2it−1 and b3it−1 are the quadratic and cubic debt stock ratios, respectively.
• ρ1 is the key coefﬁcient of interest in this regression when it is estimated in
its linear form, i.e., excluding quadric and cubic debt: ρ1 measures the sign
and intensity of the ﬁscal reaction across countries and time;
• ρ2 and ρ3 are the core coefﬁcients deﬁning the ﬁscal reaction function, jointly
with ρ1, when it is estimated as a cubic relationship;
• y˜it is the output gap or business cycle, measured as the deviation from trend
of real GDP, whereby the trend is determined by the Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter;1
• g˜it is temporary ﬁscal outlays, measured as the deviation from trend of real
government expenditure, whereby the trend is determined by the Hodrick–
Prescott ﬁlter;
• cit are control variables, including oil and non-food commodity prices—both
measured as trend deviations—and average CPI inﬂation rates;
• dit is a matrix including country dichotomous variables, a time trend, and the
regression constant;
• β1 to β4 are the additional coefﬁcients estimated; and
• εit is a ﬁrst-order autoregressive error term, AR(1), which in the feasible
generalized least squares (FGLS) estimation also allows for cross-sectional
correlation and heteroskedasticty.
Equation (A4.1) is estimated by FGLS. Compared to ordinary least squares
(OLS), the FGLS method allows for a variance–covariance matrix that accounts
for correlation and heteroskedasticity across countries as well as for county-
speciﬁc autocorrelation. Put differently, FGLS accommodates the possibility that
the relationship between ﬁscal policy and the variables inﬂuencing it may be
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correlated, and that variances across these variables as well as autocorrelation
structures be not the same across countries. To check the robustness of the
estimates to changes in the estimation method, we estimate equation (A4.1)
also by OLS. The latter also allows for AR(1) disturbances across panels, but
not for heteroskedasticity and country-speciﬁc correlation of the error terms, as
within-estimates are now produced through OLS, not FGLS.2
In addition to the static model speciﬁcation, we estimate equation (A4.1) as a
systemgeneralmethod ofmoments (SGMM)dynamic panelmodel, the dynamism
or feedback mechanism of which derives from including lagged primary ﬁscal
surplus as an additional regressor, shown on the right hand side of equation A4.3.
More speciﬁcally, the latter enters the regression as the so-called general method
of moments (GMM)-type instrument, (ast−i), which captures the dynamics of the
primary ﬁscal surplus variable and its dependence on itself through time, as well
as the system-type instruments, which are the debt, GDP, and expenditure ratios
taken in differences (signed by a dot). Omitting the cubic speciﬁcation of the debt
stock ratio for simplicity, the SGMM is estimated as3:
psit = αsit−1,2 +ρbit−1 +β1˜yit +β2g˜it +ρb˙it−1 +β1y˙it +β2g˙it + εit (A4.3)
εit = ϕεit−1 + γit and γit ∼
(
0,σ 2γ
)
(A4.4)
Themain advantageofSGMMestimation is its explicit accounting for the inertia of
primaryﬁscal deﬁcits. For example, government ﬁscal reactionmaybe constrained
when current outlays are largely predetermined by extant commitments for
multiyear investment projects or government consumption, such as public sector
payrolls. To the extent that current ﬁscal revenue and expenditure (net of interest
payments) tend to correlate to those of the previous years, SGMM adds an
important dynamic element that increases the regression ﬁt and hence its accuracy
above that of FGLS and OLS.
However popular a tool of cross-country analysis may be, a number of caveats
and qualiﬁcations need mentioning in relation to the results presented in this
section. In view of serious data limitations and the considerable heterogeneity
within the region, the econometric results are to be treated with care. Indeed,
although a fully balanced set of data allows robust panel estimation for the sample
of 7 Asian economies, the results are far less robust across alternative samples
including larger groups of economies. This arises from Appendix 3.3, Tables
A3.3.2–A3.3.4, summarizing the outcomes from regressions on the sample of 32
economies. Whereas the large-sample results can be seen to qualitatively overlap
with those of the sample of 7 economies, the economic and statistical signiﬁcance
of the ﬁscal reaction coefﬁcients tends to be lower for the former. However,
differences in outcomes are most pronounced in the cubic regressions, which
present different signs on the key parameters, implying a shape of the reaction
curve that would be different from that in Figure 3.4.
The sensitivity of the regressions to sample inclusion derives from the
dominance of single country experiences in the results during certain years, which
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is felt particularly strongly when estimating small samples. Lest outliers are to
drive the results, regression analysis has to make do with a small subsample of
countries for which a full series of data of sufﬁcient quality are available, as
was done in this chapter. Even then, however, panel regressions of ﬁscal reaction
functions are best interpreted as a pattern indicative of a regional context such
as for Asia, and not as proof of a consistent ﬁscal response function speciﬁc to
any individual country. To achieve country-speciﬁc conclusions, the empirical
strategy would have to take exclusive focus on countries one by one, studying
the time series properties and unit roots of the relevant variable over an extended
period of time, probably not less than 40–50 years. Whereas Bohn’s ground-
breaking work in the estimation of ﬁscal reaction functions could rely on roughly
two centuries of data on ﬁscal policy in the United States (Bohn 1998), such a
rich data set is usually not available for emerging economies. Thus, researchers
are regularly forced to use a panel setting across countries, although the concept is
strictly country-speciﬁc and its hypotheses can ultimately only be refuted against
country data series spanning a reasonably long time period.
Appendix 3.4 notes
1 The Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter removes the trend γ from y (or g) by minimizing with
respect to γt :min
T∑
t=1
{
(yt − γt)2 +ϕ
[(
γt+1 − γt
)− (γt − γt+1)]2}, where yt −γt is the
business cycle component or temporary output gap that is assumed to affect the primary
surplus.
2 The interested reader can ﬁnd a discussion about the differences between these methods
in Greene (2012).
3 SGMM builds a system of two equations including the original equation as well as the
transformed equation, in differences. It rests on the assumption that ﬁrst differences of
the instrument variables are uncorrelated with the ﬁxed (country) effects. See Arellano
and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) for a discussion of the SGMM method.
Appendix 3.5: Assumptions underlying the 2011–16 baseline
projections
Table A3.5.1 Assumptions underlying the 2011–16 baseline projection
Subregion and
period
GDP
growth
rate
Inﬂation
rate
Average
interest
rate
Revenue Expenditure Average
share of
FCD debt
Primary
deﬁcit∗
(%) (%) (%) (% of
GDP)
(% of
GDP)
(%
total
debt)
(% of
GDP)
Central Asia
2000–10 0.081 0.111 0.026 −0.081 0.023 0.809 −0.033
2011–16 0.049 0.071 0.027 −0.044 0.030 0.759 0.054
(continued)
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Table A3.5.1 (Continued)
Subregion and
period
GDP
growth
rate
Inﬂation
rate
Average
interest
rate
Revenue Expenditure Average
share of
FCD debt
Primary
deﬁcit∗
(%) (%) (%) (% of
GDP)
(% of
GDP)
(%
total
debt)
(% of
GDP)
East Asia
2000–10 0.073 0.065 0.033 −0.032 0.004 0.328 −0.330
2011–16 0.088 0.048 0.031 −0.017 0.022 0.302 −1.532
Paciﬁc
2000–10 0.020 0.058 0.044 −0.012 0.020 0.543 −1.256
2011–16 0.041 0.068 0.047 −0.021 0.027 0.613 0.634
South Asia
2000–10 0.059 0.068 0.053 −0.014 0.026 0.512 1.199
2011–16 0.064 0.076 0.063 −0.014 0.046 0.492 1.413
Southeast Asia
2000–10 0.053 0.060 0.049 −0.010 0.008 0.371 0.476
2011–16 0.057 0.048 0.047 −0.001 0.019 0.300 1.263
FCD = foreign currency denominated, GDP = gross domestic product.
Note: − sign = deﬁcit in the Primary deﬁcit column.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Appendix 3.6: Data issues in stochastic debt sustainability
analysis
Stochastic debt sustainability analysis (DSA) relies on country time series of the
key macroeconomic variables, from which to estimate the variance–covariance
matrix as a gauge of the basic correlation structure underlying debt dynamics. As
is the case for all analysis involving time series data, for vector autoregression
(VAR) analysis to yield meaningful results, estimations must rely on a minimum
number of observations. Although no clear rule exists in this regard, a typical
rule of thumb for VAR regressions would indicate 40 as the minimum number
of observations, below which the time series properties of the underlying data
series cannot be adequately established and estimates tend to lack the minimum
degree of precision and reliability required. Without consistent annual data series
spanning at least 40 years or so, researchers and analysts often resort to using
quarterly or monthly data. The higher frequency of such data more easily fulﬁlls
the minimum data requirement, reducing by a factor of 4 or 12 the number of years
that historical data series are required to go back in time.
Unfortunately, the data available for developing countries, and low-income
countries in particular, often do not meet the minimum requirements for this
type of analysis. For many of these countries, ﬁscal and debt data are typically
available for a short time series and exclusively with annual frequency. Further,
in the exceptional instances, when long enough time series are available for
all the variables to be analyzed, the data tend to be inconsistent because of
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signiﬁcant structural shifts—such as in relation to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis—
which signiﬁcantly complicates estimation on technical grounds.
Recent attempts to circumvent these difﬁculties include Garcia and Rigobon
(2004), who estimate a VAR system for Brazil based on monthly observations of
debt stocks, the real interest rate, inﬂation, and the exchange rate. In this approach,
the data gap pertaining to primary ﬁscal balances and gross domestic product,
which are not available on a monthly basis, is closed by deriving suitable series
from quarterly data adjusted for inﬂation. An alternative approach, also followed
in this chapter, uses quarterlymacroeconomic data to estimate a VAR system from
which to derive a quarterly probability distribution. The latter is then annualized
for the construction of fan-charts, which are easily reconciled with the annual
frequency of the usual DSA framework (Ferrucci and Penalver 2003; Celasun,
Debrun, and Ostry 2006).
For the stochastic analysis in this section, quarterly data for each of the eight
economies on real growth, inﬂation, and the exchange rate were drawn from
national sources. Quarterly data for the nominal effective interest rate on central
government debt are not available in the DSA data set of any of these economies
and had to be generated instead. This process involved identifying, for each
economy, the annual interest rate series among those available in the International
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database that most strongly
correlates with the interest rate series of the annual DSA data set. The difference
between the annual International Financial Statistics series and the effective
rate of interest applied in country DSAs was then used to proportionally adjust
the corresponding quarterly International Financial Statistics series, to ensure it
corresponds with the DSA annual effective rate of interest when annualized after
simulations.
Appendix 3.7: The stochastic simulation analysis
Stochastic simulation is performed according to equation (3.5), deﬁning the
debt dynamics, and equation (3.6), representing the vector autoregression (VAR)
system of the macroeconomic variables affecting the debt dynamics. The VAR
system in equation (3.6) can also be expressed as a reduced form VAR as follows:
Xt = A0 +
p∑
k=1
AkXt−k +υt, υt ∼ N (0,) (A7.1)
where Xt is a vector of variables, A0 is a vector of constraints, k and p are the
beginning and ending lagged values, t is time and υt ∼ N (0,) is a vector of
residuals that are normally distributed with mean 0 and variance . The residuals
contained in υt may be contemporaneously intercorrelated as characterized
by the structure of its variance–covariance matrix () Thus,  provides the
contemporaneous joint statistical properties of the macroeconomic disturbances
affecting the debt dynamics.
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Alternative paths for each of the macroeconomic variables are simulated by
using the estimated VAR in (A7.1), taking lagged values of X as the initial
condition and the draws of the corresponding residuals for each period. An
appropriate correlation matrix is needed to ensure that the draws are consistent
with the estimated distribution of the residuals to reﬂect the underlying properties
of the data. To that end, a Cholesky decomposition is applied to , to derive a
consistent correlation that determines the random draws on the residuals.
The simulations involve 10,000 draws on the stochastic residuals, from
which the distributions of X over the projection period are derived. These
projections of Xt are ﬁrst annualized, to produce an annual spectrum of values
for the macroeconomic variables determining debt dynamics over the horizon
of projection. The spectrum of the corresponding debt paths is then computed
recursively according to equation (3.5), assuming a certain path of primary
budget balance and the share of foreign currency denominated debt over the
projection period, together with the spectrum of annualized macroeconomic
variables projected from the quarterly VAR above.
Notes
1 The data cut-off date for this chapter is 30 September 2011, at which time the ﬁscal data
for the year 2010 were mostly preliminary. Data for some countries have been revised
frequently.
2 Consistent data for Central Asian countries are available only from 2000 on.
3 For a summary of ﬁscal stimulus measures in the region in response to the GFC, see
the Appendix in Chapter 1.
4 For example, South Asia’s average debt ratio actually declined in 2009 and 2010,
despite ﬁscal interventions. As discussed in Chapter 5 in relation to India, South Asia’s
robust growth during and since the GFC helped drive down debt ratios in a large part
of the subregion.
5 In 2009/10, average general government expenditure was 29.4% and revenue was
25.0% in emerging economies, and 37.5% and 35.4%, respectively, in advanced
economies (IMF 2011b: 125–6).
6 Underlying Mongolia’s particularly challenging debt pattern within East Asia is its
late transition to a market economy, combined with weak ﬁscal government and an
unfavorable external environment that jointly led to a massive buildup of public debt
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Major structural reform efforts, ﬁscal discipline, debt
relief (including the Russian Federation’s writing off most of Mongolia’s Soviet-era
debts), and favorable commodity price developments jointly brought the country back
from the brink of default and, by 2008, down to a debt ratio that was roughly in line
with the subregional average.
7 Indonesia stands out as the country most heavily hit by the AFC, which, among
other things, led to the nationalization of Indonesia’s banking sector. Subsequently,
in the decade since 2000, major reforms and solid economic growth amid a favorable
external environment—including high international commodity prices—resulted in
the country’s debt ratio being drastically reduced to a level substantially beneath the
subregional average.
8 As discussed in Appendix 3.4, an alternative choice to using simple averages to derive
subregional aggregates would be toweight debt ratios by countries’ economic sizes. For
example, in that case, the East Asian aggregate would be less reﬂective of Mongolia’s
vicissitudes, and would closely resemble the PRC’s debt ratio instead. However, there
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is no obvious reason to prefer such a weighted average, as long as individual economies
are considered equally representative of the region as a whole.
9 The Appendix in Chapter 1 lists ﬁscal stimulus packages in Asia, outlining their main
features and period of application.
10 This is most certainly the case for countries facing interest rates that are higher than
their rate of economic expansion. By contrast, when the rate of economic growth
exceeds the interest rate, the debt ratio may be stabilized, even when the primary
balance is in deﬁcit. As noted in the next three sections of this chapter, many countries
in Asia have indeed been beneﬁtting from a persistently negative IRGD that has played
a key role in keeping debt ratios in check.
11 Appendix 3.3, Table A3.3.2 shows that the ﬁndings for the larger panel of 32 countries
largely mirror those of the Asia7 panel discussed in this section, although the accuracy
of the estimates tends to be lower due to the strong presence of outliers in the data.
12 Also speciﬁc to SGMM estimation is the Arellano–Bond autocorrelation test reported
in the last two rows of Table 3.2. First-differenced errors of orders 1 and 2 show no
sign of violating the model assumptions, and the model appears to be sufﬁciently well
speciﬁed.
13 In the cubic model, equation (A4.3) in Appendix 3.4 includes on the right-hand side
both the quadratic and the cubic form of lagged average debt stock ratio (b2it−1 and
b3it−1).
14 The estimated function is strictly monotonic, which implies that the primary surplus
continuously increases (and never falls) as the debt ratio grows larger.
15 The estimation results of spline regression analysis are reported in Appendix 3.3,
Tables A3.3.3 and A3.3.4. The estimation technique is described in Appendix 3.4
and essentially consists of dividing the sample into ﬁve subsamples ordered according
to increasing debt ratios, for which equation (A4.3) of Appendix 3.4 is then estimated
separately.
16 As noted in the ﬁrst section of this chapter, the advantage of this sample of countries is
the availability of a consistent set of comparable macroeconomic and ﬁscal data.
17 In Figure 3.5, the DSPB is computed so as to stabilize the public debt ratio at its 2010
level. More generally, the assumptions underlying the DSPB in Figure 3.5 are made
to roughly assess the sustainability of ﬁscal policy in the region during, for example,
2011–13, if countries’ growth, interest rates, and ﬁscal policy turn out to be similar to the
levels observed during 2008–10. Arguably, the volatile macroeconomic environment
and quick reversal of the ﬁscal stance since the GFC provides a plausible scenario,
which well reﬂects the fundamental uncertainty underlying macroeconomic forecasts
for the next few years.
18 As previously mentioned, the prevalence of large average primary deﬁcits during
2008–10 mostly reﬂects the strong ﬁscal stimulus packages enacted in response to
the GFC.
19 Further, the discussion in Chapter 2 shows that when θt < 0, the debt ratio converges
to zero asymptotically and debt sustainability no longer requires a government to abide
by the transversality condition and the government budget constraint. Essentially, in
the “court of debt sustainability,” a country can “get away with murder” as long as
θt < 0, in that it may run sizeable ﬁscal deﬁcits up to any point in time and yet have
its debt ratio decline to zero eventually. (For a more comprehensive discussion on the
implications of a negative IRGD, see Escolano 2010.)
20 In addition, in the presence of negative real interest rates, the actual interest rates in the
regionmay not reﬂect the true shadowprice of debt, thus involving substantial economic
costs and distortions, which themselves pose a signiﬁcant risk to ﬁscal sustainability
and macroeconomic stability more broadly (Adams, Ferrarini, and Park 2010).
21 Akin to the “modiﬁed golden rule” in Blanchard and Fischer (1989), efﬁciency
conditions associated with long-term economic growth and the intertemporal allocation
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of consumption by welfare-maximizing private agents require θt > 0 to hold for any
economy close to its steady state. Otherwise, welfare-maximizing agents would have
an incentive to borrow at low interest rates and raise present consumption, and roll over
their debts indeﬁnitely (up until θt > 0) in view of a declining ratio of debt to income
(see Blanchard and Fischer 1989; Escolano 2010).
22 This roughly reﬂects the average θ for advanced economies of the G20 and represents
a typical scenario assumption for this type of exercise (IMF 2011a: 52).
23 Due to the need for different scales on the vertical and horizontal axes of Figure 3.8,
its separating line is drawn more steeply than the same line in Figures 3.5 and 3.7. The
interpretation of the line remains the same.
24 The only exception among the 24 countries is Fiji, which would beneﬁt from this
scenario because it involves a positive IRGD that is narrower than what it has actually
been facing.
25 DSA is routinely implemented by ADB, the IMF, the World Bank, and other
organizations in the context of country economic and ﬁnancial reports, lending
operations, and country assistance programs. The IMF has been leading the
conceptualization and implementation of DSA for both market-access and poorer
countries. It publishes debt sustainability assessments for its member countries,
typically in the context of annual Article IV country consultations or IMF program
reports.
26 This applies to countries with access to the international ﬁnancial markets. A slightly
different analysis is applied for low-income countries, which are mainly recipients of
concessional loans, characterized by long grace periods and a high grant element. To
reﬂect these features of public debt, DSA for poorer countries is conducted on the basis
of net present value of debt over longer horizons of up to 20–30 years. See IMF and
IDA (2010) for guidelines of their jointDebt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income
Countries.
27 See IMF (2008) for an outline of the stress tests typically conducted in relation to
market-access countries.
28 Equations (3.3) and (3.5) express the same accounting identity (apart from Zt),
showing the evolution of the debt ratio to depend on the real interest rate, the real
growth rate, and the primary ﬁscal balance. Equation (3.3) subsumes inﬂation into the
nominal growth rate and the interest rate, whereby the latter reﬂects the local currency
equivalent of effective interest paid on both domestic and foreign-currency denominated
debt. Equation (3.5) more explicitly accounts for these individual factors, although a
clean separation is not possible. For example, the denominator (1+ gt +πt + gtπt)
of the ﬁrst three items of the right-hand side of equation (3.5) is a decomposition of
the nominal growth rate in its real and nominal components, and the numerators of the
ﬁrst and third items include variables other than the interest rate and the exchange rate,
respectively.
29 Unfortunately, the higher the stock-ﬂow reconciliations are through Zt , the lower the
usefulness of DSA is as an ex-post accounting tool of the changes in the debt stock by
means of ﬂow accounting alone.
30 The aggregate of seven Asian economies was introduced in relation to the regression
analysis in the ﬁrst section of this chapter. The aggregate is included because it
represents a largely representative sample of core Asian countries from the East, South,
and Southeast Asian subregions, for which a consistent set of data is available.
31 The forecasts are as of 30 September 2011. ADB macroeconomic forecasts are drawn
from the Asian Development Outlook 2011 Update (ADB 2011b). ADB forecasts are
integrated with IMF forecasts, as reﬂected in the World Economic Outlook September
2011 (IMF 2011c) and in IMF country documents. The data sources underlying
Figure 3.8 are described in Appendix 3.2, Table A3.2.2. For a detailed discussion
of country-speciﬁc DSAs, rather than subregional aggregates, see the next section in
this chapter.
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32 See, for example, IMF (2011a; 2011b: 10–11).
33 For a discussion of hidden liabilities, see Chapter 2. For an example of DSA that
explicitly accounts for hidden liabilities, see Chapter 4 on the PRC.
34 Any discrepancy between the two lines in any given yearwill accumulate over the years.
This explains why, except for the Paciﬁc, the two lines diverge quite strongly at some
point, particularly for Central Asia and East Asia. The causes of large discrepancies
are manifold and speciﬁc to individual countries. On the causes underlying large
stock-ﬂow reconciliation in the Republic of Korea, see the discussion in Box 7.1
(Chapter 7).
35 The only exception is Georgia, for which projections show a slight increase in the debt
ratio in 2012 and a decline thereafter.
36 The size of the shock is country-speciﬁc, depending on the standard deviation of the
country’s interest and growth rate during 2001–10.
37 For a review of the application of stochastic DSA to emerging economies, see Ferrucci
and Penalver (2003), Garcia and Rigobon (2004), and Celasun, Debrun, and Ostry
(2006).
38 This is in line with the observation in Figure 3.12, which suggests that high primary
ﬁscal surplus is the main factor lowering debt ratios in the Republic of Korea.
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4 Public debt sustainability and
hidden liabilities in the People’s
Republic of China
Richard Hemming∗
Introduction
As this chapter was being written, during the latter part of 2011, global ﬁnancial
markets were in turmoil following a sovereign downgrade in the United States and
there were worries that the debt crisis in Europe was spreading from the periphery
to the core. Against this background, government debt in the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), which ofﬁcial numbers suggest is well below 20% of gross domestic
product (GDP), would hardly seem to merit a second glance. Yet concern about
sovereign debt in the PRC has been growing, with the possibility that ofﬁcial
numbers signiﬁcantly understate the government’s true indebtedness.
This is not the ﬁrst time that such a concern has been voiced. Lardy (2004)
explains how nonperforming loans (NPLs), prompted by a sharp increase in bank
lending in the early 2000s combined with poor risk management by banks, can
impose a ﬁscal burden that is not reﬂected in debt statistics but is nonetheless
a potential threat to debt sustainability. The issue now is similar—rapid growth
in bank lending for the last few years, speciﬁcally to ﬁnance local government
investment in infrastructure. This investment and the associated borrowing are
off-budget, and the quality of many projects, and by implication the soundness
of bank assets is questionable. For these reasons, government debt in the PRC
could be as high as in countries where the possibility of default is being openly
discussed, and there has been speculation that a debt crisis is more than a remote
possibility for the PRC.
Clearly, this is an opportune time to have a closer look at debt and debt
sustainability in the PRC, and to provide answers to the following questions:
• What is the PRC’s true debt position? Answering this question requires
understanding what is included in ofﬁcial debt numbers and deciding whether
the government has hidden liabilities that should be counted as debt and
included in headline debt numbers.1
∗This chapter has beneﬁtted from comments by discussants (Mark Kruger and Louis Kuijs) and
participants at a technical workshop held in Beijing on 22 July 2011 where preliminary ﬁndings
were presented. Claire Ying Shi provided valuable research assistance. However, the author is solely
responsible for the views expressed here.
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• Does the government have other hidden liabilities that may not count as debt
but should be taken into account in assessing debt sustainability? To answer
this question, the nature and consequences of all hidden liabilities have to be
identiﬁed.
• How should the way that debt sustainability is assessed be modiﬁed to reﬂect
hidden liabilities? One possibility is to include them in an augmented total
debt measure, as is done by people who have produced much higher debt
numbers for the PRC. However, an alternative approach, based on assessing
the ﬁscal risk associated with hidden liabilities, provides a basis for more
helpful insights about debt sustainability.
• When all hidden liabilities are taken into account, does the PRC have a
sovereign debt problem? If so, what should be done? Even if not, hidden
liabilities can pose ﬁscal and other macroeconomic management challenges
that have to be addressed.
What do ofﬁcial debt numbers say?
Figure 4.1 describes the evolution of government debt. The data are from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook (WEO) database,
and they refer to gross debt incurred from the budgetary operations of central and
local government. Local government comprises provinces, municipalities, and
counties. Off-budget borrowing to ﬁnance local government infrastructure invest-
ment is not included. The WEO numbers are very close to the ofﬁcial PRC
government numbers, and are widely accepted headline numbers.
The debt ratio rose steadily through the late 1990s and early 2000s and reached
just over 19% of GDP in 2003, then fell back (albeit erratically) to 17% of
GDP in 2010.2 The spike in 2007 is due to CNY1.6 trillion in bonds issued
to establish the China Investment Corporation, while the pickup in 2008 and
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GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database.
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2009 reﬂects borrowing associated with ﬁscal stimulus spending in response to
the global ﬁnancial and economic crisis. The fall in 2010 reﬂects the withdrawal
of stimulus.
In general, debt developments have been heavily inﬂuenced by the govern-
ment’s activist approach to ﬁscal policy, where government plans have been
characterized by Lida (2007) and others as proactive (meaning expansionary),
tight or moderately tight, or prudent (meaning neutral).3 However, as Dunaway
and Fedelino (2006) explain, the announced and actual ﬁscal stances differ, due
to deviations of revenue and expenditure outturns from budget plans. Revenue is
generally underestimated; excess revenue used to be overspent and ﬁscal policy
was often looser than planned, but more recently part of excess revenue has been
saved and ﬁscal policy has tended to be tighter than planned. For this reason, and
as can be seen in Figure 4.2, while ﬁscal stimulus was supposed to continue in
2010 before being withdrawn starting in 2011, withdrawal actually began in 2010
owing to unanticipated revenue growth.
The IMF (2011b) projection in Figure 4.3 shows the debt ratio falling through
to 2016 based on assumptions that ﬁscal stimulus would be withdrawn further
in 2011; the primary balance will improve through to 2013 due to increasing
revenue collections before stabilizing with a primary surplus of 0.5% of GDP
(which would mean a 2.5% of GDP improvement from 2010); and the interest
rate–growth differential (IRGD) will average about −9 percentage points. By
2016, debt will have fallen to 9.3% of GDP.
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International comparison also presents government debt in the PRC in a good
light. Indeed, Figure 4.4 shows that debt in most emerging markets, including
those that have experienced debt crises in the past, is signiﬁcantly lower than in
industrial countries where debt is a current concern. Moreover, debt in the PRC
is half the emerging market average, with only Chile, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, the
Russian Federation, and Saudi Arabia, all resource-rich countries, having less
debt than the PRC. That said, emerging markets have in the past defaulted with
quite low debt ratios, but this is because their debt structures were risky. Unlike
countries that borrowed mainly short term and in foreign currency, and were
therefore exposed to interest rate and exchange rate risk, the PRC hardly any
foreign currency government debt, while the maturity structure of the debt is well
balanced.
Not surprisingly, markets seem unconcerned about the PRC’s sovereign debt.
Figure 4.5 depicts a steadily improving credit rating, except for a single “technical”
downgrade in 1997. The alternative market indicators shown in Figure 4.6 give
the same benign impression. All in all, debt in the PRC does not appear to be
anything to fret about. Appearances, however, can be deceptive.
Are hidden liabilities masking a more serious debt problem?
“Government debt, including hidden liabilities, could reachRMB39.8 trillion
or 96% of GDP in 2011. The worst case is a pretty large-scale ﬁnancial
crisis around 2012. The slowdown would last at least two years and maybe
longer” (V. Shih, quoted on Bloomberg 2010).
If Shih is correct, government debt in PRC is of the same magnitude as that
in Iceland or Ireland, and is exceeded in only a few highly indebted industrial
countries (Italy, Greece, and Japan). However, while alarm bells are already being
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sounded more widely (see The Economist 2011: 86), it is important to understand
the sort of liabilities that 96% of GDP and similar numbers count as debt. While
the detail underlying such numbers is often lacking, it is quite easy to produce
a disturbingly high number, although not one quite as high as 96% of GDP.
Table 4.1, which includes many of the sources of hidden liabilities mentioned by
people who have discussed the issue, illustrates this.4 The debt of local investment
companies (LICs) merits some explanation in view of its size, and the recent
attention it has attracted from Shih and others. (The individual items in this table
will be discussed later.)
LICs are off-budget special purpose entities set up by local governments to
ﬁnance infrastructure investment and other urban development projects.5 The
LICs’ main source of ﬁnance is bank loans, which are partly collateralized by
land and other local government assets, and LICs depend heavily on land sales
for revenue. The number of LICs, their borrowing, and their reliance on land sale
revenue have all expanded rapidly with the government’s ﬁscal stimulus program,
given its heavy emphasis on infrastructure spending.6 So too have concerns about
the quality of the projects that theLICs are ﬁnancing, the possibility that land prices
will retreat from current levels, and the implications for banks should a sizable
number of LICs run into repayment difﬁculties. It is widely assumed that lending
to LICs is either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by government, in which case
widespread loan delinquency would likely have a signiﬁcant ﬁscal cost.
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Table 4.1 Total government debt, 2009
Debt % of GDP
1. Commercial bank NPLs 1.5
2. ABC NPLs 2.5
3. Asset management company bonds 2.9
4. Policy bank bonds 13.3
5. PBOC bonds 12.4
6. Local investment company debt 33.5
7. Ministry of Railways bonds 0.9
Hidden liabilities 67.0
Ofﬁcial government debt 17.7
Total government debt 84.7
ABC = Agricultural Bank of China, GDP = gross domestic product; NPL = nonperforming loan,
PBOC = People’s Bank of China.
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database; China Banking Regulatory Commission; ABC
Annual Report; CEIC Data Co. Ltd.; PBC, Victor Shih (various reports); Trusted Sources (2010).
Putting aside momentarily the numbers in Table 4.1, it is interesting to ask
whether the approach the table embodies is a useful starting point for thinking
about government debt and its sustainability. More speciﬁcally, is it meaningful
to add a mix of hidden liabilities—bank NPLs, bonds issued by public ﬁnancial
institutions, and off-budget debt of government entities—to ofﬁcial debt? Are
they equivalent, or should they be treated differently? And what about other
hidden liabilities (e.g., rising pension costs and bailouts of state-owned enterprises
[SOEs])? Answering these questions is key to understanding whether the PRC
faces a serious debt problem, and to developing an appropriate approach to
managing both ofﬁcial debt and hidden liabilities.
Standard debt sustainability analysis
A useful starting point for analyzing the issues raised by the foregoing questions
is the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) routinely undertaken by international
organizations, rating agencies, and others. Figure 4.7 provides the results of the
standard approach for the PRC, which involves preparing a baseline scenario
based on a set of policy and economic assumptions, alternative policy scenarios,
and sensitivity analysis with respect to policy and economic assumptions. The
2010 and 2011 ﬁgures are treated as estimated outturns and the projection period
is 2012–16.During this period, the primary balance improves precisely as assumed
in IMF (2011b) and in producing in Figure 4.3, while the IRGD averages about
−8.5% percentage points, based on Asian Development Outlook projections
(ADB various years). Although this is a slightly smaller difference than assumed
by the IMF, the baseline scenario in Figure 4.7 shows a similar decline in the debt
ratio as does Figure 4.3.
Alternative policy scenarios assume that all variables are at their historical
average for the period 1999–2009, with a primary deﬁcit of 1.2% of GDP, and
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that the primary deﬁcit stays at its 2009–11 average of 2% of GDP (i.e., no policy
change). Sensitivity tests report the independent effects of 1 standard deviation
permanent shocks to the real GDP growth rate, the nominal interest rate on
government debt, and the inﬂation rate. An exchange rate shock is usually also
included, but this has no effect given that the PRC has very little foreign currency
debt.7 The debt ratio could end up on an upward rather than a downward path,
especially with a combination of looser-than-planned ﬁscal policy and adverse
economic shocks. But how much can be read into this?
It is important to note that Figure 4.7 does not depict a central projection of
the debt ratio with a reasonably high probability of being the actual outcome,
ﬂanked by increasingly less likely outcomes. In fact, the baseline scenario is
highly unlikely to materialize, and the other scenarios are no more or less likely to
do so. They are simply guesses about how future public ﬁnances might evolve
in different states of the world, which is why they are sometimes referred
to, more appropriately, as illustrative scenarios (see IMF 2011d).8 Moreover,
such scenarios convey little information about the likelihood of debt sustain-
ability problems.
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One can safely conclude that if the debt ratio looks set to increase continuously,
then the government will eventually be unable to ﬁnance ﬂow deﬁcits and retire or
roll over existing debt.9 The government will then have little choice but to default
on debt service payments and/or other obligations (including by inﬂating them
away), or to embark on a sizeable ﬁscal correction that could create a debt spiral
where default is delayed but a recurring cycle of slower growth, deteriorating
debt dynamics, and further ﬁscal correction eventually make default unavoidable.
However, default or near default could be a long time coming, and so it would
be useful to know when debt enters a danger zone where default risk becomes
unacceptably high. Unfortunately, it is far from straightforward to establish a
benchmark, or debt limit, that distinguishes a safe debt ratio from a dangerous
one. Such a benchmark should reﬂect a country’s debt tolerance—its capacity to
successfully manage ﬁscal policy as debt rises—but debt tolerance depends on a
wide array of country-speciﬁc factors (including debt structure, hidden liabilities,
economic volatility, institutional quality, adjustment record, and default history)
that are hard to translate into a benchmark.10 Thus, a reliance on rule-of-thumb
debt limits is understandable.11
The limitations of debt scenarios and sensitivity analysis notwithstanding, they
illustrate possible outcomes that can usefully inform policy decisions. Knowing
the trend in the debt and its underlying determinants is an essential starting
point for thinking about ﬁscal policy choices. However, care is always needed
in interpreting DSA results and a large element of judgment is required in doing
so. Moreover, while the sophistication of DSA has been improved, especially
through the use of stochastic simulations to generate alternative outcomes and
ﬁscal reaction functions to forge a link between debt and ﬁscal policy responses,
this probably calls for even greater caution. For example, the “state of the art” is
currently represented by fan-charts, and it is tempting to interpret them as showing
the probability attached to different debt paths. But fan-charts in fact show the
probability of deviations from a baseline for which the probability of occurrence
is unknown. Again, fan-charts can be useful in thinking about ﬁscal policy, but
the process of producing them has to be well understood before too much is read
into them.
What are the implications of this discussion of DSA for the PRC? Certainly,
the discussion points to the need to think about whether the DSA as shown in
Figure 4.7, even on its own terms, tells thewhole story about the debt outlook. Two
things come immediately tomind in this connection. First, what should reasonably
be assumed about future ﬁscal policy? On the one hand, the government is facing
pressure to step up social and rural development spending. On the other hand,
there is considerable scope to increase revenue collections, and the government’s
stated objective is to achieve broad budget balance, which it believes is necessary
to provide room (or ﬁscal space) to respond to future ﬁscal challenges. Second,
is it reasonable to assume that the IRGD will continue to remain so negative?
Maybe the possibility of a sharp growth slowdown (which the evidence suggests
is usual for middle-income countries and could happen to the PRC before 2016)12
and signiﬁcantly higher interest rates (due to short-term monetary tightening and
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longer term ﬁnancial liberalization) should be considered. However, at the current
low debt level, even reasonable pessimism about these things cannot produce a
troubling debt outlook.13
This conclusion might change, however, if debt is in fact higher than the
ofﬁcial numbers suggest. As previously noted, hidden liabilities inﬂuence debt
tolerance, the point being that, all other things being equal, a country with sizeable
hidden liabilities is less debt-tolerant because such liabilities can create a future
ﬁscal burden and future debt. The approach adopted in Table 4.1, where hidden
liabilities are counted in a measure of total debt, simply means that debt levels
are initially higher. Either way, whether through increases in future spending
or a higher starting debt ratio, DSA is affected, and the assumptions made
about future ﬁscal policy and key macroeconomic variables could then matter
much more.
Hidden liabilities and the measurement of government debt
Government obligations
Figure 4.8 classiﬁes government obligations from hard to soft, with ofﬁcial
debt being “hard” in the sense that debt interest and amortization payments are
certain in their timing and reasonably certain as to their amount.14 Arrears are
also quite hard, being fairly certain in terms of amount but less so in timing.
Contingent liabilities arising from explicit guarantees, deposit insurance, and the
like must be honored if triggered, although being of uncertain timing and amount.
They are somewhat harder than contractual obligations, such as government
and social security pensions or the purchase of services under public–private
partnership (PPP) arrangements, which the government may have every intention
of honoring in full but policy decisions can be taken to change this.15 “Stand
behind obligations” refers to implicit guarantees, where experience may suggest
that the government will step in to bail out the ﬁnancial sector and to provide
disaster relief, but will not make this explicit because of moral hazard concerns.
Finally, at the “soft” end, come constructive obligations,which refer to the services
that government is conﬁdently expected to provide, but for which there is no
contractual backing.
Arrears, contingent liabilities, contractual obligations, and “stand behind
obligations,” have all at some time been referred to as hidden liabilities.
Constructive obligations, on the other hand, relate to the government’s spending
commitments, and few people would argue that these obligations create a
liability. But what determines whether a hidden liability is a debt? Statistical
standards provide some guidance on this, because they deﬁne debt as follows:
“Total gross debt consists of all liabilities that are debt instruments. A debt
instrument is deﬁned as a ﬁnancial claim that requires payment(s) of interest
and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date, or dates, in the future”
(IMF 2011c: 3). On the face of it, this deﬁnition provides little scope to include
hidden liabilities as part of debt. While insurance, pension, and standardized
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Figure 4.8 The spectrum of government obligations.
PPP = public–private partnership.
Source: Author, drawing on Heller (2004).
guarantee schemes are treated as debt instruments, this only provides a basis for
counting government pensions and small guarantees issued in large numbers (e.g.,
export credit guarantees), the costs of which can be reliably estimated, as debt.
Social security pensions and most contingent liabilities would be excluded.16
However, statistical standards also deﬁne the institutional coverage of debt
statistics, providing more scope for including hidden liabilities as debt. This will
be explained in the following section by speciﬁc reference to hidden liabilities
in the PRC.
Hidden liabilities
Nonperforming loans
At the end of the 1990s, the four big state-owned commercial banks—Agricultural
Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China—had nonperforming loans (NPLs) of 42% of loans,
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or about 30% of GDP. Much of the buildup in NPLs had occurred in the second
half of the 1990s, even though three special purpose banks—the Agricultural
Development Bank, China Development Bank, and Ex-Im Bank—had been set
up in 1994 to take over responsibility for policy lending, which had previously
accounted for about one-third of the lending of the big four. In 1999, an asset
management company (AMC) was paired with each of the four banks,17 and in
1999 and 2000 they assumed CNY1.4 trillion of NPLs, including CNY100 billion
from China Development Bank. These were taken on at par, ﬁnanced by cash
provided by the Ministry of Finance, People’s Bank of China (PBOC) credit,
and (for the most part) by issuing 10-year AMC bonds.18 By 2006, the AMCs
had disposed of CNY1.2 trillion in NPLs (through auction, recovery action,
rescheduling, and debt-for-equity swaps with SOEs) with a recovery rate of
about 21%. The poor quality of remaining assets, disputes over the ownership
of collateral, and other issues have prevented signiﬁcant further sales, and AMCs
have resorted to trading bad assets among themselves. The balance sheets ofAMCs
are clearly fragile, with what good assets they have being needed simply to ensure
that interest is paid on AMC bonds.
In the meantime, as Figure 4.9 shows, by the year 2010, NPLs had fallen
sharply to CNY429 billion, or just over 1% of loans and of GDP in absolute
terms, due to write-offs and improved lending standards, and relative to total
loans and GDP, due to stepped up lending that ﬁnanced rapid growth. Also, in
2008, CNY800 billion of Agricultural Bank of China NPLs was transferred to a
special fund as part of the bank’s restructuring. Despite lower NPLs, having AMC
bonds on their balance sheets clearly exposes banks to the risk that AMCs may
default on their bonds. For this reason, and maybe because banks want to keep
AMCs in business should there be a further buildup of bank NPLs, banks have
been providing ﬁnancial support to AMCs. NPLs at policy banks are modest—
for the largest bank, China Development Bank, they are less than 1% of loans
(although, as previously noted, this is after some of its NPLs were taken over
by AMCs).
What is the hidden liability associated with NPLs? In the worst case, the
government could be faced with the full cost of cleaning up NPLs. Based on
the ﬁgures in Table 4.1 (p. 115), as of the end of 2009 this would cost just under
7% of GDP. However, commercial bank and policy bank NPLs are modest and
risks are manageable, especially given recent increases in provisioning. However,
NPLs held by AMCs are a different proposition, given the fragility of their
balance sheets. If AMCs were to default on their bonds and other loans, banks
and other creditors may be able to manage this on their own, or AMC debt
may have to be assumed by the government because it is implicitly guaranteed.
This discussion suggests that the government’s expected liability due to NPLs in
2009 was less than 7% of GDP, and probably no more than half that if the only
signiﬁcant risk is posed by AMCs. That said, NPLs could have a much larger
downside, for example, if a signiﬁcant share of bank lending to LICs were to
go bad.19
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Figure 4.9 Commercial bank nonperforming loans, 2001–10.
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Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission.
Local investment companies
Local governments are responsible for spending on regional economic and
social development and on local administration, which accounts for about three-
quarters of general (central, provincial,municipal, and county) government budget
spending. This is paid for by local taxes and nontax charges, and more recently
from land sale proceeds. Local governments are not supposed to run deﬁcits
and cannot issue bonds, but in the last few years the central government has
issued bonds on their behalf to cover budget gaps. However, as already noted,
local governments also undertake off-budget spending on infrastructure and urban
development. While local governments have some sources of off-budget revenue
to cover this spending (mainly fees collected by funds and other off-budget
entities), they use LICs to sidestep borrowing restrictions. Estimates suggest that
there are 8,000–10,000 LICs; while the larger ones are known, many smaller LICs
operate completely “under the radar.” Outside speculation that LIC borrowing is
a threat to debt sustainability has of late turned into ofﬁcial concern that they may
indeed pose a problem for ﬁnancial stability.
Of course, properly assessing LIC borrowing is difﬁcult in the absence of good
information about all aspects of their operations, although more ﬁnancial data are
beginning to emerge. With the ramping up of infrastructure spending as part of
the government’s ﬁscal stimulus, LIC borrowing has risen signiﬁcantly in recent
years. In 2009, LICs borrowed CNY1.3 trillion from banks, which was a third
of bank lending. The China Banking Regulatory Commission estimates that the
bank debt of LICs was CNY7.7 trillion as of mid-2010, while unofﬁcial estimates
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Figure 4.10 Local government debt, 1996–2010.
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: The People’s Republic of China’s National Audit Ofﬁce.
suggest that their total debt was as high as CNY11.4 trillion at the of end 2009
(when bank debt was CNY7.4 trillion). This is the basis of the LIC debt number
reported in Table 4.1. However, the PRC’s National Audit Ofﬁce recently issued
a report that estimates that local government debt was CNY10.7 trillion in 2010
(CNAO 2011). But this number is difﬁcult to assess. The explicit debt of local
governments of CNY6.7 trillion in 2010, including LIC debt of only CNY3.1
trillion in 2010, seems very low, with LIC debt in particular coming out well
below other unofﬁcial and ofﬁcial estimates.20 At the same time, bonds the central
government issued on behalf of local governments, and possibly some other debt,
are included in both the local government and ofﬁcial debt numbers. Moreover,
the overall number includes CNY4 billion of guaranteed debt and unspeciﬁed
borrowing, neither of which is clearly explained. In the ﬁnal analysis, it is difﬁcult
to say exactly how much debt local governments (including LICs) have incurred,
but for now it is assumed that CNY10.7 trillion, which has been highly publicized,
is correct. Based on this number and other information in PRC’s National Audit
Ofﬁce report, Figure 4.10 shows that, after increasing fairly steadily for a number
of years (by slightly more than 1% of GDP on average), local government debt
accumulation accelerated sharply in 2009, reﬂecting the LIC borrowing binge,
then slowed in 2010.21
What should be made of numbers such as these? One possibility is to think
of LICs as local SOEs, in which case the issue is what happens if LICs get
into trouble and default on their bank debt. The answer is that bad LIC debts
are added to bank NPLs, and the government’s hidden liability is the expected
ﬁscal cost associated with increased NPLs, plus the cost of any subsidies that
have to be provided to keep troubled LIC-ﬁnanced projects aﬂoat. Following this
approach, local government debt should exclude that of LICs, and would be quite
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small (although local government guarantees of LIC debt may be large). Another
possibility is to treat LICs as part of local government, because they are controlled
by them, and to consolidate LIC operations with local government budgetary
operations. LIC debt would then be counted as local government debt, and as
general government debt. Statistical standards support this treatment: “Special
purpose entities undertaking ﬁscal and/or quasi-ﬁscal activities and not bearing
the risk associatedwith (their) assets and liabilities are part of general government”
(IMF 2011c: 16). Because LIC borrowing, and the projects it ﬁnances, are to all
intents and purposes backstopped by the government, this would seem to be the
correct approach to take.
Whatever the treatment of LIC debt, it is necessary to form a view on how
much LIC debt will go bad, but this is difﬁcult given that the true riskiness
of LIC borrowing is unclear.22 The degree of riskiness depends on the quality
of projects that are ﬁnanced. In all likelihood, LIC borrowing has so far been
fairly low risk, in that it has ﬁnanced investment to ﬁll critical gaps in economic
infrastructure and has generated high returns in terms of growth and government
revenue. However, these returns do not generate the resources LICs use to service
their bank debt; rather, the returns accrue to the government. So, if investment
returns are lower than they might be because the quality of some projects is
in doubt or, as is likely, they begin to fall as essential economic infrastructure
projects give way to less proﬁtable economic and social infrastructure, this creates
problems for government. The principal risk facing LICs is that land sale revenue
declines as the property market cools, which is beginning to happen in response
to government containment measures. However, if lower property prices, higher
interest rates, or some other development were to create problems for LICs, the
ability of the government to respond could also be affected by lower investment
returns and revenue.
Other sources of hidden liabilities
PBOC bonds. While PBOC bonds may be implicitly guaranteed by the govern-
ment, statistical standards do not call for including the central bank in the general
government (it is part of the ﬁnancial corporation sector), and in practice this
would only be justiﬁed where central bank policies are driven by ﬁscal policy
objectives, that is, there is ﬁscal dominance (Anand and van Wijnbergen 1988).
Because PBOC bonds are issued for monetary policy purposes, and given that
the PBOC balance sheet is strong, they are not a hidden liability of government;
the possibility that the PBOC could at some time require ﬁscal support creates a
hidden liability, but this is highly unlikely and the associated hidden liability is
very small. A related concern is the impact of accumulating depreciating dollars
on the value of PBOC assets. Clearly, such an exchange rate movement weakens
the PBOC balance sheet, but the way that the government is managing ﬁnancial
policy does not suggest that the exchange rate movement could lead the PBOC to
need recapitalizing in the foreseeable future, and certainly not that it could result
in insolvency.
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Ministry of Railways bonds. The PRC is investing heavily in the rail sector and
much of its borrowing for this purpose is extrabudgetary. Here statistical standards
are clear: “General government entities with individual budgets not covered by the
general budget are considered extrabudgetary” (IMF 2011c: 10). Extrabudgetary
entities are part of general government. Hence, Ministry of Railways (MOR)
liabilities should count as debt, and not just the bonds it has issued, which is all
that is in Table 4.1.
State-owned enterprises. SOEs, of which there are well over 100,000 in the
PRC, still play a major role in the economy. In many countries, loss-making
and bankrupt SOEs are a major drain on ﬁscal resources. In the most extreme
cases, where SOEs are controlled by government and engage in extensive ﬁscal
(or quasi-ﬁscal) activities, the IMF has in the past called for consolidating the
nonﬁnancial public enterprise sector with the general government and analyzing
ﬁscal policy at the level of the public sector. Thus, for DSA purposes, the focus
would shift from government to public sector debt, including SOE debt. Statistical
standards provide some justiﬁcation for this: “The [GovernmentFinanceStatistics]
system covers all entities that materially affect ﬁscal policy…ﬁscal policy may be
carried out by government-owned or controlled enterprises that engage mainly in
commercial activities…these enterprises are not considered part of government”
(IMF 2001d: 6). “Statistics should be compiled for the public sector as well as for
the general government sector” (Ibid: 14).While this falls short ofwhat the IMFhas
called for, and there is clear justiﬁcation for payingmore attention to SOEﬁnances,
making the public sector the focus of ﬁscal policy analysis is neither widely
accepted nor especially compelling. Doing so would limit meaningful dialogue
about ﬁscal policy that is formulated at the government level, the relevance of ﬁscal
accounts that are inﬂuenced by commercial activities is unclear, and focusing
on the public sector could hamper reforms to reduce the dependence of SOEs
on government.
In the PRC case, SOEs are assigned ﬁscal and quasi-ﬁscal objectives and, for
this and other reasons, some SOEs are loss makers. SOEs are also a source of
bank NPLs, and defaults and bailouts, while rare, are not unknown. This means
that SOEs could require subsidies or, in extreme circumstances, bailouts, which
makes them a source of contingent liabilities. However, SOEs in the PRC are
primarily commercial in orientation, and the SOE sector is not only proﬁtable but
also achieves a reasonable rate of return on assets, and so contingent liabilities
arising for SOE operations do not seem to be a serious threat to debt sustainability.
That said, some of the largest SOEs are state monopolies that can be highly
proﬁtable despite considerable inefﬁciency, and the sources and consequences
of SOE inefﬁciency are a concern.23
Public–private partnerships. Most infrastructure investment in the PRC is
ﬁnanced by the government, and by local governments in particular, using some
internal resources but mainly through borrowing. After some early forays in the
power and water sectors in the 1980s and 1990s, PPP investment picked up in
the 2000s. The Beijing Olympic venues may be the highest proﬁle PPP projects,
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but transport projects, especially road building, have been the most numerous.
And PPPs are found across many sectors. Little has been written about PPPs in
the PRC, but a weak legal framework, a lack of competitive bidding, bureaucratic
intervention, and corruption seem to have led some projects to fail, although recent
projects (e.g., the Beijing metro extension) appear to be more like model PPPs.
While some projects have government guarantees, their extent and purpose is
unclear. But if the guarantees are extensive, or are likely to become so as PPPs
expand, there is a potentially signiﬁcant contingent liability. Some PPPs will also
involve the government in signing long-term service delivery contracts. While
these do give rise to a contractual obligation, spending on them is small relative
to total expenditure and the resulting hidden liability is also small.
Pension liabilities. The PRC faces signiﬁcant pension challenges owing to the
legacy costs of the pension system that was replaced in the 1997 reform, the cost
of ongoing reform to address the limited coverage of the working population, and
a rapidly aging population. This means that the social security pension system has
an unfunded liability, but the size of this liability is far from clear. The legacy
costs are in fact quite modest: in 2003 they were estimated at 7% of GDP. The
problem is determining the size of the overall unfunded liability. The estimates,
which range from a low of 10% of GDP to a high of 141% of GDP for 2001,
are unhelpfully wide. In principle, the unfunded pension liability is the present
value of future pensions less the sum of existing pension fund assets and the
present value of future contributions, all based on the current pension system and
announced reforms. AWorld Bank estimate of the pension ﬁnancing gap for 2001,
95% of GDP, seems to be measuring the right thing, but is so out of date that it
excludes the impact of signiﬁcant reforms, especially the launch of a rural pension
scheme that aims to achieve universal coverage by 2020 and the introduction of
social pensions for the urban population. It is important to estimate the current
unfunded liability, because it has a signiﬁcant bearing on taxation and spending
going forward (Sin 2005). The unfunded liability is a hidden liability, but its size
is far from clear given that pension reform is in a state of ﬂux and what pension
provision will look like in the future is unknown, including the extent to which
there will be more of a shift to a funded system.
Augmented debt and hidden liabilities
Based on the preceding discussion, a strong case can be made for augmenting the
ofﬁcial debt number by adding local government debt and MOR debt to produce
a comprehensive headline government debt number. Using the PRC’s National
Audit Ofﬁce report numbers for local government debt and MOR numbers for
its total liabilities, this would give the estimates in Table 4.2. Looking back at
Figure 4.4 reveals that the numbers in Table 4.2 push debt in the PRC out of what
is clearly the comfortable zone.24 And while debt is not clearly in the critical
zone, the possibility that debt is signiﬁcantly higher than current ofﬁcial numbers
suggest argues for a more thorough investigation of its precise level and proper
scrutiny of its implications.
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Table 4.2 Augmented total government debt, 2009 and 2010 (% of GDP)
Debt 2009 2010
Ofﬁcial government debt 17.7 17.0
Local government debt 25.5 26.9
Ministry of Railways liabilities 3.8 4.8
Total government debt 47.0 48.7
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook database; National Audit Agency; and Ministry of Railways,
People’s Republic of China.
Turning to hidden liabilities, the focus should be on contingent liabilities. Most
obviously, NPLs and AMC losses merit the closest attention, but all sources of
contingent liabilities should be considered, including explicit and implicit guar-
antees, insurance programs, bailouts, disaster spending, environmental cleanup,
legal action against government, indemnities, uncalled capital, etc. The idea is to
treat contingent liabilities as a source of ﬁscal risk, and to incorporate ﬁscal risk
into DSA. The following section discusses how to do this.
Debt sustainability analysis and ﬁscal risk
Revisiting standard debt sustainability analysis
In the ﬁrst instance, the standard DSA can be modiﬁed to reﬂect the inclusion of
local government debt and MOR debt in augmented total government debt. For
direct comparisonwith the earlier DSA results, a starting level of total government
debt for 2011 must be established and new local government borrowing projected
for the period 2012–16. On the assumption that new borrowing continued to slow
in 2011 as it did in 2010, and given that ofﬁcial debt is projected to fall, it is
assumed for illustrative purposes that total government debt rose only modestly
in 2011, to 50% of GDP. Projecting what will happen to borrowing in the future
is fraught with problems. The pace of the government’s railway modernization
must slow, as must investment in other areas of economic infrastructure. But
social infrastructure needs are enormous, and the ﬁrst step in meeting these needs
appears to be an ambitious social housing program that will be ﬁnanced by local
governments and could require them to raise 2%–3% of GDP yearly in ﬁnancing
during the next 5 years. If this occurs, newborrowing by local governments, almost
all of it through LICs, could be quite large, and, while not as high as in 2009, it is
likely to be well above the longer term average.
The central scenario in Figure 4.11 assumes that local government and MOR
activities will add 4% of GDP a year to primary spending during 2012–16
(compared to the baseline projection in Figure 4.7), and the alternative scenarios
describe the impact of higher or lower spending. Although the central scenario’s
debt ratio is higher than in Figure 4.7, the scenario is characterized by a slowly
falling debt ratio. This reﬂects the basic arithmetic of debt dynamics. With a 50%
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Figure 4.11 Revised debt scenario and sensitivity analysis, 2009–16.
e = estimate, GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Author’s assumptions.
of GDP debt ratio, nominal GDP growth of 10% would accommodate an overall
deﬁcit of close to 5% of GDP without adding to the debt. In the central scenario,
the higher debt ratio due to the inclusion of local government and MOR debt
combines with high growth to provide the room to reﬂect LIC and MOR spending
in the primary balance while holding the debt dynamics in check. However, the
situation is precarious, in that higher spending (by LICs, the MOR, or other parts
of government) could easily produce a debt explosion. The issue of whether a debt
ratio of about 50% of GDP is too high is taken up later.
Contingent liabilities, ﬁscal risk, and debt sustainability analysis
According to Brixi and Schick (2002), ﬁscal risk is concerned with potential
sources of future ﬁscal stress, especially contingent liabilities and off-budget
ﬁscal activities. The term “ﬁscal risk” has been used more broadly to cover all
sources of deviation between ﬁscal outcomes and plans.While the present concern
is the ﬁscal consequences of contingent liabilities, DSA tries to take account of a
wider range of ﬁscal risks.
The ﬁscal risk from contingent liabilities can be incorporated into DSA.
Figure 4.12 indicates the stages involved. The idea is that contingent liabilities
have to be identiﬁed and the nature of the ﬁscal risks they pose determined. Some
may have ﬂow implications, mainly in the form of higher spending, for example
to honor guarantees. Others may have only stock implications, for example, if
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a bailout involves an assumption of debt. One issue is whether ﬂows should in
fact be converted to stocks, so that the expected future ﬂow costs of contingent
liabilities are discounted to the present and included in an augmented debt ﬁgure
for DSA purposes. While turning contingent debt into an equivalent amount of
actual debt may be appealing, it would be better to work with a debt measure
that meets statistical standards, and to treat the consequences of contingent
liabilities as exactly what they are, expenditures or stock adjustments.25 In this
way, contingent liabilities can be incorporated into a modiﬁed DSA baseline. This
baseline can then be subjected to the same sensitivity tests as in Figure 4.7, with
the addition of a contingent liability shock. This is the sense in whichDSA looks at
a wider range of ﬁscal risks, such as errors in macroeconomic and ﬁscal forecasts
and policy uncertainty.26
The DSA in IMF (2011b) actually does something along these lines in that it
includes an alternative scenario in which “contingent debt” arising from current
and future NPLs, AMC losses, and unfunded pension liabilities is recognized. As
previously noted, treating unfunded pension liabilities as contingent debt may be
merited. The alternative scenario assumes that contingent debt is recognized in
full in 2011, adding about 68% of GDP to the debt stock, with a sensitivity test
adding 10% of GDP to the original debt stock rather than this larger ﬁgure. This
approach would add the ﬂow costs of contingent liabilities to future spending,
which in turn would be reﬂected in future primary balances (as is done above
with local government spending ﬁnanced through LICs). Figure 4.13 does this,
on the assumption that contingent liabilities impose a ﬁscal cost of 3% of GDP a
year, using the central scenario in Figure 4.11 as a starting point. The alternative
scenario is the government taking a larger 20% of GDP in 2012 in the form of a
debt stock adjustment (e.g., due to recapitalization or debt assumption related to
a banking crisis), while the ﬁscal cost of remaining contingent liabilities is 2% of
GDP a year.27 Naturally, this results in higher debt levels, but the arithmetic of
debt dynamics just discussed again prevents a debt explosion.
The scenarios in Figure 4.13 are subject to all the caveats about DSA discussed
earlier. Indeed, because they are based on assumptions about things that are
even more speculative than with the standard DSA, interpreting outcomes merits
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even greater care. That said, it should be possible to improve the quality of the
assumptions about local government and MOR borrowing, and about contingent
liabilities, on which Figure 4.13 is based. However, this requires greater clarity
about government spendingplans and the contingent liabilities that the government
has taken on.28
Fiscal management and policy issues
Debt sustainability, ﬁscal vulnerability, and government assets
The foregoing discussion focuses on developing a better understanding of the
way debt should be measured in the PRC, ﬁscal risks that could result in higher
debt in the future, and the evolution of the debt under different circumstances.
While debt could be pushed onto an upward path by some combination of ﬁscal
laxity (especially at the local government level) and contingent liability and
macroeconomic shocks, a view has not been offered as to when debt becomes too
high. IMF (2011d) uses a 40% of GDP debt limit to assess ﬁscal adjustment needs
in emerging market countries, and the same limit has also been used more widely.
However, the use of rule-of-thumb debt limits is perhaps the most signiﬁcant
shortcoming of DSA and of the ﬁscal policy recommendations that follow from
it. As already noted, there is a need to establish a benchmark or debt limit based
on a country’s debt tolerance.
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While factors point to the PRC being more debt-tolerant than many other
emerging market economies (e.g., its debt structure is favorable), other factors
may suggest the opposite. Recent work on ﬁscal vulnerability, while not coming
up with a benchmark or debt limit, throws light on factors affecting the risks
associated with sovereign debt. For example, Ghezzi, Keller, and Wynne (2010)
have produced an index of ﬁscal vulnerability, which incorporates debt tolerance
considerations by looking at ﬁve components of vulnerability: solvency (basic debt
dynamics, i.e., whether the debt ratio is stable or increasing); ﬁscal ﬁnancing needs
and debt composition; external ﬁnancing dependence; ﬁnancial sector health;
and institutional strength. The idea is that a judgment as to whether the debt
dynamics point to a possible default depends in part on the other factors. The ﬁscal
vulnerability index is reported as country z-scores, which are highly correlated
with 5-year credit default swap spreads across 47 industrial and emerging market
economies. The PRC ranks 11th best of 47 economies, and its z-score is as close to
that of the least vulnerable economy—HongKong, China—as is Portugal’s to that
of the most vulnerable—Greece. The PRC’s favorable debt dynamics and limited
ﬁnancing requirements distinguish it from many other economies, and more than
compensate for its ﬁnancial sector weaknesses and ineffective institutions (as
reﬂected in World Bank governance indictors).
Of course, the ﬁve components of z-scores do not exhaust all factors that may be
relevant, and they may not focus on those that are most important. More recently,
BlackRock (2011) has reported sovereign risk scores based on four factors: ﬁscal
space (debt level and structure, demography, default history, etc.); the external
ﬁnance position; ﬁnancial sector health; and willingness to pay (political and insti-
tutional factors). This index is also highly correlated with ﬁve-year credit default
swap spreads, and the PRC ranks 18th best of 44 economies. In this case, the PRC’s
index is quite different from those of the least risky economies (which are mainly
industrial countries), but it is surrounded (in terms of its index) by a large group of
countrieswhere sovereign debt distress is not very likely.29 The ﬁscal vulnerability
z-scores and sovereign risk scores add support to the view that the PRC does not
have a signiﬁcant debt problem. However, a key factor is clearly not taken into
account in these scores—hidden liabilities, and especially LIC debt and contingent
liabilities. Taking the hidden liabilities into account would make the PRC look
more vulnerable or risky. But another key factor, the size of the government’s
assets, clearly reduces ﬁscal vulnerability and sovereign risk in the PRC.
At the end of 2009, the government had deposits at the PBOC and commercial
banks totaling 15.3% of GDP. It also issued bonds in 2007 to capitalize the China
Investment Corporation, equivalent to 4.5%ofGDP, againstwhich it hasmatching
claims. The gross debt of 47% of GDP for 2009 reported in Table 4.2 therefore
translates into a net debt of 27.2% of GDP. On top of this, the SOE sector has net
assets totaling about 50%ofGDP, and the government still has large landholdings,
so that privatization and further land sales (even if land prices retreat from their
current high levels) offer considerable scope to meet debt obligations if necessary.
The exact state of the government’s balance sheet is not known, but there is reason
to believe that it is reassuringly strong.
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Local investment platforms, local government ﬁnances,
and expenditure prioritization
Even if LICs are not the source of an overall debt problem in the PRC, the LICs’
activities pose challenges for economic management. Ofﬁcial concern focuses on
the risk that LIC borrowing could at some time lead to another wave of NPLs.
To contain this risk, the government has already called for closer scrutiny of
LIC loans and collateral, especially by smaller regional banks where close ties
to local governments result in laxer lending standards. This explains why bank
lending to LICs started to slow in 2010. The government also seems prepared to go
further if need be, although its precise response, which could involve regulation,
consolidation, and/or new AMCs, has yet to be decided. But there are also bigger
issues to address.
Current ﬁnancial arrangements at the local government level do not seem to be
sustainable. At present, local governments are responsible for spending that they
cannot pay for, given their limited revenue sources and ability to borrow. They
should not need to borrow to cover current spending, other than temporarily, and
they should not have to set up off-budget entities to borrow to pay for infrastructure.
Rather, they should be given a wider range of independent revenue sources, with
the rolling out of the property tax being the highest priority in this regard. At the
same time, they should reduce their dependence on land sales, so that there is
less pressure to keep land prices high (which would make providing affordable
housing easier).
LICs should also be brought on-budget, making them formally part of local
and general government.30 Future LIC-ﬁnanced spending will then be subject
to the same budget scrutiny as other spending programs; current and capital
spending could be properly coordinated (e.g., to ensure adequate provision for
investmentmaintenance); and assurances could be given that debt and debt service
of all general government entities is manageable. Transfers from central to local
governments should reﬂect the social returns to investments mandated by the
central government and economic returns accruing to the central government
rather than local governments, so that infrastructure investment can be self-
ﬁnancing at the local government level. Finally, the absence of a local bond
market makes it difﬁcult for local governments to fulﬁll their responsibility for
infrastructure investment. LICs have requested permission to issue bonds, but they
cannot yet do so. Letting creditworthy LICs issue bonds could be a ﬁrst step in
creating a well-functioning local bond market (as part of a general shift toward
more nonbank ﬁnancial intermediation) where local governments can also raise
capital subject to appropriate prudential controls and ﬁnancial markets can play
more of a role in disciplining the behavior of local governments, LICs, and other
local public entities. Clarity about guarantees is essential if this is to happen.31
There is also a pressing need to thinkmore broadly about spending prioritization,
especially in view of the PRC’s large social expenditure needs (pensions, housing,
health, education, unemployment beneﬁts, and other social transfers) and planned
rebalancing in favor of private consumption. To this end, the government should
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consider implementing medium-term budgeting, with resources constrained by
borrowing capacity and revenue potential, spending priorities guided by strategic
objectives, and budgets increasingly results-driven. Such a framework keeps
governments focused on the need for ﬁscal discipline and spending efﬁciency,
in that they have to think about whether the medium-term payoff from spending
justiﬁes borrowing to ﬁnance it, and whether public money is being wasted on
unnecessary and ineffective programs. Medium-term budgeting should also force
governments to pay attention to and (to the extent possible) quantify ﬁscal risk,
and to ensure that there are short-term budget resources and longer term ﬁscal
space to handle the risks. Of course, where local governments are responsible for
a large share of spending, both the central and local governments need to adopt
medium-term budgeting. Whether this is the highest budget reform priority given
the PRC’s other budgeting problems (Deng and Peng 2011) has to be established
in the context of formulating longer term budget reform strategy.
Conclusions
This chapter starts by asking whether there is more to the PRC’s government debt
position and outlook than the ofﬁcial numbers suggest, and in particular if they are
masking a debt problem that poses a serious threat to ﬁnancial stability and growth.
The answer provided suggests that ofﬁcial numbers do understate government
debt, and that the government is exposed to ﬁscal risks that could increase debt
in the future. However, the debt appears to be sustainable in that there is little
likelihood of a debt explosion, while the government’s ﬁscal position provides
room to handle reasonable risks and its asset position provides an additional
cushion should more extreme risks materialize. That said, the principal source of
concern about the PRC’s debt—borrowing by LICs—raises broader issues about
local government ﬁnances and government spending that need to be addressed.
These should be priority areas for reform.
The discussion in this chapter also highlights another priority reform area—
ﬁscal transparency. Much of the speculation about government debt is badly
informed about both the nature of the government’s liabilities and the properway to
think about different liabilities, as illustrated in Table 4.1. This chapter contributes
to ﬁscal transparency by distinguishing between hidden liabilities that should be
included as part of government debt and those that are contingent in nature and
therefore a source of ﬁscal risk that could lead to higher debt in the future.However,
the chapter has made only a limited contribution to increased transparency about
contingent liabilities and their implications for debt sustainability, because the
information necessary to go much further is not readily available. Meeting the
disclosure requirements for contingent liabilities in IMF (2007) would be a good
start, but work will need to be done, including the collection of relevant data,
to determine their quantitative signiﬁcance and impact and whether steps need
to be taken to control the ﬁscal risks they pose. Doing this should be part of a
concerted effort to provide more information about ﬁscal policy and government
operations.
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Notes
1 Headline numbers are those most widely quoted in ofﬁcial statements and public
commentary on ﬁscal policy.
2 However, both the latest version of the WEO database and the most recent IMF Fiscal
Monitor (IMF 2011a) report a higher debt number for 2010 than in the WEO database
of only a few months previously, the preceding Fiscal Monitor (IMF 2010d), and the
latest IMF Country Report for the PRC (IMF 2011b). The higher number for 2010,
33.8% of GDP as opposed to 17% of GDP, includes local government debt that was
previously excluded. Because the proper measurement of government debt is discussed
in detail in the following text, and given that revised data for previous years are not
reported, the lower number is included in Figure 4.1.
3 For a discussion of the role of proactive ﬁscal policy in the PRC, see Jia (2002).
4 Lardy (2004) produces a ﬁgure very close to that in Table 4.1, viz. 85% of GDP, but his
ﬁgure is for 2003,whenNPLsweremuch higher andLICdebtwas virtually nonexistent.
He also excludes some of the hidden liabilities included in Table 4.1. Krumm andWang
(2002) described a range of hidden liabilities in the PRC, but they did not attempt to
come up with a comprehensive estimate.
5 LICs are also referred to as “local government investment platforms” and “urban
development and investment companies.”
6 Wong (2011) provides a detailed discussion of the role of LICs in the context of the
PRC government’s ﬁscal stimulus program.
7 Value-at-risk shocks, which are concerned with the joint effects of 1 standard deviation
temporary shocks to key variables, are not reported, but in this case an exchange rate
shock has an effect via other economic variables that is almost identical to the historical
scenario.
8 This is the term used in IMF (2011d).
9 Deﬁned in this way, DSA is more about assessing liquidity than solvency, especially
given that the timeframe is 5 years, when it is unlikely that major shifts in policies
or policy regimes are feasible. Solvency is concerned with the government’s ability
to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint over the long term, when there is more
scope for policy and regime changes. Sustainability should be about both solvency
and liquidity, but it is very difﬁcult to determine whether a government is in fact
solvent.
10 Wyplosz (2007) concludes that the combination of an unknowable debt path and
unknown debt limit means that judgments about debt sustainability simply cannot be
made. He refers to this as the “impossibility principle.”
11 Rules of thumb include stabilizing the debt ratio at the current level, which is presumed
safe if debt problems have so far been avoided, or adopting a widely used limit such as
the euro-area’s 60% of GDP convergence target. A 40% of GDP limit is often thought
to be more appropriate for emerging market economies in view of their lower debt
tolerance. IMF (2011d) bases its medium-term ﬁscal adjustment scenarios on a 60% of
GDP debt target for advanced economies (except Japan) and a 40% of GDP target for
emerging markets.
12 See Eichengreen et al. (2011).
13 However, extreme assumptions can produce apparent policy challenges. For example,
the ﬁscal adjustment scenario in IMF (2011d) suggests that, to stabilize debt at its 2010
level, the PRC needs to undertake a ﬁscal adjustment of similar size to that required in
G20 countries on average during 2010–20. However, this assumes an IRGD of 0 up to
2015 and is 1 thereafter.
14 The domestic currency cost of servicing foreign currency debt depends on
exchange rate movements, which adds some uncertainty to interest and amortization
payments.
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15 In the case of government pensions, provisions are written into formal employment
contracts, while social security can be characterized as an informal contract between
successive working generations.
16 This treatment is consistent with the Government Finance Statistics Manual (IMF
2001). In the case of social security pensions, it could be argued that the government’s
contractual obligation to provide pensions is indistinguishable from its constructive
obligation to provide health care. Indeed, the provision of pensions and health care
to the elderly is often discussed as if they are much the same, which seems quite
reasonable, not because current levels of health care for the elderly are guaranteed, but
rather because it has been clearly demonstrated that pension promises can be altered.
Thus, while providing social security pensions may be a contractual obligation of
government, the basis on which the size of pensions is determined is not covered by the
contract.
17 The AMCs are the Great Wall with Agricultural Bank of China, Orient with Bank of
China, China Cinda with China Construction Bank, and China Huarong with Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China.
18 AMCs may also have assumed another CNY1 trillion of NPLs in 2003, but reporting
of this is sporadic.
19 For further discussion of NPLs and the role of AMCs, see Bottelier (2004).
20 CNY6.7 trillion is the amount used to produce the higher 2010 debt number in IMF
(2011b).
21 The PRC’s National Audit Ofﬁce report does not include a time series for local
government debt, but it does report growth rates. Figure 10.3 is based on the 2010 ﬁgure
and reported growth rates. Local government debt for 2009 is estimated at CNY8.7
trillion.
22 In August 2010, Roubini Global Economics suggested that CNY400 billion of
CNY7.7 trillion LIC bank debt would have to be written off by the end of 2012.
However, other reports have suggested that maybe 25% of LIC bank debt should be
classiﬁed as NPLs.
23 As, for example, Chang (2011) has claimed.
24 The comparisons in Figure 4.4 may change somewhat if the debt numbers for other
countries are examined as closely as those for the PRC have been and are modiﬁed as
needed.
25 What is done does not matter analytically, in the sense that stabilizing any measure
of debt at the current level will require the same amount of adjustment to the primary
balance (measured in a way corresponding to the chosen debt measure).
26 While the focus here is on contingent liabilities, the approach can be extended easily
to other hidden liabilities, such as unfunded pensions (when, unlike in the PRC, future
pension provision is reasonably clear). Perhaps, since hidden liabilities are being
revealed, some other less judgmental term, such as “nondebt liabilities,” should be
used to describe them.
27 The alternative scenario may look less drastic than that of IMF (2011b), with its
68% of GDP contingent debt shock. While details of the IMF estimate of contingent
debt are not available, pension liabilities are undoubtedly the biggest item, and
these are more likely to be ”recognized” through future expenditure than through
prefunding.
28 Approaches to improving the analysis of ﬁscal risks in DSA are discussed in IMF
(2011c).
29 IMF (2011d) includes a ﬁscal sustainability risk map with six dimensions—core ﬁscal
indicators, long-term ﬁscal challenges, liability structure, macroeconomic uncertainty,
ﬁnancial sector risks, and policy implementation risk—but country-speciﬁc information
is not reported. IMF (2011a) discusses ﬁscal fundamentals in the PRC: debt, gross
ﬁnancing, short-term debt, cyclically adjusted primary balance, pension spending,
136 R. Hemming
health spending, and the IRGD. The PRC’s ﬁscal fundamentals look a lot stronger
than in those of most other countries, although the presentation of separate data on each
fundamental does not make it easy to compare across countries.
30 An issue is what this would mean for the banks that have already lent to LICs. While
LIC debt could be backed unconditionally by government, there is no reason why banks
that havemade bad lending decisions should be bailed out in the event of an LIC default.
Rather, banks should be required to assess the riskiness of LIC loans and provision for
them appropriately.
31 These very general recommendations will need to be supported by speciﬁc institutional
reforms. Liu (2010) draws on international experience to suggest a range of market
and nonmarket measures that could help to discipline local government and LIC
borrowing.
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5 Public debt sustainability and
ﬁscal management in India
Mukul G. Asher∗
Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2008/09 global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC), severe income
disparities and chronic ﬁscal imbalances have emerged as among the major
risks facing the global economy (WEF 2012). As ﬁnancial and capital markets
have become more focused on ﬁscal risks, the prospects of debt sustainability
in countries at all income levels have become a major concern of the pol-
icymakers. At the minimum, perceptions of unsustainable ﬁscal deﬁcits and
debt levels raise risk premiums for rolling over and for issuing public debt,
thereby potentially crowding out growth and equity-enhancing use of budgetary
resources.
The guiding principles for managing sovereign risk and high levels of public
debt (the Stockholm principles) for sound sovereign debt management state that
debt portfolio risks should be kept at prudent levels, while funding costs need to
be minimized over the medium to long term (IMF 2012).
Managing ﬁscal imbalances and debt sustainability prospects are among the
key macroeconomic management issues in India. These have been recurrent
themes of the Article IV consultations of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) with India and of academic writings and commentaries by ﬁnancial sector
economists. Thus, Singh and Srinivasan (2004: 31) argue that “… India’s ﬁscal
situation requires immediate attention: high growth and low interest rates will not
take care of the problem of long run sustainability of the debt, nor the risks of a
crisis in the short or medium run.” Topalova and Nyberg (2010) ﬁnd that, among
a sample of 27 emerging countries, India’s general government debt ratio was
among the highest, and between 2003 and 2008 the reduction in India’s public
debt/gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, at 9.2%, was lower than for the sample
as a whole, at 15.5%.
∗ This chapter has beneﬁtted greatly from the comments by the participants at the workshop organized
by the Asian Development Bank on India’s Debt Sustainability in Singapore on 21 November 2011.
Thanks are also due to Subbaiah Singala for research assistance. I alone, however, am responsible for
any remaining errors.
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Ahya (2012) argues that unless a credible plan is implemented to address India’s
high national deﬁcit, primarily arising from increasing government consumption
expenditure (including on subsidies), India will continue to experience high real
interest rates, low productivity of investments, and slow growth, and will be
vulnerable to adverse global shocks. The central government expenditure on
subsidies in ﬁscal year 2009/10 (FY2010)1 was 2.3% of GDP, nearly the same
as in FY1991 (2.4%), when India experienced a major macroeconomic crisis
(Chakravarty 2012). This has also been emphasized in the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI) review of monetary policy for the third quarter of FY2012, which stated
that “At the current juncture when there is a need to boost private investment, the
increase in ﬁscal deﬁcit could potentially crowd out credit to the private sector.
Moreover, slippages in the ﬁscal deﬁcit have been adding to inﬂationary pressures
and it continues to be a risk for inﬂation” (RBI2012: 12).Narrowing thedifferential
between the interest rate and GDP growth in turn would adversely impact the
sustainability of India’s public debt.
In addition to persistently large ﬁscal deﬁcits (Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1), India
needs to simultaneously address the current account deﬁcits in the balance of
payments. The deﬁcits have shown a rising trend since 2004, reaching nearly
3% of GDP in FY2011 (Malik 2011). The factors contributing to India’s current
account deﬁcits have included persistently high oil prices despite diminished
growth prospects globally as well as in India. During April–September 2011,
India’s current account deﬁcit was equivalent to 3.6% of GDP (RBI 2012: 7). The
depreciation of the Indian rupee in recent months has been one of the corrective
consequences of the higher current account deﬁcits and elevated inﬂation. In 2009,
the domestic inﬂation based on the GDP deﬂator was 10.2%, and in 2010 it was
9.3% (Table 5.1). Due to India’s ﬁscal and current account deﬁcits, monetary
policy has been overextended in managing the macroeconomy.
As the RBI (2012: 15) argues:
strong signs of ﬁscal consolidation, which will shift the balance of aggregate
demand from public to private and from consumption to capital formation, are
critical to create the space for lowering the policy rate without the imminent
risk of resurgent inﬂation. In the absence of credible ﬁscal consolidation,
the RBI will be constrained from lowering the policy rate in response to
decelerating private consumption and investment spending. The forthcoming
Budget must exploit the opportunity to begin this process in a credible and
sustainable way.
In the foregoing context, this chapter analyzes the dynamics and prospects for the
sustainability of India’s public debt for the next several years. India is a federal
country with a population (according to the 2011 census) of 1.2 billion. India has
established constitutional and other provisions for ﬁscal powers and for center–
state relations. This chapter is based on the premise that, to understand dynamics
of public debt and its sustainability in India, one must grasp the constitutional and
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institutional aspects of ﬁscal arrangements and debt management, as well as major
components of budgetary revenue and expenditure that impact ﬁscal balance, in
addition to standard IMF-style debt sustainability analysis (DSA) focusing on key
macroeconomic variables.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section analyzes recent
trends in the level and composition of India’s public debt and their implications
for India’s debt sustainability. The aggregate debt, ﬁscal, and macroeconomic
data used are from IMF sources to ensure compatibility with the DSA in the
fourth section. For more detailed micro-level analysis, however, ofﬁcial Indian
government sources are used.2 As ﬁscal deﬁcits ﬁnanced by borrowing add to the
stock of public debt, trends in ﬁscal deﬁcits of the central government, and the cost
of debt and composition of holders of government securities with implications for
debt rollover risk, are discussed in the third section. Section four provides IMF-
style standard DSA for India. Such standard DSA is an accounting framework
that does not incorporate endogenous behavioral responses—a major limitation
of the standardDSA. The chapter then discusses the constitutional and institutional
framework for debt management in India. Measures that could help address ﬁscal
deﬁcits that contribute to debt accumulation and assist in better debt management
are discussed in the sixth section. The ﬁnal section concludes.
Trends in the level and composition of public debt
Table 5.1 provides selected public debt, ﬁscal, and macroeconomic indicators for
India in 1999–2010. The trends observed from the data and their implications for
India’s public debt sustainability are noted below.
First, the public sector debt as a percentage of GDP increased sharply between
1999 and 2003, from 68.0% to 81.7%, but then dropped to 64.1% by 2010.3 The
ﬁscal correction implied by the reduced debt levels has been a result of several
initiatives. In 2003, India adopted a rules-based ﬁscal framework by passing
the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act at the central
government level and since then all but three states have passed similar acts. As
noted in the 13th Finance Commission4 Report, which makes recommendations
for the period 2010–15, the 12th Finance Commission had suggested a detailed
reform for the states to achieve a target level of revenue balance by 2008–09. All
but three states had achieved this target by FY2008. The 13th FinanceCommission
commended the states for their extraordinary performance in deﬁcit management
(FCI 2009: Chapters 1, 2, 4, 7, and 13).
The central government also initiated several measures to ease the debt burden
of the states:
• the Debt Swap Scheme (FY2003–05);
• the Debt Consolidation and Relief Facility, effective in FY2006, which
allowed central government loans to be rescheduled at a reduced rate of
interest of 7.5% and debt to be waived (subject to enactment of ﬁscal
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responsibility legislation [RBI 2005] and adherence to revenue deﬁcit
reduction targets); and
• reduction of the interest rate on securities issued to the National Small
Savings Fund (NSSF) during FY2000–02, which carried interest rates of
10.5%–13.5%, effective from FY2008.
Further, in accordance with the National Development Council’s decision, the
states’ obligatory share in the NSSF has been reduced from 100% to 80% from
FY2008.
The foregoing initiatives suggest that the Indian government can undertake
major ﬁscal correction when conditions demand it. But the aftermath of the GFC
shows that a systematic rather than a reactive approach is required to forestall
severe crisis.
Second, the overwhelming proportion of India’s debt is internal, and this
has been growing. Thus, in 2010 the internal debt was 93.3% of the total,
compared with 84.9% in 1999. As a result, India is not very vulnerable to external
sentiments in managing and sustaining its public debt. However, to the extent
that internal borrowings by the public sector crowd out private sector domestic
borrowings, the country’s vulnerability to external developments may grow as
the private sector’s external debt increases. Indian companies will need to repay
$11.4 billion of dollar bonds in 2012, double the ﬁve-year average of $5.6 billion
(LiveMINT 2011). According to the Crisil Ratings, the Indian corporate sector’s
debt servicing capacity, measured by the interest coverage ratio, declined to
4.8 times in September 2011, compared with the ﬁve-year average of 8.4 times
(LiveMINT 2012a).
The central government’s internal debt largely consists of ﬁxed tenure and ﬁxed
rate government papers (dated securities andTreasury bills) that are issued through
auction (GI 2010). In FY2011, dated securities ﬁnanced about 90% of the ﬁscal
deﬁcit.
According to ofﬁcial sources, the vulnerability indicators for the external
debt deteriorated slightly between September 2009 and September 2010 (RBI
2011c). Thus, the ratio of short-term debt to total debt, based on the original
maturities, rose from 17.5% in September 2009 to 22.3% in September 2010;
while the corresponding ﬁgures for the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to
total debt declined from 115.9% in September 2009 to 99% in September 2010.
Nevertheless, external public debt is not a signiﬁcant source of concern for India’s
debt sustainability.
Third, total interest payments as a share of GDP have ranged from a low of 4.7%
in 2010 to a high of 10.4% in 2002. Even the 2010 ﬁgure is of sufﬁcient magnitude
to constrain ﬁscal ﬂexibility, that is, reallocating government expenditure toward
growth and equity-enhancingdirections. This situationhas arisen in spite of the fact
that the nominal GDP growth rate has in most years exceeded the average interest
rate. The interest rate–growth differential (IRGD) has been quite substantial since
2004. Until 2007, the high real GDP growth rate contributed signiﬁcantly to the
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IRGD but, since then, high domestic inﬂation has been the main contributor.
Restoring the pre-2007 composition between the real GDP growth and domestic
inﬂation, without extensive ﬁnancial repression, would enable India to improve
its debt sustainability capacities without compromising broader developmental
objectives.
Fourth, the differential between total revenue and grants and total expenditure—
that is, the overall ﬁscal deﬁcit—has been substantial throughout the period. The
differential narrowed between 2004 and 2007 when India experienced higher
real GDP growth rates, but has widened considerably since then. In 2010, the
differential between the two was 8.4% of GDP. As overall deﬁcit adds to
the stock of outstanding public sector debt, it needs to be lowered for debt
sustainability.
In all but three years during 1990–2010, India also experienced a primary
deﬁcit—overall deﬁcit less debt repayment. The primary deﬁcit has widened
substantially since the GFC in 2008/09, suggesting an urgent need for ﬁscal
correction.
Trends in ﬁscal debt, and cost and ownership patterns
of Indian government securities
The previous sections have strongly suggested the need for ﬁscal correction
for better macroeconomic management, including managing India’s public debt
dynamics. This section provides an overview of trends in the ﬁscal deﬁcits of
India’s central and state governments, the cost of issuing government securities,
and the ownership patterns of government securities. Implications for the
sustainability of India’s public sector debt are also brieﬂy noted.
The data used in this section, which enable a more detailed micro-level and
institutional analysis, are based on ofﬁcial Indian government sources. The gross
ﬁscal deﬁcit for FYs 1990–2010 reported by the IMF is higher by an average of
0.76% of GDP per year and the primary balance is higher by an average of 0.55%
of GDP per year (see endnote 2 regarding the treatment of small savings and other
deposits in the Public Account).
Figure 5.1 provides trends in the combined deﬁcits of India’s central and
state governments and in total liabilities of the Indian government for the
FY1991 to FY2010 period. Persistent ﬁscal deﬁcits in India have resulted in
a sustained increase in the government’s total liabilities. Fiscal deﬁcits and
increased combined liabilities (external and internal) of the central and the state
governments showed a high correlation of 0.95 during 1984–2010.
Throughout the period under consideration, India’s ﬁscal system has had a
revenue deﬁcit (i.e., current receipts were insufﬁcient to ﬁnance current expendi-
ture), severely constraining the ﬂexibility to reallocate expenditure toward public
infrastructure and other investments. The minimum goal of ﬁscal consolidation
should thus be to eliminate revenue deﬁcits. The gross ﬁscal deﬁcit accelerated
particularly noticeably in FY2009–10, a trend that is not sustainable and may
portend difﬁculties in debt management (RBI 2010).
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Figure 5.1 Combined deﬁcits of central and state governments and increase in total
liabilities, 1990–2010.
GDP = gross domestic product.
Notes: Gross ﬁscal deﬁcit (GFD) is the excess of total expenditure (including loans net of recovery)
over revenue receipts (including external grants) and nondebt capital receipts. Since 1999–2000, GFD
excludes states’ share in small savings.
Gross primary deﬁcit is deﬁned as GFD minus interest payments. Revenue deﬁcit is the difference.
Between the revenue receipts and revenue expenditure.
Increase in total liabilities refers to increase in total claims from domestic and external sources on the
government.
Source: Estimated from RBI (2011b).
Government securities market: evolution and reforms
The previous section noted that the predominance of internal debt in India’s total
public sector debt has been a major factor in containing India’s vulnerability
to developments beyond its borders. The predominant instrument for ﬁnancing
India’s deﬁcit has been dated government securities. This section discusses the
evolution and reforms of the government securities market and their implications
for debt sustainability.
The Indian government securities market has been transformed in the last
15 years. Prior to the 1991 reform period, the market was characterized by
administered (and often artiﬁcially low) rates of interest; the participants were
captive investors (mostly banks) due to high statutory liquidity ratio requirements;
and there was no liquid and transparent secondary market for government
securities, resulting in the lack of a smooth and robust yield curve for pricing
the instruments. Low coupon rates were offered on government securities to keep
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government borrowing costs down, which made real rates of return negative
for several years until the mid-1980s. During the 1980s, the volume of debt
expanded considerably, particularly of short-term debt, due to the RBI’s automatic
accommodation of the central government, through issuing ad-hoc Treasury bills.
With a captive investor base and interest below the market rate, the secondary
market for government bonds remained dormant. Yields not related to the market
for government securities affected the yield structure of ﬁnancial assets in the
system, and led to higher lending rates. Thus, the RBI’s monetary management
was dominated by a regime of administered interest rates, and raising the cash
reserve ratio and statutory liquidity ratio prescriptions. High cash reserve ratios
and statutory liquidity ratios left little room for monetary policy ﬂexibility.
Reforms in the government securities markets were initiated in the early
1990s as part of a broader set of economic reforms. The most compelling
factors for initiating reforms were: (1) the government’s increased borrowing
requirements, due to the burgeoning ﬁscal deﬁcit; (2) the need to keep the cost
of borrowing reasonable; (3) the need to develop a benchmark for other ﬁxed
income instruments for the purposes of pricing and valuation, and to act as a
conduit for convergence of interest rates in other markets; (4) the need to operate
monetary policy through indirect instruments such as open market operations and
repurchase agreements,which requires an active secondarymarket for government
securities; and (5) the need to improve the overall efﬁciency of ﬁnancial markets
(Mohan 2004).
As a result of the reformmeasures, the Government of India’s securities market
has become one of the most liquid markets in Asia, thus paving the way for an
efﬁcient debt market. The ﬁscal deﬁcits are now funded at reasonable nominal
interest rates and through long duration debt. Thus, in 2009–10, the weighted
average coupon rate on the outstanding stock of government securities was 7.89%
and the maturity period was 9.67 years (Table 5.2). Indeed, only about 30% of the
total government securities had a maturity period of 5 years or less (Table 5.3).
This makes India’s debt reﬁnancing fairly resilient to short-term volatilities in
interest rates.
Data on the composition of holders of Government of India securities
(Figure 5.2) suggest that commercial banks and insurance companies combined
hold more than three-ﬁfths of Government of India securities. As the public
sector owns a high share of these ﬁnancial institutions, debt reﬁnancing and
management are facilitated. This in turn has helped to insulate public debt
management in India from the full discipline of market forces and sentiments.
Such insulation is, however, not without opportunity costs in terms of developing
more dynamic and sophisticated ﬁnancial and capital markets, where credit and
access to savings are based on economic returns rather than public ownership or
statutory requirements.
BCA Research (2011) uses reasoning similar to the foregoing to explain why
India’s public debt situation has not been perceived as alarming despite high debt
levels. The report argues that, considering the nature of India’s public liabilities
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Table 5.2 Maturity and yield of central government securities
Issued during the year Outstanding stock∗
Year Weighted
average yield
(%)
Weighted
average
maturity
(years)
Weighted
average
coupon (%)
Weighted
average
maturity
(years)
2003–04 5.71 14.94 9.30 9.75
2004–05 6.11 14.13 8.79 9.63
2005–06 7.34 16.90 8.75 9.92
2006–07 7.89 14.72 8.55 9.97
2007–08 8.12 14.90 8.50 10.59
2008–09 7.69 13.81 8.23 10.45
2009–10 7.23 11.16 7.89 9.67
2010–11 Q1 7.61 10.45 7.85 9.71
2010–11 Q2 7.97 12.17 7.79 9.83
2010–11 Q3 8.11 12.35 7.81 9.71
2010–11 (Q1–Q3) 7.87 11.54 7.81 9.71
∗ End of ﬁnancial year or quarter (Q).
Source: GI (2011a).
Table 5.3 Maturity proﬁle of central government securities (billion rupees)
Maturity buckets End Dec. 2010 End Sep. 2010
Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%)
Less than 1 year 995.09 4.67 878.87 4.32
1–5 years 5,438.92 25.54 5,301.39 26.08
5–10 years 7,203.81 33.82 6,903.81 33.97
10–20 years 4,370.66 20.52 4,080.66 20.08
20 years and over 3,289.94 15.45 3,159.94 15.55
Total 21,298.43 100.00 20,324.67 100.00
Source: GI (2011a).
and its strong repayment capabilities, the country’s current public debt levels can
safely be termed sustainable:
• First, only about half of India’s general government debt is subject to any
market reﬁnancing risk.
• Second, the share of external debt (at about 4%) is small, and nearly all of the
government debt is in ﬁxed interest rate loans. In an inﬂationary environment,
as is currently the case in India, the real value of the debt will be eroded.
• Third, the average residual maturity of the central government debt is about
10 years, so the immediate reﬁnancing risk is low.
• Fourth, “hidden” liabilities in the form of guarantees for other government
agencies are relatively low and are already included in the debt levels.
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Figure 5.2 Composition of the holders of Government of India securities.
Source: Estimated from GI (2011a).
Debt sustainability analysis
The standard DSA analysis emphasizes historical and prospective evolution of a
medium-term public debt ratio for a country based on macroeconomic forecasts
and ﬁscal policy assumptions. The main focus in this analysis is on whether the
debt/GDP ratio is sustainable—that is, stable over the medium term, usually
5 years. In the Asian context, the implications of a negative IRGD for debt
sustainability are emphasized (see Chapter 3).
The stress tests in the standard DSA framework usually envisage altering a
country’s interest rate or growth rate by 1 standard deviation above the historical
level. A main limitation of projections based on the standard DSA and the stress
tests is that they do not take into account interactions among the variables.
The limitations of the simple stress testing can be partly overcome by the
stochastic approach to DSA, which estimates the correlation pattern among the
key macroeconomic variables to account for basic feedback mechanisms and to
reﬂect the uncertainty surrounding baseline debt projections. Such simulation thus
permits a probabilistic assessment of sustainability. As may be expected, such
simulations usually result in more nuanced understanding of vulnerabilities in
sustaining public sector debt.
The DSA projections of India’s public debt/GDP ratio (including contingent
liabilities) are presented in Table 5.4. The contingent liabilities included are in
the Public Account, where provident fund and other such balances are deposited.
While central government explicit guarantees are included in contingent liabilities,
it appears that state and local government liabilities are not. In general, only explicit
guarantees are included and not implicit guarantees. Implicit liabilities may arise
from recapitalization of weak banks, ﬁnancial institutions, and public enterprises;
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Table 5.4 Medium-term deterministic debt sustainability analysis projections (public
debt/GDP ratio, %, with contingent liabilities)
2010 2011e 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Baseline scenario 64.1 63.7 64.0 63.3 62.6 61.9 61.2
Historical scenario 64.1 63.7 63.0 62.3 61.7 61.0 60.4
No policy change scenario 64.1 63.7 63.4 62.2 60.9 59.8 58.7
Nominal interest rate shock 64.1 63.7 64.6 64.4 64.2 64.0 63.8
Real GDP growth shock 64.1 63.7 65.2 65.7 66.1 66.6 66.8
Inﬂation shock 64.1 63.7 62.7 61.0 59.3 57.8 56.2
Primary balance shock 64.1 63.7 66.2 67.6 68.8 70.0 71.0
Nominal foreign exchange
depreciation shock
64.1 63.7 64.6 64.4 64.1 64.0 63.7
e = estimate, GDP = gross domestic product.
Note: The values are for ﬁscal year.
Source: Author’s estimates.
the write-off of past tax obligations; debt relief; development support to less
developed regions; and bail-outs of unviable public enterprises. The contingent
liabilities included thus represent only a part of the potential government liabilities
that could incur ﬁscal risk.
Potentially, however, larger ﬁscal risk may arise from the cash accounting
system used by public sector organizations in India rather than the accrual
accounting system. The cash accounting system does not take into account
already-earned pension, health care, and other beneﬁts of public sector employees.
Actuarial deﬁcits of publicly managed social security organizations are also
not taken into account. Thus, the Employee Pension Scheme of the Employees
Provident Fund Organization is projected to have an actuarial deﬁcit of over
Rs250 billion (Asher 2009: 8) and growing, and this is not an isolated case.
The baseline scenario projections of India’s debt/GDP ratio in Table 5.4
assume that the real GDP growth and inﬂation levels will moderate from the
current levels, while the nominal interest rate will continue to be around the
current levels. The rupee is assumed to be depreciating at moderate rates during
2010–16.
The baseline scenario projects that India’s public debt/GDP ratio will decline
from 64.1% of GDP in 2010 to 61.2% in 2016 (Table 5.4). Based on a historical
scenario using a 10-year historical average for all variables and assuming a
“no policy change” scenario, the projections exhibit a similar declining ratio
(Figure 5.3a). The differences in the public debt/GDP ratio among the three
scenarios are relatively small. The main variable tending to reduce the debt/GDP
ratio is the IRGD, while the primary balance has tended to increase the debt ratio.5
The projections lead to a relatively optimistic view of India’s public debt
sustainability, and are consistent with Topalova and Nyberg’s (2010) ﬁnding
that India’s public debt could be sustainable even at a level of 60%–65% while
permitting counter-cyclical ﬁscal response.
a  Public debt/GDP ratio under different scenarios, standard deterministic DSA approach
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Figure 5.3 Scenarios of India’s public debt/GDP ratio.
e = estimate, DSA = debt sustainability analysis, GDP = gross domestic product, NFED = nominal
foreign exchange depreciation.
Source: Author’s estimates and Chapter 3 of this book.
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Figure 5.3b provides the results of stress tests applied using a standard
deterministic DSA approach. As may be expected, the projections in Figure 5.3b
are quite sensitive to a primary balance shock (debt level rising to 71.0%ofGDPby
2016); and a real GDP growth shock (debt level rising to 66.8% of GDP by 2016).
The debt/GDP ratio will be moderately higher if there is a nominal interest rate
shock and a nominal currency depreciation shock. The debt/GDP ratio, however,
will be sharply lower if there is an inﬂation shock (56.2% of GDP by 2016).
If the IRGD is positive by 1%, India’s debt stabilizing primary balancewill need
to be about +0.7% of GDP, implying unrealistically sharp ﬁscal consolidation.6
Thus, India must maintain a large IRGD, and do so without ﬁnancial repression
and without high inﬂation. This suggests that economic policies should focus on
sustaining high real growth. The projections also suggest the importance of ﬁscal
consolidation to ensure that the primary balance does not deteriorate. The stress
tests thus point to potential vulnerabilities in sustaining India’s public sector debt.
Figure 5.3c provides a probabilistic assessment of India’s debt sustainability
around baseline projections assuming India continues to run budget deﬁcits. Thus,
the medium-term debt ratio (excluding contingent liabilities) for India is projected
to decline to about 54% in 2016, down from 67% in 2010. However, the 90%
conﬁdence interval suggests a 10% combined probability that India’s debt ratio
in 2016 will either go up to 71% or fall to 41% of GDP. The 2008/09 GFC has
underlined the importance of heeding the tail risks. The stochastic simulations,
which assume that India has a primary budget that is balanced rather than in
deﬁcit, yields declining debt/GDP ratios under all probabilistic assessments.7
The stochastic analysis suggests that India must strengthen its efforts at
ﬁscal consolidation to guard against an adverse macroeconomic environment,
particularly a real economic growth rate falling below the projections. The
stochastic analysis thus provides policy messages consistent with those from the
standard deterministic DSA approach.
To summarize, India’s current and projected public debt levels are broadly
sustainable, though not without greater focus on ﬁscal consolidation, more
competent public ﬁnancial management, and broader economic reforms designed
to revive public and private sector investments and to maintain good quality high
growth.
In particular, India will need to avoid severe primary balance and real GDP
growth shocks. Reversing ﬁscal slippages of the last 2–3 years should clearly
be a high policy priority, but will be politically challenging given unfavorable
election outcomes for the ruling party in important states during the February–
March of 2012, the general election to be held before May 2014, and continuing
uncertainty in the global economy.
India will also need to address ﬁscal risks that are not captured in standard
DSA, whether deterministic or stochastic. One set of such risks arises from the
very slow progress in moving government accounts from the current cash-based
accounting toward accrual-based accounting, at least for selected commercially
oriented government organizations. For example, already accrued future pension
and health care liabilities of government organizations are not recognized under
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the current cash accounting system, and no assets are being set aside to meet
them. Additional ﬁscal risks arise from the increasing shift toward rights-based
or entitlement-based access to employment and social services, which will make
expenditure management difﬁcult, particularly during adverse macroeconomic
shocks.
Notwithstanding these signiﬁcant ﬁscal risks, Moody’s, the credit rating
agency, uniﬁed the Indian government’s local and foreign currency bond ratings
at Baa3 (investment grade) on 21 December 2011. Moody’s assigned a Baa2
(investment grade) rating to India’s foreign currency bank deposit, and A1 to
local currency bonds and bank deposits. Moody’s has thus upgraded them from
“not prime” to “investment grade.” Moody’s reasons included a large diversiﬁed
economy, robust medium-term prospects, and a strong domestic savings pool.
Nevertheless, it is premature to drawcomfort from the upgrade inmanaging India’s
ﬁscal risks and public debt sustainability. Moody’s observed that “…a material
decline in ﬁscal deﬁcit and government debt ratios, as well as in their vulnerability
to growth and political cycles would improve India’s credit metrics relative to
peers” (Moody’s 2011).
Constitutional and institutional framework
for debt management
This section discusses the constitutional and institutional framework for debt
management in India and the implications for public sector debt sustainability.
As the predominant share of India’s public sector debt is internal, the framework
governing its level and the cost of government securities can be impacted by
the constitutional and institutional framework for debt management. India’s
central bank, the RBI, has traditionally pursued a more conservative stance in
macroeconomic management (particularly ﬁscal and debt management) than has
the executive branch of the government. This sets the context for the debate on
the location of the debt management ofﬁce (DMO), which is discussed in this
section.
The primary objective of debt management in India is to raise the required
amount of funding in an effective way. The overall objective of the government’s
debt management policy is to meet the central government’s ﬁnancing need at
the lowest possible long-term borrowing cost and to keep the total debt within
sustainable levels. Additionally, the government aims to support development of
a well-functioning and vibrant domestic bond market (GI 2010). Other objectives
of sovereign debt management are to achieve an optimal balance between the
costs and risks of the debt and development and to maintain an efﬁcient market
for government securities.
Constitutional provisions
The Constitution of India has adopted a federal system of polity and gover-
nance, originally envisaging a two-tier structure: central (i.e., federal) and state
154 M. G. Asher
(i.e., provincial) governments.8 With theConstitution’s 73rd and 74thAmendment
Acts (1992), local self-governing institutions (i.e., rural and urban local bodies),
have been accorded constitutional status as the third tier of government. The
Constitution provides for preparation of annual budgets and borrowings by
the center under Articles 112 and 292 and by the states under Articles 202
and 293.
Under the Constitution, Union (i.e., central) Government debt is a “Union
subject,” and Article 246(1) of the Constitution gives the Parliament exclusive
power tomake laws regarding the public debt of India and foreign loans. However,
State Government debt is a “State subject,” and Parliament cannot legislate on
state borrowings. Article 246(3) of the Constitution provides that state legislatures
have the exclusive power to make laws regarding their public debts. The issue of
developing municipal bond markets and its implications are discussed later in the
subsection on subnational debt.
Under the Constitution, all public debt is charged to the Consolidated Fund
of India and can be redeemed without a vote of Parliament. Article 112(3)(c)
provides that the expenditure on “debt charges for which the Government of India
is liable, including interest, sinking fund charges and redemption charges and
other expenditure relating to the raising of loans and the service and redemption
of debt” will be charged on the Consolidated Fund of India.
The government may borrow on the security of the Consolidated Fund of India.
The borrowing powers conferred on the central government in terms ofArticle 292
can be limited by Parliament only by law. Presently, the only restriction the law
imposes on the central government’s borrowing power is the Fiscal Responsibility
and Budget Management (FRBM) Act, although the Constitution provides for
other restrictions. The FRBM Act was enacted by the Parliament in 2003, and the
rules were notiﬁed in 2004. At the time, the targets were to reduce the revenue
(operating) deﬁcit by 0.5% of GDP per year and to eliminate it by FY2009. The
overall ﬁscal deﬁcit was to be reduced to 3.0% of GDP by FY2009. The FRBM
Act was prompted partly by indicators such as the share of taxes being used
to pay interest on past borrowings. These targets have, however, been missed.
The 2008/09 GFC has contributed to missing the targets, but so has lax ﬁscal
management.
Article 293 of the Indian Constitution restricts borrowing by the state govern-
ments. TheArticle stipulates that a statemay not, without the consent of the central
government, raise any borrowings if it has any loan outstanding that is repayable
to the central government. Further, under the Constitution, state governments
were not allowed to borrow in other countries. The central government used to
be the intermediary in the transfer of external borrowings to states. Following
the 12th Finance Commission‘s recommendations, states have started borrowing
in foreign currency directly and are thus now exposed to foreign currency risk.
This has implications for the overall macroeconomic management and for debt
management. Several states have passed their own acts that are broadly similar to
the FRBM Act of 2003.
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Institutional framework
An institutional framework assigns speciﬁc roles and responsibilities relating to
debt management functions to speciﬁed agencies. The institutional arrangements
for subnational debt management in India are as follows:
• The central government decides on resource allocation, the policy for
consolidation of central debt, debt swap schemes, buybacks of debt, allocation
criteria under the NSSF, etc.
• The RBI raises market borrowing, acts as registrar, handles debt service
payments on market loans, invests surplus cash, provides ways and means,
and administers the Consolidated Sinking Fund and Guarantee Redemption
Fund.
• TheComptroller andAuditorGeneral9 and/or theController ofAid, Accounts
andAudit in theMinistry of Financemaintain accounts andmake debt service
payments on loans from line ministries.
• State governments decide policy for debt management and its execution,
decide the institutions from which to borrow and the rate at which to borrow,
pay debt service costs, and maintain debt and guarantee data.
The front ofﬁce functions are performed by the RBI. Back ofﬁce functions
are performed by the RBI (with regard to depository functions) and accounting
is done by the Comptroller and Auditor General. The middle ofﬁce function is
performed by the ﬁnance department of the concerned government.
Subnational debt
The Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, stipulates that the RBI is the ﬁscal agent
and debt manager for the Government of India and for state governments through
mutual agreement. Accordingly, the RBI is the banker to 26 states and the debt
manager to all the states. During the 1990s, the RBI used to complete the combined
borrowing program of all the states generally in two or more tranches by issuing
bonds with a predetermined coupon and pre-notiﬁed amounts for each state (the
“Traditional Tranche Method”). High statutory liquidity ratios and the small size
of state government borrowings ensured the success of these primary issues. In
1997, state governments were given the option to enter the market individually
to raise resources. As the municipal bond market gradually develops, it would be
useful to create a constitutional framework for such bonds, particularly for the
urban development authorities that span more than one municipality or state, such
as in the National Capital Region.
Municipal bond market—current status and prospects
Conventionally, the infrastructure of the Indian urban local bodies (ULBs) has
been ﬁnanced through transfers from the central and state government and
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state-owned institutions, and a small proportion through assistance from bilateral
and multilateral agencies. However, by the mid-1990s, the ULBs realized that
these funds were no longer sufﬁcient to cater to the increasing infrastructure
requirements. Additionally, as a consequence of the 74thAmendment of the Indian
Constitution in 1992, ULBs had been given the responsibility of service provision.
The growing ﬁscal imbalance between function and ﬁnance (Ventakachalam
2005) prompted policymakers to consider alternative sources of funds, such
as commercial borrowing (including municipal bond ﬁnancing), which was
recommended by the Rakesh Mohan Committee on Infrastructure Financing
in 1996.
A total of 25 municipal bond issues have taken place in India since 1997.
They have included taxable and tax-free bonds and pooled ﬁnancing issues
mobilizing nearly Rs14 billion (approximately $3 million). Only a few ULBs
have issued the bonds, with a quarter raised by the Ahmadabad Municipal
Corporation and about one-sixth each by Nashik Municipal Corporation and by
ULBs around Bangalore. The trend in the value of municipal bond issues from
1997 to 2010 showed much enthusiasm for them until 2005, then a sharp fall
in the value of issues in the past few years (Vaidya and Vaidya 2008, Srikumar
2010).
Recent estimates suggest that India’s urban population increased from
290 million in 2001 to 340 million (about one-third of the total population) in
2008, and is projected to be 590 million by 2030. Further, urban India is expected
to create 70% of all new, more productive, jobs over the next 20 years, which will
contribute to a substantial increase in India’s per-capita income. Such a rapid pace
of urbanization requires a signiﬁcant level of investment in urban infrastructure,
estimated at about $1,200 billion (Sankhe et al. 2010).
For ﬁnancing of such a scale, ﬁscal transfers to the ULBs from the higher levels
of government, while critical, are not sufﬁcient, and the importance of othermodes
of ﬁnance is rising. While the municipal bond market remains in a nascent stage,
the Government of India recognizes that the debt route might become increasingly
important in the future (Sheikh 2011).
As a part of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, the
Government of India has tried to enable ULBs to access the bond market. Credit
ratings for the municipal corporations and councils of the 63 cities covered under
this Urban Renewal Mission are being released regularly, and, in April 2010,
nearly 40% of them were rated as investment grade (MUD 2010).
However, none of these ULBs have accessed the bond market recently, which
implies that much remains to be done. Most importantly, policy initiatives
need to address the supply constraints (i.e., constraints ULBs face in issuing
municipal bonds) and demand constraints (i.e., constraints individual and institu-
tional investors face in participating in the municipal bond market) that limit the
market for municipal bonds. Developing the municipal debt market is essential
for managing India’s rapid urbanization. But the debt raised is likely to remain at
very modest levels, about 3%–5% of GDP. Guarantees and potential contingent
and noncontingent ﬁscal liabilities could be higher, however, if the public–private
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partnerships for the urban amenities and services are not designed and managed
competently.
Thus, while the current municipal debt levels are not substantial enough to
impact the overall sustainability of public sector debt in India, increasing use
of public–private partnerships to ﬁnance urban services and infrastructure could
create substantial contingent liabilities over time.10 FRBM acts of the states and
of the central government should incorporate the level of such contingent liabilities
in their targets to avoid medium-term stress on India’s public debt sustainability.
A debt management ofﬁce
The Union Budget (2007/08) proposed establishing a full-ﬂedged autonomous
debt management ofﬁce (DMO). As a precursor, an ofﬁce was set up in the
Ministry of Finance in 2008. The Union Budget 2011/12 announced: “The
Government has been in the process of setting-up an independent Debt Man-
agement Ofﬁce in the Finance Ministry. A Middle Ofﬁce is already operational.
As a next step, I propose to introduce the Public Debt Management Agency of
India Bill in the next ﬁnancial year. There has however been various perspectives
on whether the DMO should be based in the Ministry of Finance or in the Reserve
Bank of India (RBI), India’s central bank” (GI 2011b).
RBI Governor Subbarao (2011) argues for continuing to entrust debt manage-
ment responsibilities to the RBI. His reasoning is that
• public debt management in India has been effective because the RBI, which
is the monetary authority, is also entrusted with the task;
• the government’s progress with ﬁscal consolidation in the years before the
GFC suggested that operational efﬁciencies could be gained by shifting
debt management to a separate DMO, but the content and pace of this
process should be reconsidered in view of the changed circumstances since
the GFC;
• only the RBI has the requisite market pulse and instruments to aid in making
contextual assessment, which an independent debt agency, driven by narrow
objectives, will not be able to do;
• the states’ borrowing has attained a critical mass vis-à-vis the absorptive
capacity of the market, making it imperative to harmonize the market
borrowing programs of the center and the states, which could be difﬁcult
if the center’s debt management function is separated from the central
bank; and
• internationally, the emerging post-GFC wisdom recognizes the interdepen-
dence between the functions of monetary policy, ﬁnancial stability, and
sovereign debt management and the need for the central bank to be closely
associated with sovereign debt management.
There is another compelling case to reexamine the costs and beneﬁts of setting
up a DMO. While managing the sovereign debt may involve a trade-off with the
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monetarymanagement function of the central bank, the alternative of a government
department or division (such as the DMO) managing it could result in conﬂict of
interest, when the government is both a borrower from and the owner of the major
investors—the public sector banks.
The country has many years of expertise in handling the monetary and debt
management trade-offs, and the experience has been institutionalized in the
RBI. Testing a new institutional framework involving a new conﬂict of interest
(government as borrower and owner of the investing ﬁrms) could prove to bemuch
more risky, particularly from a macro-prudential perspective involving ﬁnancial
stability considerations.
The 13th Finance Commission, which covers 2010–15, has supported the move
to create a national debt management agency. The commission’s report argues
that the Ministry of Finance “… as the main force behind the ﬁscal responsibility
and budget management process, has to calibrate and implement an increasingly
sophisticated roadmap for future ﬁscal consolidation. This requires considerably
enhanced policy formulation and analysis capabilities and a more horizontal and
integrated approach to the task than has historically been the case” (FCI 2009:
257). The 13th Finance Commission argues that such a restructured Ministry
of Finance is essential if the proposed establishment of a ﬁscal council and
council of ﬁnance ministers is to steer India toward a path of greater ﬁscal
and debt sustainability, while sustaining broad-based high growth. The foregoing
suggests that institutional development and greater competency and coordination
in ﬁscal management involving India’s federal structure are essential for ﬁscal
consolidation and therefore public debt sustainability.
Rationalization of small savings schemes
The Government of India, in consultation with the RBI, has increased its market
borrowing size for FY2012, mainly due to the shortfall in collections under the
small savings scheme. The shortfall raises questions about the existing approach to
managing the small savings schemes in the context of debt sustainability. Unless
measures are taken to broadly align the interest rates on small savings with the
secondary market yields of the central government dated securities, managing the
shortfall or excess collections in the small savings is going to weaken the existing
transparency and disclosure arrangements, such as the half-yearly borrowing
calendar, and distort the price discovery process.
The central government had constituted the Expert Committee under the
chairpersonship of then RBI Deputy Governor Gopinath, for a comprehensive
review of the NSSF. The Expert Committee recommended (1) rationalizing the
small savings instruments; (2) making the secondary market yields on central
government securities of comparable maturities the benchmarks for the various
small savings instruments (other than savings bank deposits, which do not have
a ﬁxed maturity) with a reset period of one year and with a positive spread of
25 basis points; (3) placing a cap of 100 basis points so that the administered
rates are neither raised nor reduced by more than 100 basis points from one
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year to the next, even if the average benchmark interest rates rise or fall by
more than 100 basis points (this would reduce the year-to-year volatility in
the administered rates); and (4) equally sharing the borrowings from the NSSF
between the sovereign and the subsovereign governments. The Expert Committee
felt that, to the extent that the rates of interest on borrowings from the NSSF
are higher than the market rates, the 50:50 arrangement would ensure equitable
burden sharing. These recommendations could facilitate rationalizing the cost and
volatility of the collections under the small savings schemes.
Deregulation of savings bank interest rates
In 2011, the RBI announced that it would deregulate the savings bank deposit
interest rate with immediate effect (RBI 2011d). Banks are free to determine their
savings bank deposit interest rates, subject to two conditions:
• First, each bank will have to offer a uniform interest rate on savings bank
deposits up to Rs0.1 million, irrespective of the amount in the account within
this limit.
• Second, for savings bank deposits over Rs0.1 million, a bank may provide
differential rates of interest, if it so chooses. However, the interest rates for
similar amounts on deposit should be the same for all customers.
The decision could increase the cost of funds to banks and in turn lead to an
increase in the interest rates across the yield curve and overall in the cost of
government borrowings.
Measures to address ﬁscal deﬁcits and public debt
sustainability
In addition to initiatives discussed in the previous section, other measures could
help address the slippages in ﬁscal deﬁcit of the last three years, and thereby
enhance public debt sustainability in India. These measures range widely and
will require political management. While it is not feasible to quantify the extent to
which eachmeasurewill help improve India’s capabilities to sustain its public debt,
the cumulative impact of the measures would signiﬁcantly improve the prospects
that India could do so. This is consistent with the argument in this chapter that
wideranging reforms in public ﬁnancial management at all levels of government
will be essential to address the sustainability of India’s public sector debt.
The measures discussed in the following subsections are in addition to two
widely expected major ﬁscal reform initiatives. One is the introduction of a Goods
and Services Tax designed to unify India’s internal markets, widen the tax base
by including services, and reduce administration and compliance costs of sales
taxation. The other initiative is the passage of the Direct Taxes Code, which will
replace the current Income Tax Law of 1961. These reforms should be regarded
as national projects, albeit with some suitable modiﬁcations to their provisions.
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Table 5.5 Residual maturity proﬁle of the outstanding state development loans and power
bonds (billion rupees)
Year of maturity SDL % change Power % change in Total % change
in SDL bonds power bonds in total
2011–12 219.9 n.a. 14.5 n.a. 234.4 n.a.
2012–13 306.3 39.3 28.7 97.9 334.9 42.9
2013–14 320.8 4.7 28.7 0.0 349.5 4.4
2014–15 333.8 4.1 28.7 0.0 362.5 3.7
2015–16 351.9 5.4 27.9 −2.8 379.8 4.8
2016–17 315.2 −10.4 15.8 −43.4 330.9 −12.9
2017–18 677.8 115.0 … n.a. 677.8 104.8
2018–19 1181.4 74.3 … n.a. 1181.4 74.3
2019–20 1306.2 10.6 … n.a. 1306.2 10.6
2020–21 1045.4 −20.0 … n.a. 1045.4 −20.0
Total (2011–12
to 2020–21
6058.7 479.6 144.2 n.a. 6202.9 493.4
… = not available, n.a. = not applicable, SDL = state development loans.
Source: Estimated from RBI (2011a).
Variation in public debt sustainability among the states
While the general government debt appears to be sustainable, there are wide
variations in the individual states’ abilities to sustain their debts. The states are
increasingly relying onmarket borrowings to ﬁnance their ﬁscal deﬁcits. Table 5.5
suggests that, beginning in FY2018, repayment of the State Development Loans
increases rapidly and, if the collections under the small savings schemes are not
as expected, the states’ debts could be difﬁcult to roll over.
Rajaraman, Bhide, and Pattnaik (2005) had recommended a comprehensive
cap on borrowing by each state, which is formula-driven and objective, as market
perceptions of the risk attached to state government loans are critical. Though
the 13th Finance Commission put a cap of 25% of GDP as the ceiling on the
outstanding debt of any state, a huge increase in the maturity proﬁle of the
debt is likely after the 13th Finance Commission period ends in 2015. The 13th
Finance Commission, therefore, recommended that the central government set
net borrowing limits for states based on the ﬁscal deﬁcit path outlined by the
commission.
Asmarket loans are increasing in amount and importance, the state governments
may be well served if market loans receive more policy attention. The issues for
policy focus are accessing the market across the year uniformly in view of the
difﬁculty of timing the market; better use of “Ways and Means Advances”11 as
a cash management tool; issuance of securities with different maturities; passive
consolidation of State Development Loans; preparation of an advance indicative
calendar; buildup of sizeable balances in reserves such a consolidated sinking
fund,12 GuaranteeRedemption Fund, and StateRevolving Fund; and enhancement
of the investors’ base through retail investment. Capacity building for effective
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debt management, including a strong risk assessment and monitoring mechanism
at the state government level, merits serious consideration.
The ﬁscal conditions of the state ofWest Bengal illustrate the continuing urgent
need for greater ﬁscal discipline in some states if they are to avoid pressure on
the sustainability of their public debt. The reports indicate that for FY2012 West
Bengal state exhausted its borrowing limits 2 months before the end of the ﬁscal
year on 31March. This reportedly contributed to serious concerns about the state’s
ability to pay salaries and pensions for February and March 2012 (LiveMINT
2012b). Moreover, the slowdown in economic growth will impact the size of the
ﬁscal deﬁcit at the central government level, and in the states. This is because the
amount of taxes devolved from the center to the states declines as slower growth
reduces central government revenue.
Tax arrears
Table 5.6 provides data on tax arrears in India. Tax arrears arisewhen the taxpayers
refuse or fail to pay the demands of the Income Tax Department, either due to
disputes about the demands, which may go into appeal, or through an undisputed
demand for which the assessment ofﬁcers have to initiate the recovery process
through the Tax Recovery Ofﬁce.
In FY2010, for example, the uncollected portion of the tax demand was 67% of
the direct tax revenue and 2.8% of GDP. Even a small portion of these arrears can
make a signiﬁcant difference to the debt situation. The table also highlights that
the tax arrears persisted during 2005–10, and increased by 135% from FY2006 to
FY2010.An analysis of the tax arrears in demand for the quarter ending September
2010, as estimated from the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report, showed
that 60% were related to Individuals and Hindu Undivided Families and 34%
were related to companies (CAG 2011). Conversely, the trends in tax collection
indicate that the share of corporate tax collected is about twice that collected
from individuals.
Table 5.6 Tax arrears as a percentage of gross domestic product
Financial year Tax Direct tax Arrears as % GDP Arrears as %
arrears of direct of GDP
tax revenue
2005–06 772 1,207 64 36,925 2.1
2006–07 862 1,697 51 42,937 2.0
2007–08 869 2,315 38 49,864 1.7
2008–09 933 2,482 38 55,826 1.7
2009–10 1,816 2,716 67 65,503 2.8
Average (2005–06 1,050 2,083 51 50,211 2.1
to 2009–10)
CAG = Comptroller and Auditor General, GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Estimated from CAG (2011), RBI (2011b).
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Table 5.7 Estimates of tax expenditures (billion rupees)
Category 2009/10
Tax expenditure % of total % of the actual % of GDP
tax collections
Total 5,258.1 100.0 n.a. 9.4
Corporate income tax 728.8 13.9 29.8 1.3
Personal income tax 451.4 8.6 34.0 0.8
Excise duty 1,691.2 32.2 164.4 3.0
Customs duty 1,952.9 37.1 227.5 3.5
Export promotion 433.8 8.3 n.a. 0.8
2010/11
Tax expenditure % of total % of the actual % of GDP
tax collections
Total 5,702.2 100.0 n.a. 8.7
Corporate income tax 882.6 15.5 29.8 1.3
Personal income tax 506.6 8.9 34.0 0.8
Excise duty 1,982.9 34.8 148.8 3.0
Customs duty 1,744.2 30.6 132.3 2.7
Export promotion 585.9 10.3 n.a. 0.9
GDP = gross domestic product, n.a. = not applicable.
Source: Estimated from RBI (2011b).
Tax expenditures
Table 5.7 estimates the tax expenditure pattern for FY2010 and FY2011 and
indicates that revenue foregone accounted for about 9.4% of GDP in FY2010 and
8.7% in FY2011. In both years, the revenue foregone was primarily attributable to
the excise and customs duties, which together account for 69% of the total revenue
foregone in FY2010 and 65% in FY2011. This is almost 6.5% of GDP in FY2010
and 5.7% in FY2011. Excise revenue foregone includes area-based concessions,
and the customs duty concessions are given to industries such as crude oil and
mineral oils; machinery; diamonds, gold, and jewelry; edible vegetables, fruits,
cereals, and oils; chemicals and plastics; and primary metals. The costs of these
concessions against the beneﬁts could be usefully examined.
Divestment receipts
The central government has also been using divestment receipts as ordinary
receipts that reduce the ﬁscal deﬁcit, rather than treating them as extraordinary
receipts that help ﬁnance the deﬁcit. For FY2012, the central government is
attempting to meet the divestment target of Rs400 billion13 through methods such
as the rich public sector enterprises buying back shares, and pledging stocks the
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government holds in nonstate companies. These are extraordinary ad hocmethods,
when more systematic and sustained measures are needed. A strong argument can
be made that an improved investment and business environment brought about
by economic and regulatory reforms is likely to generate signiﬁcant divestment
receipts.
Using government assets more productively
Government is the largest owner of landed property in India.14 The government is
in the process of creating a more complete asset registry and developing a formal
policy of asset use, including selling and leasing of land, with a view to generating
additional revenue in new ways and using assets more productively. Monetizing
these assets in an economically sound manner could assist in ﬁscal management
and debt sustainability (Economic Times 2012).
Cost recovery
The cost of recovering social and economic services provided by the gov-
ernments at all levels has been low (RBI 2011a). Thus, according to revised
budget estimates for FY2010, cost recovery, deﬁned as a ratio of nontax revenue
to nonplan expenditure, was 3.0% for education, 4.6% for health, 17.7% for
irrigation, 22.6% for power, and 5.8% for roads. While the cost recovery
rates have improved, they are considerably lower than the levels needed for
ﬁnancial viability,15 adversely impacting the budgetary deﬁcits. The 13th Finance
Commission’s report indicates that receipts from the irrigation sector do not
even cover the expenditure on operation and maintenance of irrigation projects.
The cost recovery issues are part of a larger set of issues involving design and
implementation of economic and social sector goods and services and how to
price them in accordance with their scarcity.
Liabilities of the state-level public sector undertakings
State-level “public sector undertakings” (PSUs) remain a drag on state government
ﬁnances. Cumulative ﬁnancial support by contribution to equity, loans, and
subsidies to state PSUs stood at Rs919 billion, Rs1705 billion, and Rs250 billion,
respectively, at the end of March 2008. Outstanding state guarantees on the loans
raised by PSUs amounted to Rs1,127 billion and constituted 60% of the total
outstanding guarantees of all states at the end ofMarch 2008. Information received
from states indicated that PSUs’ dividend and interest paymentswereRs1.7 billion
andRs17 billion, respectively, in FY2008: dividends amounted to 0.18%of equity,
and interest payments amounted to 0.99% of the outstanding loans. These shares
are abysmally low and nowhere near the desired levels of 5% return on equity
and 7% interest on outstanding loans suggested by the 12th Finance Commission
(FCI 2009).
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Corporate debt market
A critical challenge to sustaining India’s sovereign debt could come from one of
its internal market segments. Most Indian banks are holding the Government of
India debt at much higher levels than required, suggesting, among other things, a
lack of adequate quality corporate debt paper.16 The situation is bound to change
as the banks’ risk aversion (particularly among public sector banks) decreases, the
regulatory environment for a more favorable investment climate for the corporate
debt market improves, and the economic capital base of the banks increases.
Consequently, the government may not be able to roll over its debt with the
same ease it has been used to. Regardless of where the DMO is established,
the regulator will be more objective in its treatment of the investments in the
government securities, which could increase the risk perception about and pricing
of the government securities. Both could increase the yields on the government
securities and thus increase the gross borrowing requirements.
Concluding remarks
This chapter has analyzed prospects for the sustainability of India’s public sector
debt in the medium term, that is, until 2016. This issue is of increasing concern to
Indian policymakers due to the persistence of high ﬁscal and current account
deﬁcits, and because the GFC has substantially raised the risks for countries
perceived to be pursuing unsustainable ﬁscal policies.
The standard IMF-style DSA for India suggests that, under a baseline scenario,
the public debt/GDP ratio will fall from 64.1% in 2010 to 61.2% in 2016. A large
negative IRGD will be the major factor in this outcome. The predominant share
of public sector debt has been internal, with public sector ﬁnancial institutions
being the major holders of government debt. These characteristics, combined
with ﬁnancial repression, have enabled the government to be relatively less
exposed to market risks in rolling over debt and in issuing new debt. This helps
to explain India’s success at debt sustainability despite relatively high levels of
public sector debt and persistent ﬁscal deﬁcits, including deﬁcits in the primary
balance.
The DSA projections, however, suggest that a severe primary balance shock
(which could arise if recent ﬁscal slippages are not addressed) and a real GDP
growth shock (which could arise not just from global slowdown, but more
importantly from failure to pursue pro-growth policies with sufﬁcient vigor)
could lead to a less sanguine view of India’s public debt sustainability. Given
India’s persistent primary deﬁcit, maintaining a large differential between the
real interest rate and real GDP growth, without undue ﬁnancial repression, will
be essential. Stochastic projections present a wide range in which the debt/GDP
ratio may fall. This suggests that tail risks, which may lead to much higher public
debt/GDP ratios than those reported, should not be ignored, particularly in the
aftermath of the GFC. Thus, policymakers should not view falling debt/GDP
ratios complacently.
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The IMF-style standardDSAanalysis focuses on keymacroeconomic variables,
primarily real interest rate, growth rate, exchange rate, and primary surplus in
analyzing debt sustainability. As the analysis in this chapter indicates, while these
are important for understanding India’s debt dynamics and sustainability, a broader
perspective is needed, involving constitutional and institutional factors, reform
in the generation of government receipts, improved government expenditure
management, and other changes.
The chapter notes several institutional initiatives, including the recommendation
by the 13th Finance Commission to set up a national DMO and a ﬁscal council of
central and state ﬁnance ministers to address India’s ﬁscal management and debt
sustainability issues. The Ministry of Finance and the RBI need to agree on the
location and functioning of the national DMO.
The chapter also examines ﬁscal risks arising from other sources such as
the cash accounting system and India’s increasing reliance on public–private
partnerships to ﬁnance infrastructure and other amenities in both urban and rural
areas. Policymakers envisage a larger role for public sector enterprises in reversing
declining investment, so that growth can be sustained. But this approach could
lead to higher contingent liabilities, creating ﬁscal risks.
The government’s increasing tendency to support entitlement or rights-based
approaches in provision of employment, education, health, and food could portend
larger ﬁscal risks thanmaybe perceived from the standardDSA,while reducing the
capacity to make ﬁscal adjustments when unanticipated adverse macroeconomic
shocks occur.
An indicator that it would be a major challenge to correct slippages in ﬁscal
deﬁcit performance in the last three years is contained in the reports that the central
government is seriously considering amending the FRBMAct to permit ﬂexibility
in ﬁscal policy (Indian Express 2011). The new targets are a ﬁscal deﬁcit of 3.5%
and revenue deﬁcit of 2.1% in FY2014. These represent yet another slippage
compared to the originals goals of the FRBM Act. As general elections must
be held by May 2014, even the latest revisions in deﬁcit targets are unlikely
to be met.
The chapter then suggests measures to enhance ﬁscal space, such as early
passage of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and Direct Taxes Code, and
addressing issues such as tax arrears, tax expenditure, the low rate of cost recovery
on social and economic services, and reform of state enterprises. Better public
ﬁnancial management, to substantially improve outcomes from budgetary outlays,
will be essential for public debt management and sustainability.
India has a historic opportunity, aided by its favorable demographic proﬁle,
to emerge as a major economic power in the next two decades. But, as the GFC
has underscored, inadequate policy emphasis on macroeconomic management,
particularly ensuring ﬁscal sustainability and ﬁnancial stability, could result in a
major setback to India’s ambitions. The practices India employs in managing its
public debt will need to be changed considerably if ﬁscal and debt management
policies are not to constrain the country’s future growth and competitiveness
internationally and globally. Such changes are also essential if India is to meet
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the aspirations and expectations of the younger generation, which is far better
networked and more exposed to national and global developments than were
the earlier generations. India’s debt sustainability efforts must be pursued in this
broader context.
Notes
1 In this chapter, the ﬁscal year will be referred to as the year in which it ends; hence,
ﬁscal year 2007/08 will be abbreviated as FY2008.
2 Reasons for differences in public debt and ﬁscal data (reported by international agencies
such as the IMF, and from ofﬁcial Indian sources such as the RBI) include differences
arising from the different treatment of “above the line” versus “below the line” items.
Thus, the treatment of small savings and other deposits in the Public Account, where the
government acts as a trustee for certain organizations, could affect the reported public
debt and ﬁscal data. All public money received by or on behalf of the Government of
India, other than money for credit to the Consolidated Fund of India, is credited to the
Public Account of India. Public Account liabilities also include “below the line” items
in the form of securities issued in lieu of subsidies.
3 Total liabilities of the Government of India are larger than the public debt due to the
liabilities arising from the deposits in the Public Account.
4 The Finance Commission is a constitutional body (Article 280 of the Indian
Constitution). It is formed every 5 years to recommend criteria for sharing tax
receipts collected by the center between the central and state governments, distributing
grants-in-aid across the states, and handling any other issues the Parliament wants
addressed.
5 See Chapter 3, Figure 3.12 for the graphical representation of annual changes in central
government debt ratio: 2011–16.
6 See Chapter 3, Figure 3.8 for the graphical representation of actual and debt-stabilizing
primary balance with a positive 1% deviation on the IRGD.
7 See Chapter 3, Figure 3.14b.
8 For a fuller description of the federal-state ﬁscal relations, see Srinivasan and Wallack
(2011).
9 The Comptroller and Auditor General is India’s supreme audit institution, with a
mandate concerning accounts of the central and state governments. It performs the
auditing function, and the function of consolidating accounts of the government
organization. Details are available at http://www.cag.gov.in.
10 India has reportedly entered into 1,017 public–private partnership projects in
infrastructure, with an investment of Rs4,866 billion (6.1% of 2010 GDP). This is
likely to grow, given ofﬁcial policy to encourage such partnerships (Singh and Malik
2012).
11 Under Section 17(5) of RBI Act, 1934, the RBI provides “Ways and Means Advances”
to the states which bank with it to help them tide over temporary mismatches in the
cash ﬂow of their receipts and payments (RBI 2011d).
12 Both a consolidated sinking fund and the Guarantee Redemption Fund fall under the
institutional measures adopted by state governments along with ﬁscal responsibility
legislations, value-added tax, and new pension schemes, which have helped them
consolidate their ﬁnances in the past (RBI 2011c).
13 At the end of December 2011, only Rs1.1 billion or 3% of the target had been generated
through divestments during the (then) current ﬁscal year.
14 The exact total is not available due to incomplete asset registry. However, the
defense sector controls an estimated 0.7 million hectares of land and Indian railways,
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0.4 million hectares. Estimates of land owned by other public organizations, public
sector enterprises, and state and local bodies are not available (Economic Times 2012).
15 As the recovery rates are uneven across states, state-speciﬁc measures would be needed
to increase overall recovery rates.
16 For an overview of India’s corporate debt market and its market infrastructure,
see Panda and Dias (2011). They estimate total outstanding corporate bonds at
Rs8,895 billion ($151 billion) as ofMarch 2011, only 4% of the total Indian outstanding
bonds. The share of corporate bonds has, however, gone up sharply from 2.0% in 2008.
More than two-ﬁfths of the corporate bonds are public sector bonds, with ultimate ﬁscal
risk on the state.
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6 Public debt sustainability and
ﬁscal vulnerability in Viet Nam
Charles Adams∗
Introduction and overview
Following the initiation of “Doi Moi” reforms in the late 1980s,1 Viet Nam
embarked on a farreaching program to liberalize its previous, centrally planned
economic system, open up to international trade and capital ﬂows, and create the
institutions for a market economy (Riedel and Comer 1998; IMF 2008; World
Bank 2010a, b). As a result, Viet Nam has become one of the fastest growing
economies in Asia and has moved from low- to middle-income status at the
World Bank within the space of two decades. And, even though the last few
years have been characterized by severe macroeconomic instability, Viet Nam’s
economic prospects continue to be viewed very positively, provided it can deepen
and broaden its reform program (IMF 2010; ADB 2011b).
For most of the reform period, Viet Nam’s ﬁscal situation remained relatively
strong and was not a major source of concern. Notwithstanding signiﬁcant
demands on the budget associated with an ambitious public investment and
expenditure program,2 bank recapitalizations to address impaired assets carried
over from the prereform regime, and declining revenues from a shrinking state
sector Viet Nam’s ﬁscal situation remained relatively solid during the ﬁrst stages
of its reform program. From the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, the deﬁcit of
the (consolidated) general government—measured according to international
conventions3—averaged a modest 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) while
public debt was on a declining trend from over 60% to around 45% of GDP.
Against the background of the State Budget Law,4 the relatively strong ﬁscal
position was facilitated by Viet Nam’s access to concessional loans with low
interest rates and to grants, buoyant oil revenues, comprehensive tax reform,5 and
a generally robust economic growth performance with average annual increases
in real GDP of 6%–7%.6
Notwithstanding the apparent strength of Viet Nam’s ﬁscal position, both
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank expressed concern
∗The author thanks Benno Ferrarini, Paul Gruenwald, and Hwee Kwan Chow for comments on an
earlier draft. However, the author is solely responsible for the views expressed here.
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in their reports in the 2000s about the potential size of various government
activities that were not included in the budget. In particular, concerns were
expressed that signiﬁcant unrecorded off-budget spending and borrowing might
imply a much less benign view of Viet Nam’s ﬁscal situation than is implied
by the ofﬁcial data (IMF 2010). And there were worries about the possibility
of potentially large contingent liabilities associated with relatively inefﬁcient
state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). Notwithstanding a commercializa-
tion of their operations, SOCBs appeared to continue to undertake relatively
high levels of directed lending and might have been accumulating signiﬁcant
impaired assets during the reform period.7 In addition, the efﬁciency of some of
the investments undertaken in the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector appeared
not to be very high, thus contributing to a relatively high incremental capital
output ratio.8
The relatively benign ﬁscal situation recorded in Viet Nam was not sustained
during the 2000s. Viet Nam’s budget deteriorated sharply in 2008–09 in the
context of a period of severe macroeconomic instability caused by both external
and domestic factors. As a result, particularly of a large ﬁscal stimulus program
introduced during the 2008/09 global ﬁnancial crisis to combat severe economic
weakness, the deﬁcit of the (consolidated) general government surged to about
9% of GDP in 2009 and the public debt ratio climbed to about 50% (Table 6.1;
Figures 6.1 and 6.2). Concerns were also expressed that the deﬁcit might increase
further as ofﬁcial announcements at the time pointed to the possibility of the
deﬁcit widening to well over 10% of GDP (ADB 2010b; IMF 2010; World Bank
2010a, b).
In response to the weaker ﬁscal position, the Vietnamese authorities sought
to reestablish ﬁscal discipline in late 2009 and 2010 against the backdrop of a
number of signiﬁcant challenges (IMF 2010). Beyond the need to unwind various
ﬁscal stimulus measures introduced in 2008–09, including a generous interest
subsidy scheme (ADB 2011b) the key challenges included ensuring adequate
ﬁnancing for muchneeded new infrastructure programs; further deepening and
broadening the tax base to compensate for ongoing declines in revenues from oil,
trade, and land taxes; and seeking to better control provincial and local government
spending. At the same time, signiﬁcant new challenges were beginning to emerge
as a result of (1) renewedweaknesses in the ﬁnancial systemand in the nonﬁnancial
sector9 (which may at some time call for ofﬁcial budgetary support); (2) the
possible negative implications of high levels of macroeconomic instability for
growth and the exchange rate; and (3) higher interest costs associated with the
graduation from low-income ofﬁcial borrower status. In addition, reﬂecting the
relatively opaque nature of Viet Nam’s budget and its presentation being not in a
Government Finance Statistics (GFS) format, substantive questions have persisted
about the extent to which the ﬁscal situation is adequately covered in the ofﬁcial
data (IMF 2010).
Against this background, the objective of this chapter is to assess the
sustainability of the ﬁscal situation in Viet Nam and the major challenges and
vulnerabilities that will need to be faced in maintaining sustainability over time.
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Table 6.1 Viet Nam—debt sustainability analysis scenarios (% of GDP)
Scenario Actual Estimate Projections
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
1. No policy adjustment
Fiscal balance −1.2 −9.0 −5.7 −4.0 −4.0 −4.0 −4.0 −4.0 −4.0
Primary balance −0.1 −7.6 −4.4 −2.5 −2.5 −2.5 −2.5 −2.5 −2.5
Public debt 42.9 51.2 52.8 54.4 52.8 51.5 47.8 44.5 41.6
2. Baseline policy adjustment
Fiscal balance −1.2 −9.0 −5.7 −4.0 −3.8 −3.5 −3.3 −3.0 −2.9
Primary balance −0.1 −7.6 −4.4 −2.5 −2.2 −2.0 −1.8 −1.6 −1.6
Public debt 42.9 51.2 52.8 54.4 52.5 51.0 47.1 43.6 40.7
3. Delayed ﬁscal adjustment
Fiscal balance −1.2 −9.0 −5.7 −4.0 −3.8 −3.5 −3.3 −3.0 −2.9
Primary balance −0.1 −7.6 −4.4 −2.5 −4.7 −4.4 −4.3 −4.0 −4.0
Public debt 42.9 51.2 52.8 54.4 54.9 53.4 49.6 46.0 43.2
4. Growth slowdown
Fiscal balance −1.2 −9.0 −5.7 −4.0 −3.8 −3.5 −3.3 −3.0 −2.9
Primary balance −0.1 −7.6 −4.4 −2.5 −2.2 −2.0 −1.8 −1.6 −1.6
Public debt 42.9 51.2 52.8 54.4 53.0 51.9 48.4 45.1 42.6
5. Inﬂation increase
Fiscal balance −1.2 −9.0 −5.7 −4.0 −3.8 −3.5 −3.3 −3.0 −2.9
Primary balance −0.1 −7.6 −4.4 −2.5 −2.2 −2.0 −1.8 −1.6 −1.6
Public debt 42.9 51.2 52.8 54.4 50.2 46.5 41.0 36.2 32.3
6. Domestic interest rate increase
Fiscal balance −1.2 −9.0 −5.7 −4.0 −3.8 −3.5 −3.3 −3.0 −2.9
Primary balance −0.1 −7.6 −4.4 −2.5 −2.2 −2.0 −1.8 −1.6 −1.6
Public debt 42.9 51.2 52.8 54.4 53.6 53.1 50.2 47.5 45.5
7. Real exchange rate depreciation
Fiscal balance −1.2 −9.0 −5.7 −4.0 −3.8 −3.5 −3.3 −3.0 −2.9
Primary balance −0.1 −7.6 −4.4 −2.5 −2.2 −2.0 −1.8 −1.6 −1.6
Public debt 42.9 51.2 52.8 54.4 62.8 75.0 86.7 101.4 120.8
8. “Perfect storm”
Fiscal balance −1.2 −9.0 −5.7 −4.0 −3.8 −3.5 −3.3 −3.0 −2.9
Primary balance −0.1 −7.6 −4.4 −2.5 −2.2 −2.0 −1.8 −1.6 −1.6
Public debt 42.9 51.2 52.8 54.4 56.8 63.5 72.8 84.8 100.1
Memo item:
growth interest −23.8 −2.6 −11.2 −10.8 −8.0 −6.3 −8.5 −8.0 −7.7
rate gap
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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Figure 6.1 Policy scenarios—Viet Nam’s public sector debt (% of GDP).
e = estimate, GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Author’s estimates.
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Figure 6.2 Macroeconomic scenarios—Viet Nam’s public sector debt (% of GDP).
e = estimate, GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Author’s estimates.
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To this end, the chapter draws on and extends the analysis of ﬁscal sustainability
presented in Adams, Ferrarini, and Park (2010) based, in particular, on the concept
of ﬁscal vulnerability discussed by Hemming and Petrie (2002). The chapter
considers the sustainability of Viet Nam’s current ﬁscal situation—in terms of
whether it is consistent with the stabilization of the public debt ratio at a reasonable
level over time—and where the main vulnerabilities and challenges to ﬁscal
sustainability may lie and how they might best be addressed.
A number of studies of the ﬁscal situation in Viet Nam have been done, most
notably, the regular debt sustainability analyses (DSAs) undertaken jointly by the
IMFandWorldBank (IMF2008, 2010). In addition, several academic studies have
addressed aspects of Viet Nam’s actual and prospective ﬁscal situation (Anh 2002;
Roy 2003; Giang 2004; Castel 2007, 2009). However, many of them have focused
on the early period of the reform process and—subject to a number of caveats—
have not generally seen major threats to ﬁscal sustainability. Some studies have
focused on particular components of the budget (e.g., Anh [2002] and Castel
[2007] discuss pensions) rather than focusing on the overall ﬁscal situation. Given
the ﬁscal slippages in Viet Nam during the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008/09
(Castel 2009) as well as new challenges associated with Viet Nam’s increased
reliance on nonconcessional foreign currency borrowing, it is important to revisit
the earlier ﬁndings and the degree to which the conclusions on debt sustainability
remain valid. In particular, it is useful to consider whether Viet Nam’s increased
reliance on foreign currency market borrowing is making it more vulnerable to the
sort of self-fulﬁlling disequilibria in which even unfounded concerns about ﬁscal
sustainability could become self-validating by raising the local currency value of
foreign debt or the interest rate.10
The approach to assessing ﬁscal sustainability taken in this chapter is subject
to four important caveats. First, as in the case of any economy under transition
from state to private ownership, there are substantive questions in Viet Nam
about where the evolving line should be drawn between the state and nonstate
sectors in assessing the ﬁscal situation and the level of public debt. Best practice
in assessing ﬁscal sustainability might be to focus on the broadest concept of the
public sector that includes state enterprises in addition to the central and provincial
governments (Adams, Ferrarini, and Park 2010). The data for such coverage are
not easily available—the SOE sector in Viet Nam has been evolving during the
reform period—and such an approach would require continually redeﬁning the
public sector to account for ongoing privatization and equitization. In addition,
this approach would likely lead to a deﬁnition of the ﬁscal sector that was several
times broader and larger than the ofﬁcial measure.
Second, there are substantive questions about the boundaries for the govern-
ment sector, and continued concerns with regard to the comprehensiveness of
ofﬁcially reported budget spending and revenue data and the sizes of various
off-budget accounts, as well as a number of quasi-ﬁscal activities (IMF 2008,
2010). Fortunately, the authorities are beginning to address these issues and have
indicated their intention to bring Viet Nam’s ﬁscal data up to GFS standards. At
this point, however, it is necessary to rely on very imprecise estimates of the sizes
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of the various off-budget items and, when the ﬁscal data are presented according
to GFS conventions by the authorities, themeasures of the budget may be different
from the current measures.
Third, in line with the standard approaches to the assessment of ﬁscal
sustainability, this chapter deﬁnes public debt to include the outstanding interest-
bearing liabilities of the government (excluding the State Bank of Viet Nam)
and any nongovernment debt that is explicitly guaranteed by the government.
Unfortunately, however, there is some ambiguity about the formal extent of such
guarantees,11 as evidenced by the lack of clarity about whether the Government
of Viet Nam would assume responsibility for the liabilities of the state group
Vinashin after its apparent debt default in late 2010.12
Finally, an important caveat—related to the lack of a medium-term ﬁscal
framework forVietNam’s budget—is the absence of complete data on both funded
and unfunded medium-term government liabilities associated with items such as
social support, pensions, and medical beneﬁts (Castel 2007, 2009). Instead, it is
necessary to rely largely on external estimates of the costs of various programs
and their possible implications for the budget.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The following section develops
and applies relatively standard deterministic and stochastic DSAs to identify the
extent to which Viet Nam’s current ﬁscal situation is sustainable and the amount
of adjustment required to ensure medium-term sustainability at a reasonable debt
level. The approach focuses on the general government and hence covers the
central, provincial, and local governments. As in the case of the most recent IMF
and World Bank sustainability assessment for Viet Nam (IMF 2010)—based on
similar macroeconomic assumptions—the key ﬁnding is that Viet Nam’s ﬁscal
position is not currently very far from a sustainable level given recent efforts
to bring the ﬁscal deﬁcit down from its peak of close to 9% of GDP in 2009;
in addition, public debt does not appear to be at the sort of levels that ﬂash
major warning signals about debt sustainability. And, even though the primary
(noninterest) general government surplus will need to increase somewhat to bring
the public debt ratio down to a more comfortable rate over the medium term, the
adjustment required does not appear too large to achieve if economic conditions
remain favorable.
However, based on extensive sensitivity analysis in which a range of less
favorable economic assumptions about growth, interest rates, and the exchange
rate are adopted—with implications for the gap between the growth rate and
interest rate (the interest rate–growth differential, or IRGD)13—the ﬁscal position
potentially appears much less sanguine. Against this background, the chapter’s
third section discusses some potential vulnerabilities in Viet Nam’s ﬁscal situation
and their implications for the outlook. Building on the framework of Hemming
and Petrie (2002), a number of vulnerabilities are discussed regarding a possible
underestimation of the size of the true ﬁscal position; the degree of sensitivity
of ﬁscal outcomes to various risks (including reﬁnancing and exchange rate
risk); the robustness of the underlying budget situation; and weaknesses in ﬁscal
management practices. The chapter argues that several of these vulnerabilities
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are somewhat elevated in Viet Nam and may make it difﬁcult to maintain ﬁscal
sustainability over time. Finally, section four presents the key conclusions and
policy recommendations.
Debt sustainability analyses
Fiscal sustainability refers to a situation in which the government is able to ﬁnance
its operations smoothly over time without generating explosive or excessive
increases in public debt (Chalk and Hemming 2000; Adams, Ferrarini, and Park
2010). For some purposes, it is useful to explicitly distinguish between the ability
of government to smoothly ﬁnanceﬁscal deﬁcits in the short term (a liquidity issue)
and medium-term ﬁscal solvency issues (the ability of the government to meet its
debt and other obligations). This section applies relatively standard deterministic
and stochastic DSAs to consider issues of medium-term ﬁscal sustainability or
solvency; short-term funding issues are addressed in the next section.
Even though ﬁscal sustainability is a critical concept, agreement about how
it should best be assessed is not universal. As discussed in earlier Chapters
2 and 3, and by Adams, Ferrarini, and Park (2010), there are three broad
approaches to assessing medium-term ﬁscal sustainability. Under time series
approaches, ﬁscal sustainability is assessed through formal tests on the time
series properties of variables such as government spending, revenues, and public
debt (frequently as shares of GDP) and whether they exhibit stationarity or co-
integrating relationships. Essentially, these tests are based on the fact that ﬁscal
sustainability will imply that variables such as debt/GDP ratios do not exhibit
explosive behavior and that variables such as government spending and revenues
will tend to move together when the government budget constraint is satisﬁed and
ﬁscal solvency is achieved.
Another set of tests can be referred to as ﬁscal reaction function (or primary
balance) tests, as they measure how the primary (or noninterest) component of the
ﬁscal balance responds to increases in variables such as debt ratios. Intuitively,
the basis for these tests is that a tendency for the primary balance to increase as
debt ratios rise will tend to support ﬁscal sustainability. This is because such an
increase will imply that ﬁscal space is created to cover the associated increase in
debt-servicing costs. Unfortunately, however, both time series and ﬁscal reaction
function tests require a long time span of consistent ﬁscal data, which is not
available in the case of Viet Nam.14
Accordingly, this chapter uses a third approach involving scenarios or stress
tests. The scenario approach involves projecting public debt ratios several years
into the future on the basis of current and other policy settings in order to assess
whether they imply explosive paths for debt. Alternatively, the stress test approach
involves considering the implications of less favorable economic conditions,
such as weaker growth and/or higher interest rates, for the behavior of public
debt ratios. These latter approaches are referred to as stress tests in so far as
the sensitivity of the results is typically evaluated under a range of stressed
conditions or very large shocks to economic variables (e.g., 2 or 3 standard
Public debt sustainability and ﬁscal vulnerability in Viet Nam 177
deviation changes in variables such as interest rates and growth rates may be
considered to capture stress). In addition, the chapter uses stochastic approaches
to assessing debt sustainability. The stochastic approaches to debt sustainability
take explicit account of the probabilistic behavior of the variables that inﬂuence
debt sustainability, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
The key elements of Viet Nam’s DSA framework are outlined in Table 6.1,
drawing on the latest analyses of ﬁscal sustainability by the IMF and World
Bank (IMF 2008, 2010). In the table, all magnitudes are expressed as shares
of GDP unless otherwise indicated; overall ﬁscal deﬁcits are broken down into
their primary (noninterest)15 and nonprimary components; and the data apply
to the (consolidated) general government. Data through 2011 refer to estimates
of ﬁscal outturns while the data for 2012 and beyond are projections based on
alternative assumptions about Viet Nam’s ﬁscal adjustment effort and different
macroeconomic forecasts for growth, inﬂation, and the real exchange rate.
In the ﬁrst scenario (no policy adjustment) the primary ﬁscal deﬁcit is assumed
to be held constant at its 2011 ratio of 2.5% of GDP and the public debt ratio is
projected on the basis of this assumption. The second scenario (baseline policy
adjustment) draws on IMF andWorld Bank views on the primary ﬁscal adjustment
required by Viet Nam to lower its public debt ratio toward a more comfortable
40% of GDP over the medium term.16 The starting point for both scenarios is
an estimated outturn for Viet Nam’s (consolidated) general government deﬁcit of
about 4% of GDP in 2011 (down from 9% of GDP in 2009) and a public debt ratio
close to 50% of GDP in 2011.
Neither of the two scenarios points to signiﬁcant ﬁscal sustainability problems
in Viet Nam. Even under scenario 1 (no policy adjustment), Viet Nam’s public
debt ratio would decline over the medium term toward 45%–40% of GDP, albeit
at a relatively slow pace. Such a scenario would imply, however that Viet Nam’s
public debt ratio would remain high for a longer period relative to comparator
countries; in addition, it would, in the view of the IMF (2010), remain above
prudential norms given Viet Nam’s level of development and the strength of
its institutions. Accordingly, scenario 2 (baseline policy adjustment) assumes a
targeted reduction in the primary ﬁscal adjustment of 1%ofGDP spread uniformly
over several years. In this second scenario, not surprisingly, the public debt ratio
declines more rapidly than in the no-policy adjustment scenario and falls to about
40% of GDP during the next 3–5 years.
Based on these two scenarios, one could conclude that Viet Nam is not very far
from a sustainable ﬁscal position, and the ﬁscal adjustment that started in 2010 and
2011 (which reduced the overall ﬁscal deﬁcit by almost 5% of GDP from its 2009
peak of 9%) already represents a signiﬁcant down-payment on the adjustment
required to stabilize the debt ratio at an appropriate medium-term level.
Such a sanguine conclusion on Viet Nam’s ﬁscal situation would be premature
for at least four sets of reasons, however:
• First, the conclusion (as noted) is based on the assumption that substantial
progress has already been made in reducing Viet Nam’s ﬁscal deﬁcit from
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a peak of 9% of GDP in 2009 to less than 4% of GDP in 2011. At this
stage, the ﬁscal outturn for 2011 is a ﬁrst estimate—slippages from budgeted
outcomes are possible and have occurred in the past. In these circumstances,
care is needed in assuming that the bulk of the ﬁscal deterioration in 2009 has
already been reversed.
• Second, the conclusion is based on very favorablemacroeconomic conditions,
including sustained high real GDP growth, the stabilization of inﬂation at
single digit rates, and real exchange rate stability.17 In the spirit of DSA, it is
important to consider the implications of less favorable economic assumptions
and what they might imply for the required adjustment to stabilize the debt
ratio. Given recent macroeconomic instability in Viet Nam, it is especially
useful to consider the robustness of the conclusions to a “perfect storm”
scenario in which there are adverse movements in several economic variables
at the same time. To this end, consideration is given below to the implications
of an inﬂation-led growth slowdown accompanied by a period of sustained
weakness in the real dong exchange rate.
• Third, the conclusion assumes that the authorities are not only successful in
raising the revenue-to-GDP ratio on a sustained basis (even as traditional tax
sources need to be replaced by new tax sources and the grant element of aid
continues to be reduced) but also that higher revenues are used to improve the
primary ﬁscal balance rather than ﬁnance new public spending. As discussed
by Adams, Ferrarini, and Park (2010), there has been no guarantee in the past
that ﬁscal savings in Asia will necessarily be used to improve primary ﬁscal
surpluses; in some countries, increases in revenue collection have largely
been spent rather than “saved.” Thus, it is useful to consider the robustness
of the conclusions to alternative assumptions about the ﬁscal policy reaction
function.
• Fourth, the conclusion assumes a continuation of the very favorable positive
gap of around 10 percentage points on average between the real growth rate
of Viet Nam’s economy and the average real interest rate on public debt
(Table 6.1). Given this gap—with the real growth rate well above the real
interest rate—stabilization of the debt ratio is possible even when Viet Nam
is running a relatively large primary ﬁscal deﬁcit. Either because trend growth
in Viet Nam may be reduced by the recent macroeconomic turbulence (IMF
2010,World Bank 2010a), or on account of Viet Nam’s graduation to middle-
income status and the greater sensitivity of interest rates to market conditions,
the favorable IRGDs may narrow.18 Alternatively, any sustained weakening
of Viet Nam’s real exchange rate will tend to narrow the gap by raising
the real cost of external debt. It is useful to consider the sensitivity of the
conclusions to alternative assumptions about the IRGD, which plays a critical
role in the DSA.
Consider each of these qualiﬁcations in turn. Essentially, the ﬁrst qualiﬁcation
centers on the progress already made in reversing the sharp increase in the ﬁscal
deﬁcit in 2009. Based on the assumption that almost 5% of GDP of the required
adjustment has already taken place, onlymodest further adjustments in the primary
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balance are required to bring the debt/GDP ratio down to 40% over the medium
term. This, however, ignores the possibility of ﬁscal adjustment delays or slippage
in 2011 related to the sharp recent increases in inﬂation—which had already risen
to close 20% by mid-2011—and the risk of a slowing of growth in response to
the necessary monetary policy tightening (ADB 2011b; World Bank 2011). For
purposes of illustration, scenario 3 in Table 6.1 (delayed ﬁscal adjustment) is
based on the assumption that no progress is made in reducing the primary ﬁscal
deﬁcit in 2011 with all the adjustment shifted to later years. Not surprisingly, the
debt/GDP ratio remains elevated for a longer period under this scenario, but it then
trends down to a shade above 40% over the medium term. Accordingly, under the
assumptions made, a short delay in ﬁscal consolidation does not fundamentally
change the favorable conclusions on ﬁscal sustainability.19
Of greater potential signiﬁcance for ﬁscal sustainability would be much less
favorable macroeconomic conditions than assumed in the DSA, which narrow
the interest rate–growth differential. To this end, Table 6.1 reports the results of
sensitivity exercises in which the key macroeconomic variables in the DSA are
subjected, one by one, to a number of unfavorable shocks (scaled in standard
deviations). More speciﬁcally, the alternative scenarios display, in turn, the
implications for ﬁscal sustainability of a 1 standard deviation reduction in real
GDP growth (a 1.25 percentage point growth slowdown); a 1 standard deviation
increase in the inﬂation rate (a 5 percentage point increase); a 2 standard deviation
increase in the domestic nominal interest rate (about 7.6 percentage points change);
and a shock of about a 4 standard deviation depreciation in the level of the real
exchange rate (a 14% real depreciation on the average). Based on the recent
high degree of macroeconomic instability in Viet Nam (ADB 2011a, b), each
of these represents a plausible shock to which ﬁscal policy could reasonably
be exposed and it is appropriate to consider the potential implications for debt
sustainability.
As illustrated in Table 6.1, the key effect of each these macroeconomic shocks
is to raise the trajectory for the public debt ratio in the near term and slow the
convergence to a public debt ratio of 40% of GDP. Perhaps most surprising is
the very high sensitivity of the debt ratio to weakness in the real exchange rate.
With around two-thirds of public debt denominated in foreign currencies,20 any
sustained weakness in the real exchange rate has a very large adverse impact on
the debt ratio and the amount of adjustment in the primary ﬁscal balance needed
to stabilize the ratio. This implies considerable vulnerability for Viet Nam as it
has been moving in recent years toward a more ﬂexible exchange rate and there
has been severe weakness in the dong exchange rate in the short term.
In all of the scenarios considered so far in Table 6.1, shocks are assumed to
occur one by one and the implications for debt sustainability are determined in a
relatively mechanical way based on the breakdown of the ﬁscal accounts into their
primary and nonprimary components. In practice, a much more useful exercise
involves considering the simultaneous occurrence of several plausible shockswith
allowance for behavioral responses. Unfortunately, however, there are no widely
used macroeconomic models for Viet Nam that could be deployed for such an
exercise. As a result, a considerably less ambitious approach must be taken.21
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The last scenario in Table 6.1 considers the “perfect storm” of an inﬂation-
induced slowdown in growth accompanied by an increase in the domestic interest
rate and real exchange rate weakness. As illustrated, the effects are dramatic
and imply a large increase in the debt ratio of more than 20% of GDP over the
medium term. While the precise projections should be treated with care, they
clearly show that conclusions on ﬁscal sustainability are dependent on macro-
economic outcomes, especially as regards the real exchange rate. Accordingly,
and especially in light of the recent macroeconomic instability in Viet Nam, they
suggest the need to be cautious about howeasy itwill be to attain andmaintainﬁscal
sustainability.
A third key set of assumptions underlying the relatively sanguine view of ﬁscal
sustainability relate to the ability of Viet Nam to mobilize additional revenues and
the assumption that additional revenues will go toward reducing the ﬁscal deﬁcit
rather than increasing spending. As Viet Nam does not have binding ﬁscal rules
in place on the size of the deﬁcit, explicit decisions will be needed to save rather
than spend higher revenues. As illustrated in Table 6.1, much of the assumed
improvement in the primary balance required to stabilize the debt ratio over the
medium term (scenario 2, baseline policy adjustment) comes about as a result of
an increase in the ratio of revenue and grants to GDP by close to one percentage
point. As grants to Viet Nam are on a downward trend and the buoyancy of the
tax system22 does not appear to be very high, the implication is that tax rates will
have to be increased and/or the tax base broadened to reduce the primary deﬁcit.
While a 0.5 to 1 percentage point increase in the revenue/GDP ratio does not
appear very difﬁcult to achieve, oil taxes have until recently contributed almost
2 percentage points of GDP to revenue and are expected to decline signiﬁcantly
over the medium term (IMF 2010). In these circumstances, about 2–3 points of
GDP of (non-oil) revenues will be required to help stabilize the debt ratio even
under the optimistic economic assumptions made in the ﬁrst two scenarios of the
DSA analysis. Alternatively put, while the required improvement in the primary
balance may (under optimistic assumptions) only amount to 1% of GDP, the
required improvement in the non-oil primary balance may need to be 2%–3% of
GDP, given falling revenues from oil sources.
Another key assumption underlining the DSA is that additional revenue
mobilized will be used to reduce the deﬁcit rather than ﬁnance higher public
spending. Or, equivalently, the assumption is that higher revenue mobilization
will be used to reduce the primary deﬁcit on a one-to-one basis. Such an outcome
is not guaranteed, and may be especially difﬁcult to achieve when there are high
demands for public infrastructure investment and the grant component of foreign
aid is declining. The highest levels of government in Viet Nam, however, appear
to agree that much inefﬁcient public investment can be scaled back to make
room for new public investment; in addition, attention is being paid to innovative
ways to use public–private partnerships for ﬁnancing infrastructure (IMF 2008;
ADB 2011b). In these circumstances, the priorities of the public investment
program will not necessarily preclude devoting higher revenues to reducing
the deﬁcit.
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Against this background, one way to assess the likelihood of revenue mobi-
lization being used to reduce the primary deﬁcit is to look at Viet Nam’s recent
ﬁscal adjustment experience. Drawing on Adams, Ferrarini, and Park (2010), one
approach would be to estimate a primary ﬁscal policy reaction for Viet Nam that
measures the extent to which the primary ﬁscal balance deﬁcit has historically
been reduced as the debt/GDP ratio rises. Such an approach, however, was
difﬁcult to implement, as a stable policy reaction function could not be identiﬁed
for the limited number of time series observations available for Viet Nam.
Instead, a policy reaction function was estimated for how innovations in (primary)
government spending in Viet Nam respond to innovations in revenues.23 Subject
to issues of causality, the function can be interpreted as measuring the propensity
of the government to spend the proceeds from revenue innovations. The estimated
coefﬁcient of the reaction function is relatively high and suggests on average that
about 90%–95% of every percentage point increase in revenues leads to higher
public spending. In these circumstances, special efforts will be required to ensure
that revenue mobilized is used to reduce the deﬁcit.
The ﬁnal point concerns the large positive excess of Viet Nam’s real growth
rate over the (average) real interest rate on its public debt. To understand the
signiﬁcance of this IRGD, it is useful to note that the standard approach to debt
sustainability analysis in advanced countries is based on the ﬁnding that the real
growth rate of the economy is normally less than the real interest rate.24 In such
circumstances, a key result is that stabilization of the debt ratio will call for a
primary surplus that is approximately equal to the negative of the IRGDmultiplied
by the debt/GDP ratio. Accordingly, if the real interest rate exceeds the real growth
rate by 2 percentage points and the debt ratio is 100% of GDP, a primary ﬁscal
surplus of 2% of GDP will be needed to stabilize the debt ratio. In the case of
Viet Nam (and many other rapidly growing emerging markets), the arithmetic is
reversed on account of the real growth rate on average being above the real interest
rate by a signiﬁcant margin; in these circumstances, the public debt/GDP ratio can
be stabilized even when Viet Nam is running a primary deﬁcit. Even though such
a situation would not be expected to continue indeﬁnitely, it can clearly persist
for long periods, as discussed by Adams, Ferrarini, and Park (2010).
Table 6.1 reports the real IRGD for Viet Nam during the last decade and clearly
shows not only that the gaps have been very large and positive, but also very
persistent.Moreover, the large positive gaps have reﬂected a relatively high growth
rate of real GDP, and they have reﬂected highly negative real interest rates on
both domestic and foreign debt over some periods. In the case of foreign debt, the
negative real interest rates have reﬂected the concessional nature of much foreign
borrowing and the avoidance of signiﬁcant real depreciations in earlier periods that
would raise the real cost of foreign debt. In the case of domestic debt, the negative
real interest rates reﬂect inﬂation rates that in many years are well in excess of low
nominal rates. While many factors may contribute to the low ofﬁcial borrowing
rates in the domestic market, key contributing factors may be the existence of few
alternative safe assets that can be held domestically and the effects of ﬁnancial
repression. In the event, the key implication of the large positive IRGD is the
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additional room provided to Viet Nam to stabilize its debt ratio. Conversely, were
the real growth rate to fall below the real interest rate, Viet Nam would need to
run a primary surplus to bring down its current relative debt ratio to 40% of GDP
over the medium term. Accordingly, the required adjustment in the primary ﬁscal
balance in scenario 2 (baseline policy adjustment) in Table 6.1 would amount to
at least 6% of GDP.
Looking forward, the key consideration is not that the positive real IRGD
would be expected to disappear over the next few years; rather, with concessional
ﬁnancing being scaled back and the costs of debt issuance on the domestic market
likely to rise as ﬁnancial liberalization proceeds, there are strong reasons for
believing that the gap will narrow due to increases in the domestic interest rate.
And, based on the arithmetic, each percentage point narrowing of the gap implies
approximately another one-half percentage point increase in the primary surplus
needed to stabilize the debt ratio. Furthermore, as discussed in more detail in the
next section, the positive gap can be reduced by real exchange rate depreciation
and, in the short run, at least, is very vulnerable to conﬁdence crises that lead to
sharp depreciations in the dong exchange rate.25
Another perspective on debt sustainability can be obtained by explicitly
allowing for uncertainty in a stochastic version of the DSA. The stochastic DSA,
as in the case of the deterministic DSA, points to the need for caution about
ﬁscal sustainability while at the same time underscoring the degree of uncertainty
about ﬁscal outcomes. Figure 6.3 extends Viet Nam’s DSA by accounting for
the stochastic properties of the debt dynamics.26 In contrast to the deterministic
version ofDSA, the stochastic approach toDSArandomlygenerates a large sample
of stress tests from which frequency distributions of the debt ratio can be derived
for each year of the projection. These are then laid out like a fan around themedian
projection, permitting a probabilistic assessment of sustainability.
To derive the stochastic DSA for Viet Nam, an unrestricted vector autoregres-
sion (VAR) model was estimated on the basis of yearly data spanning 1991–2010
for the real exchange rate against the United States dollar, the real growth rate,
the rate of inﬂation, and the average weighted interest paid on domestic and
foreign debt.27 The VAR’s estimated variance–covariance matrix captures the
joint dynamics of the variables, which is then used for Monte Carlo simulations
reiterated 100,000 times to produce a probability distribution of shocks that is
consistent with those joint dynamics.
The stochastic debt ratio (the dashed line in Figure 6.3) is then projected
according to the median realizations of the macroeconomic variables and the
ﬁscal policy assumptions, which are assumed to be the same as those underlying
the deterministic baseline (the light gray line in Figure 6.3). The probability
distribution around the median projection is shown as a shaded area between
the 5th and 95th percentiles of the probability distribution. The stochastic DSA
projections assume ﬁscally responsible behavior by Viet Nam’s government,
raising the primary surplus by 0.05% for a unit percentage increase in the debt
ratio with a lag of one year. (This coefﬁcient is compatible with the estimates
in Chapter 2.)
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Figure 6.3 Viet Nam’s debt sustainability analysis (% of GDP).
e = estimate, GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Author’s calculations based on Asian Development Bank and International Monetary Fund
macroeconomic and ﬁscal forecasts.
That the deterministic DSA baseline falls within the 5th to 95th percentile
range of the stochastic fan-chart in Figure 6.3 suggests that the baseline
assumptions are compatible with a broad range of conceivable shocks to the
system ofmacro variables underlying the debt dynamics. The baseline’s allocation
in the area above the median of the fan-chart indicates that its underlying
assumptions are not overly optimistic compared to the historical trends and
correlation structures underlying the projected stochastic distribution.
Based on the conventional DSAs applied in this section, Viet Nam does
not appear to be very far from a sustainable ﬁscal position, notwithstanding
the large ﬁscal deterioration during the 2008/9 global ﬁnancial crisis. And,
even though new challenges for ﬁscal policy have been appearing, the ﬁscal
adjustment required to meet them does not appear to be of a size that is out
of line with past experience. More worrying is the possibility of signiﬁcantly
less favorable economic conditions but, as argued, they would have to be
very adverse to eliminate the very large positive IRGD and have a signiﬁcant
impact. Against this relatively sanguine background, the chapter now turns to
some vulnerabilities in Viet Nam’s ﬁscal position that are potentially of much
greater concern.
Fiscal vulnerabilities in Viet Nam
This section extends the analysis of ﬁscal sustainability by considering some
of the key vulnerabilities faced by ﬁscal policy in Viet Nam. To motivate the
discussion, this section focuses on vulnerabilities that may limit the ability of
Viet Nam’s ﬁscal policy to meet its stated objectives, such as the provision of
public goods, equitable redistribution, and macroeconomic stability. Obviously,
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deviations from ﬁscal sustainability can create vulnerabilities because they may
reduce the ability of ﬁscal policy to ﬁnance needed public investment programs.
But even in circumstanceswhereﬁscal policy appears sustainable, the achievement
of ﬁscal objectives may be compromised by the vulnerabilities that are considered
in this section.
Based on the taxonomy introduced by Hemming and Petrie (2002), this chapter
considers ﬁscal vulnerabilities in four key areas and attempts to provide some sense
of their potential signiﬁcance and implications. In all instances, the vulnerabilities
refer to factors that may impede to some degree the ability of ﬁscal policy to
perform its intended functions. Accordingly, it will be in the interests of the
authorities to try to address these vulnerabilities as part of the effort to increase
the likelihood of meeting ﬁscal objectives.
The four key areas of potential vulnerability are (1) the comprehensiveness of
measures of the ﬁscal balance and the extent to which the budget makes allowance
for ﬁscal contingencies; (2) the robustness of the budget position as reﬂected in
the underlying behavior of public expenditures and revenues; (3) the exposure
of the ﬁscal position to market risk, including reﬁnancing risk and exchange rate
risk; and (4) the effectiveness of the ﬁscal management process.
The information required for assessing the actual and potential signiﬁcance
of all these vulnerabilities is not easy to obtain. Nevertheless, based on the
available information, some tentative conclusions may be obtained. Viet Nam’s
ﬁscal situation appears vulnerable to potential weaknesses in all four areas and,
in particular, potentially signiﬁcant vulnerabilities related to incomplete coverage
of the budget and its failure to allow for various contingencies, and the growing
sensitivity of budgetary outcomes to interest rate and exchange rate risk. Each of
the four areas of ﬁscal vulnerability is considered in turn.
Fiscal position vulnerability. Viet Nam’s ofﬁcially reported ﬁscal position
does not, as noted in the preceding section, suggest signiﬁcant problems of
ﬁscal sustainability. Rather, the key concern is that the ofﬁcial ﬁscal data may
systematically exclude a number of important expenditure and revenue items
such the national investment program, including many projects funded by ofﬁcial
development assistance (ODA); in addition, the issuance of government bonds28
used to ﬁnanceODAprojectsmay not always be included in the ofﬁcial public debt
data. At the same time, the extent to which ofﬁcial debt guarantees (including in
the context of public–private partnerships) are properly accounted for in the ﬁscal
data is unclear, and there is some ambiguity about the extent to which current and
capital defense expenditures are included in the budget. If excluded expenditures
are signiﬁcant and larger than excluded revenues, the deﬁcit may be understated
and the amount of public debt may be underestimated. In these circumstances, the
authorities are potentially vulnerable to “surprises” that could adversely impinge
on the credibility of the budgetary process, lead to higher funding costs, and, in
the extreme, raise concerns about ﬁscal sustainability.
Looking forward, there is also a possibility of adverse ﬁscal “surprises”
related to the emergence of signiﬁcant (unfunded) contingent liabilities for the
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government associated with the still large SOCBs and some of the newer joint-
stock banks. Currently, the budget does not explicitly account for banking sector
contingent liabilities. Discussions with a range of observers—as well as recent
World Bank reports (2010b, 2011)—have shown renewed concerns about the
health and solvency of several banks in Viet Nam. There are two key types of
uncertainties, however, regarding the implications of these weaknesses for the
ﬁscal situation in Viet Nam. One relates to the size of any solvency problems in
the banking sector, and the other, to whether and to what extent the authorities
would inject ofﬁcial funds to help SOCBs and joint-stock banks return to solvency
and/or to restructure in the event of difﬁculties. Not surprisingly, the authorities
are reluctant to make their intentions with regard to any bailouts of ﬁnancial
institutions clear on account of moral hazard concerns. At the same time, recent
macroeconomic developments in Viet Nam have again raised concerns about the
health of the ﬁnancial system (IMF 2010).
Given the recent rapid growth of credit in Viet Nam that has brought the
credit/GDP ratio close to 130% and been accompanied by a signiﬁcant increase
in the number of joint-stock banks—and the channeling of signiﬁcant amounts
of credit to the stock market and to fund real estate—a fairly widely held view
is that parts of Viet Nam’s ﬁnancial sector are in difﬁculty and will at some time
require restructuring and the injection of additional capital (IMF 2010). The size of
the problem in the ﬁnancial sector is not known, partly because bank statements are
not systematically reviewed by external auditors and many banks apply relatively
low standards in identifying and provisioning for impaired assets. And, even if
there are solvency problems, they need not necessarily be resolved using ofﬁcial
money; the problems could, for example, involve healthier large banks taking over
small banks and/or allowing for increases in private ownership and capital through
stepped up “equitization.” In short, a range of options is available for injecting any
needed capital into the banking system, other than using ofﬁcial money. In these
circumstances, it is not easy to “score”VietNam’s contingent ﬁscal liabilities in the
ﬁnancial sector other than to note that Viet Nam does face potential contingencies
that it would be prudent not to ignore and for which some contingency planning
may be desirable. And any lack of transparency about the size of these potential
contingencies may lead some economic agents to fear the worst.29
These arguments indicate that Viet Nam appears to be vulnerable to potential
adverse ﬁscal “surprises” related to incomplete coverage of the budget and
possible contingent liabilities in the ﬁnancial sector. Even though the sizes of
these “surprises” may not be known, it would be prudent to make reasonable
estimates of their potential magnitude and ensure that there is adequate ﬁscal space
to absorb them. And this knowledge could be useful for determining a prudent
level of public debt.
Budget position vulnerability. Looking forward, there are potential vulnerabil-
ities on both the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget that policymakers
might usefully address with a view to ensuring ﬁscal sustainability over time.
On the revenue side of the budget, the key vulnerabilities are related to the high
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dependence on unsustainable revenue sources such as the oil and gas sectors,
SOEs, trade tariffs, and land fees (IMF 2010; Rosengard et al. 2010). In addition,
dependence on ODA to ﬁnance needed public investment and infrastructure has
been relatively high. Given Viet Nam’s graduation to middle-income status, ODA
is expected to decline. Already, the Vietnamese authorities have made signiﬁcant
progress in reducing its revenue vulnerabilities by broadening and extending the
tax base, but the process is not yet complete. Rosengard et al. (2010), in particular,
have suggest that direct taxation and the corporate income tax need improvement to
help close revenue shortfalls, implying the need for signiﬁcant further tax reform.30
In addition, the current tax system appears not to exhibit a very high level of
buoyancy in other areas (IMF 2008, 2010). Unless the revenue system is made
more buoyant, at some time in the future the authorities may not be able to meet
their expenditure objectives.
On the expenditure side, the key potential vulnerabilities for the Vietnamese
authorities relate to their apparent commitment to introduce universal health
insurance by 2015 and to signiﬁcantly expand the coverage of social insurance in
order to reduce households’ vulnerability to income shocks.31 These desirable
commitments could add signiﬁcantly to the budget and increase over time.
This is the case, even though Castel (2009) has suggested that current plans
to expand health insurance will not incur signiﬁcant additional budgetary costs
and can be largely paid for by a natural decline in pensions provided after the
Viet Nam War. Pension obligations do not appear to be a major vulnerability at
the moment because Viet Nam’s population is relatively young. Nevertheless,
schemes introduced should not impose too large a burden on the budget
(Anh 2002).
Another potential vulnerability on the expenditure side relates to high provincial
infrastructure spending and unnecessary duplication of public investment projects
across regions to satisfy local interests. In addition to the adverse implications
for efﬁciency, such spending renders budgetary control difﬁcult. And, as noted
earlier, vulnerability is related to defense spending, much of which is not currently
included in the budget.
Putting these arguments together, Viet Namhas ﬁscal vulnerabilities on both the
revenue and expenditure sides, but the former are probably more signiﬁcant. Even
though much progress has been made in addressing the revenue vulnerabilities,
further tax reform and broadening of the revenue base are likely to be necessary
to ensure revenue buoyancy.
Vulnerability to short-term market risk. Short-term market risk refers to the
risk of ﬁscal outcomes deviating from plans as a result of innovations in interest
rates, exchange rates, and market liquidity conditions. Domestic and foreign
interest rates are becoming increasingly important for ﬁscal outturns as Viet Nam
starts to borrow at market-determined interest rates and given the relatively short-
term maturity of its debt.32 Based on these short-term maturities, as well as the
relatively large share of foreign currency debt (about two-thirds), Viet Nam is
potentially exposed to a relatively high level of short-term ﬁscal risk from interest
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rates, the exchange rate, and liquidity conditions. Of course, given that perhaps as
much of 50%–60% of Viet Nam’s outstanding public debt is still bilateral ofﬁcial
debt (on concessional terms), the tendency is to reduce the extent of rollover
risk33 related to market liquidity conditions. This is because ofﬁcial creditors,
unlike private creditors, do not typically withdraw credit when market liquidity
conditions are tight.
At the same time, foreign participation in Viet Nam’s domestic bond market
(which is dominated by ofﬁcial debt) is still relatively low as a result of
extensive capital controls.34 However,market conditionswill improve and foreign
investors will increase in importance as Viet Nam’s ﬁnancial markets develop and
liberalize.
With debt becoming more sensitive to market risk and, in the extreme, subject
to rollover risk, prudent practice would be to take into account not only the size of
the public debt in considering issues of (short-run) ﬁscal vulnerability, but also the
debt’s maturity structure and currency of denomination. Both these factors create
vulnerability. It will be important for Viet Nam to avoid (1) signiﬁcant currency
and maturity mismatches in public debt (whereby short-term foreign currency
debt is used to ﬁnance longer term projects with domestic currency returns);
and (2) situations involving a large proportion of foreign currency debt. Foreign
currency debt can lead to signiﬁcant vulnerabilities due to negative feedback loops
when there is lack of conﬁdence in the domestic currency.
The risk of negative feedback loops arising in Viet Nam occurred in late 2010
and early 2011 when inﬂation concerns led Vietnamese to shift out of the dong
into the United States dollar, thereby weakening the exchange rate. The weakness
in the exchange rate raised the domestic currency value of foreign debt and could
have created a negative feedback loop if concerns about increases in the domestic
currency value of external debt had further weakened conﬁdence in the dong.
Another implication of market conditions becoming more important pertains to
the ease of rolling over public debt when it matures.When there is sizable ﬁnancial
repression and “captive” markets for public debt, rollover risk is relatively low.
As markets are liberalized, rollover risk becomes potentially more important, as
was evident when Viet Nam experienced a number of failed debt auctions in 2008
and 2009 (ADB 2010a).
An important conclusion that follows from the foregoing is that ﬁscal outcomes
are becoming increasingly sensitive to market risk in Viet Nam and that this
sensitivity is likely to increase as the authorities further liberalize the economy
and dismantle capital controls. This vulnerability should be recognized and ways
found to mitigate the risks.
Fiscal management and effectiveness vulnerabilities. The fourth group of
vulnerabilities relates to the risk that ﬁscal management systems (including the
public debt management system) may not be up to the task of ensuring ﬁscal
objectives are met. Weaknesses here can be in the structure of ﬁscal institutions,
the approaches taken to budgeting, and the human capital of staff. Not surprisingly,
in the case of an economy transitioning from central planning to the market
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economy, new ﬁscal institutions have had to be constructed and new practices
in ﬁscal management adopted in Viet Nam.
During the early part of the reform period, signiﬁcant progress was made
in strengthening and modernizing ﬁscal management, but signiﬁcant challenges
remain. This is especially the case for bringing ﬁscal reporting up to international
accounting standards, ensuring complete coverage of ﬁscal activities in the budget,
and forecasting revenues and expenditures (IMF 2010, Rosenberg 2010). In
addition, challenges remain in strengthening medium-term budget planning and
in moving toward performance-based budgeting approaches. As regards public
debt management, there are also still challenges in moving toward allowing more
market-determined yields in domestic public debt issuance, setting prudential
limits on foreign currency debt issuance, and reversing the recent shortening of
debt maturities.
Given these challenges,VietNammight reasonably be judged as facingmedium
to high risk in the area of ﬁscal management. A new state budget law is, however,
proposed to take effect in early 2013, and is intended to address many of the
challenges. In addition, under the 2009 Public Debt Law, the authorities are
planning to signiﬁcantly strengthen debt management, including the issuance of
domestic public debt (IMF2010). Together, the ﬁscal and public debtmanagement
reforms, if successfully implemented, could reduce ﬁscal management risk
signiﬁcantly.
Conclusions and policy implications
Viet Nam has enjoyed an enviable economic performance since it initiated Doi
Moi reforms in the late 1980s. During the global ﬁnancial crisis, however,
Viet Nam’s ﬁscal situation deteriorated sharply as the budget deﬁcit rose abruptly
and public debt climbed to about 50% of GDP. As a result, concerns about
ﬁscal sustainability came to the foreground in Viet Nam and the authorities have
been taking steps to bring the deﬁcit down to more sustainable levels in the last
few years.
Ofﬁcial data indicate that Viet Nam’s ﬁscal situation is already well on the way
to reestablishing sustainability and only relativelymodest further ﬁscal adjustment
will be required during the next few years. This ﬁnding should not, however, be
taken as grounds for complacency. A central argument of this chapter is that
Viet Nam’s ﬁscal situation faces a number of potentially signiﬁcant risks and
vulnerabilities that could pose serious challenges to attaining and maintaining
ﬁscal sustainability.
In particular, vulnerabilities relate to the relatively narrow coverage of the
budget; contingent liabilities in the banking sector that may be relatively large;
weak budget management practices; and the increased sensitivity of the budget
to interest rate, exchange rate, and rollover risk. Viet Nam will require a
comprehensive approach to address these risks and vulnerabilities and attain and
maintain ﬁscal sustainability on a lasting basis. Looking forward, account will also
need to be taken of the likelihood that some of the factors that supported ﬁscal
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sustainability in the past—including a large positive excess of the economy’s
growth rate over the interest rates—are unlikely to continue indeﬁnitely. As
a result, attaining ﬁscal sustainability may become more difﬁcult over time,
underscoring the desirability of starting to address these vulnerabilities in the
ﬁscal position as soon as possible.
Notes
1 The Sixth Communist Party Congress took the decision in late 1986 to move from a
socialist centrally planned economy to a “socialist economywith a market orientation.”
In practice, as argued by Riedel and Comer (1998), the transition did not effectively
begin until the early 1990s.
2 Major expenditure items included transportation infrastructure and education
(Rosengard et al. 2010).
3 Here, and in what follows, Viet Nam’s ﬁscal accounts are measured according to the
IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual. Reﬂecting some signiﬁcant differences
in the classiﬁcation of expenditures and revenues—as well as regards the treatment of
various off-budget accounts—theﬁscal data presented in this chapter differ substantially
from the ofﬁcial data.
4 The 1997 State Budget Law represented an important milestone in the reform of the
budget process. The law addressed issues of ﬁscal centralization and decentralization
and the responsibilities of local government for revenue mobilization for development
purposes.
5 Two major sets of tax reform were undertaken during this period. The ﬁrst took place
during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s and involved introducing a turnover tax, proﬁt tax,
trade tax, and consumption tax. The second, in the latter part of the 1990s, involved
introducing a value-added tax and a corporate tax to replace the turnover and proﬁt tax
(Riedel and Comer 1998).
6 Not surprisingly for a young transition economy, the state-owned enterprise sector
contributed a signiﬁcant share of revenues during this period.
7 Considerable uncertainty has existed, however, regarding the extent of impaired assets
on the balance sheets of the SOCBs. The IMF and World Bank have encouraged the
Vietnamese authorities to allow the balance sheets of the major banks to be externally
audited and bank balance sheets reported according to international standards (IMF
2008).
8 For further discussion, see Hong (2004).
9 Included here are the problems that emerged in the state group Vinashin that led to a
default on its external debt in late 2010 as well as reports of difﬁculties in a number of
property-related companies (ADB 2011b).
10 In contrast to the People’s Republic of China and India, where most public debt
is denominated in local currency, over two-thirds of Viet Nam’s public debt is
denominated in foreign currency.
11 For further discussion, see Rosengard et al. (2010).
12 Formally, the Government of Viet Nam has indicated that Vinashin’s external debts
are not covered by a government guarantee. Under Vietnamese law, only the Ministry
of Finance and State Bank of Vietnam have the authority to provide ofﬁcial guarantees
on debt.
13 For discussion of the signiﬁcance of the IRGD for ﬁscal sustainability, see Adams,
Ferrarini, and Park (2010).
14 It does not seem appropriate to extend the number of observations by going back
before Doi Moi reforms because the ﬁscal structure was very different under the central
planning regime prior to the reforms.
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15 The decomposition of the budget into primary and nonprimary components abstracts
from any assets held by the government and hence only takes into account interest
payments on government ﬁnancial liabilities. In practice, the government sector will
hold some assets, including ownership of SOEs. See Adams, Ferrarini, and Park (2010).
16 As discussed in subsequent text, the IMF sees a 40% debt ratio as being as prudent in
the case of Viet Nam (IMF 2010).
17 Over the medium term, the scenarios assume that the real exchange rate (measured
through relative GDP deﬂators) is constant. This is more of a technical assumption
than a forecast of the most likely outcome.
18 The gap can equivalently be expressed as the difference between the real growth rate of
GDP and the (average) real interest rate on Viet Nam’s public debt, or as the difference
between these magnitudes expressed in nominal terms. Because about two-thirds of
Viet Nam’s debt is denominated in foreign currencies, the real cost of debt is inﬂuenced
signiﬁcantly by changes in the real value of the dong.
19 A delay in ﬁscal adjustment could have more adverse effects if it damages
conﬁdence.
20 In practice, much of the debt is denominated in United States dollars, Japanese yen,
and euros.
21 Consideration is given below to a stochastic DSA based on estimated vector
autoregressions for the key variables.
22 The buoyancy of the tax system is traditionally measured by the elasticity of tax
revenues with respect to GDP. When the elasticity exceeds unity, tax revenues
grow more rapidly to GDP. During the latter part of the 1990s, the budget revenue
buoyancy was 0.92. For a discussion of aspects of Viet Nam’s tax system, see Roy
(2003).
23 Innovations are measured as the residuals from simple ﬁrst order autoregressive
processes for revenues and primary spending.
24 This is one implication of the modiﬁed golden rule. For further discussion, see Adams,
Ferrarini, and Park (2010).
25 Given pervasive currency substitution in Viet Nam as well as a record of high and
variable inﬂation, the dong exchange rate is very vulnerable to deteriorations in inﬂation
expectations, as occurred in 2008 and 2010.
26 This is done by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) that captures the
correlation pattern of the (nonﬁscal) macroeconomic variables underlying the evolution
of the debt ratio and then using this information to implement Monte Carlo
simulations.
27 Optimally, the estimation of the VAR model would be performed on the basis of
quarterly data spanning 10 years or longer, as was done for some countries in Chapter 2
of this volume. Unfortunately, a sufﬁciently consistent quarterly dataset for estimation
is not available for Viet Nam and yearly data had to be used instead. Because the
data span only 20 years, the variance–covariance matrix cannot be estimated precisely.
Nevertheless, it indicates the basic direction and intensity of the correlations among the
variables.
28 Domestically, these would include education bonds, infrastructure bonds, reform bonds
(pre-2000 SOCB debt) and municipal bonds. Reportedly, the government has also
issued international bonds to help ﬁnance SOEs (IMF 2010).
29 International credit rating agencies have expressed concern about the health of the
banking system and appear to assume that ofﬁcial bank data seriously overstate the
health of the banking system (IMF 2010).
30 Rosengard et al. (2010) argue that the personal income tax has made up only 2% of
Viet Nam’s total revenue, compared with about 16% in other low- and middle-income
developing countries.
31 Large parts of the informal sector will enter the systemwith the introduction of notional
individual accounts.
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32 Unfortunately, comprehensive data are not available on the original or remaining
term to maturity of public debt. The IMF has suggested, however, that domestic
public debt is of relatively short maturity, which is not uncommon in emerging
markets such as Viet Nam’s. See also the Asia Bond Monitor (ADB 2010a,
2011a).
33 Rollover risk refers to the risk of not being able to reﬁnancematuring debt at any interest
rate when it matures. Rollover risk related to the remaining term to maturity of a debt
contract may also be due to covenants that may require immediate repayment in the
event of some event such as a credit rating downgrade.
34 See issues of the Asia Bond Monitor (ADB 2010a, 2011a).
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7 Conclusions and other country
perspectives
Benno Ferrarini, Raghbendra Jha, and
Arief Ramayandi∗
Introduction
To combat the recession that accompanied the global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC),
most major countries supplemented automatic ﬁscal stabilizers with discretionary
ﬁscal stimulus packages. While the global economy has started to recover, these
packages, combined with the costs of ﬁnancial sector and other bailouts and sharp
output and revenue losses, have left many countries with large public debt burdens
as a long-lasting legacy of the crisis. This is especially true of the United States
(US) and several European countries. As noted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), the
global economy moved from a ﬁnancial crash to a debt crisis, although Asia was
not at the epicenter of the GFC, nor is it at the center of the subsequent debt crisis.
Most developing member countries of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in
the Asia and Paciﬁc region pursued a similar mix of policies, although much less
actual support was provided to banks and ﬁnancial institutions in Asia and there
were far fewer bailouts (BIS 2010). As a consequence of the GFC, public debt
rose in this region, although not spectacularly as in the US and some European
countries. Deﬁcit reduction measures followed this debt accumulation, even
as the risk of another global slowdown, if not outright recession, remained high.
This is particularly true of Europe but (depending on the slowdown’s intensity)
the slowdown could spill over to the US and the world economy as a whole
(ADB 2011).
This book has inquired into the sustainability of public debt in the Asia and
Paciﬁc region and argued that largely because of favorable histories of domestic
macroeconomic parameters, major economies in the Asia and Paciﬁc region were
able to avoid a prolonged deceleration in economic growth during the GFC.
Further, their comfortable ﬁscal positions enabled them to put into place ﬁscal
stimulus packages without accumulating excessive public debt. Moreover, after
the worst impact of the global recession was over, the stimulus packages could be
rolled back without causing recession.
∗ The authors are grateful to Charles Adams, Mukul Asher, and Richard Hemming for helpful
comments on an earlier draft. Paul Holden contributed the subsection on the Paciﬁc island economies,
and Kiseok Hong provided the box on the Republic of Korea. The authors are solely responsible for
the views expressed here.
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This ﬁnal chapter provides some tentative conclusions for the issues covered
throughout the book plus brief overviews on debt sustainability issues in some
economies that are not covered in the country-speciﬁc chapters. As much of the
previous analyses in the book pertain to the market-access countries, this chapter
allocates a speciﬁc section to discuss the public debt issues for small and isolated
economies in the Paciﬁc region. The Asia and Paciﬁc region’s readiness to handle
another potential global slowdown, as a consequence of a possible recession in
Europe, is discussed.
Public debt and ﬁscal performance in developing Asia:
trends and implications
Although this book emphasizes what happened after the GFC of 2008/09,
Chapter 1 looks at a longer period (since 1994) to facilitate an understanding of
the underlying trends. The period since 1994 can be divided into three subperiods:
(1) that till 2000—the end of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC); (2) from 2000
to the GFC of 2008/09; and (3) the period since then. The AFC represented a
watershed for many countries in the region as they experienced considerable ﬁscal
pressures.1 Soon after, however, consolidation began and debt/GDP ratios were
back to pre-AFC levels by 2007/08. They then slipped again in response to the
steps taken during the GFC, and debt ratios peaked in 2009–10. Subsequently,
ﬁscal consolidation resumed.
Public debt ratios across developing Asia have displayed considerable hetero-
geneity and variation over time. South Asia was the subregion with the highest
average debt/GDP ratio in Asia during 1994–2000, and East Asia had the lowest.
Since the beginning of the 2000s, however, overall public debt ratios in Asia
have been relatively low by developing countries’ standards, with the notable
exception of South Asia. In most Asian economies, debt/GDP ratios tend to
increase following crises as government ﬁscal balances deteriorate due to the
release of ﬁscal stimulus measures for cushioning the crises’ impacts as well as
cyclical factors. Such episodes are typically followed by gradual improvements
in ﬁscal positions as governments wind down the stimulus, before debt ratios are
eventually lowered.Onaverage, this pattern suggests ﬁscal prudence in developing
Asia in general, where economies tend to react responsibly to increasing debt ratios
in the medium to longer term by reining in ﬁscal positions and lowering debt to
more manageable levels when necessary.2 This, however, does not necessarily
rule out the short-term pro-cyclicality of government spending during high
growth periods.
Chapter 2 explores in depth the analytical foundations of debt sustainability
analysis. The chapter discusses why the ﬁscal deﬁcit matters and how it is
measured and shows that, although the accounting deﬁnition of the ﬁscal deﬁcit
is straightforward, there are a number of issues in measuring it accurately. For
example, different taxes and expenditures have different effects on aggregate
demand and, hence, on the ﬁscal deﬁcit itself. The ﬁscal deﬁcit is sensitive
to inﬂation and to phases of the business cycle. Various modes of ﬁnancing
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the deﬁcit (e.g., bond ﬁnancing, money ﬁnancing, and external ﬁnancing) will
have different effects on the economy and thence on the ﬁscal deﬁcit itself.
Further, the impact of the deﬁcit can vary depending on whether the deﬁcit
arises largely from current as opposed to capital expenditure, for example, on
infrastructure.
Chapter 2 then articulates the basic notions of public debt dynamics and ﬁscal
sustainability and develops two broad approaches to debt sustainability analysis—
viz., cointegration betweenpublic revenue andpublic expenditure series, assuming
they are each non-stationary, and debt sustainability analysis (DSA) in the tradition
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Particular attention is given to the fact
that although in many developing Asian countries the growth rate of the economy
is higher than the interest rate, ultimately this gap will narrow, and may indeed
be reversed, because otherwise it would be proﬁtable to borrow indeﬁnitely. The
chapter also points out some shortcomings of DSAs: in particular the technical
difﬁculty of applying them; insufﬁcient government control over future revenues;
the inadequacy of past data for predicting future outcomes; and the recognition
that debt may stabilize at levels that are difﬁcult to service, even though such debt
is, strictly speaking, sustainable. The chapter also argues that a solvency crisis
(deﬁned as a situation in which creditors are unwilling to lend) may arise even
when sustainability conditions are satisﬁed.
Chapter 2 then alludes to evidence that domestic and external debt may be
hard to separate in practice, especially if capital accounts are open, resulting in
the need to consider consolidated public debt. The chapter then underscores the
importance of issues not considered in the book, including Classiﬁcation and
Regression Tree models of ﬁscal stress; an evaluation of the risk of meeting debt
service obligations, including the use of value-at-risk models; problems with debt
dilution; an analysis of ﬁscal stress and the identiﬁcation of thresholds3; the impact
of the composition of debt; and broader interpretations of sovereign debt crises.
The chapter then underscores the fact that any assessment of the sustainability of
debt can only be as accurate as the quality of the revenue and expenditure data
available. In particular, many “hidden” liabilities of the government (including
contingent liabilities) and the central bank deﬁcit may be omitted from ofﬁcial
debt statistics. But revenue may also be reported erroneously. Practices regarding
suchmatters vary across countries. These and other factors underscore the need for
doing country-level DSAs that look closely at speciﬁc country practices. Chapter 2
thus sets the stage for detailed examination of the DSA methodology (considered
in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6).
Chapter 3 formally tests for the existence of a ﬁscal prudence tendency in Asia
and conﬁrms that, generally, economies in the region have exhibited responsible
behavior in managing their ﬁscal positions. This behavior has helped the region
lower its average debt ratios or at least keep them from rising uncontrollably as
evidenced in the trend of the region’s average debt ratios since the beginning
of the 2000s. The trend was disrupted during the onset of the 2008/09 GFC
as governments introduced ﬁscal stimulus measures to cushion the impact on
their economies. However, as economies started to recover, their debt/GDP ratios
196 B. Ferrarini, R. Jha, and A. Ramayandi
seemed to fall back to their declining trend, as indicated by the medium-term
projection discussed in Chapter 3.
In addition to relatively responsible behavior in ﬁscal management, developing
Asia has also beneﬁtted greatly from favorable macroeconomic outcomes that
deliver high economic growth in a low interest rate environment. This combination
has helped to lower the interest rate–growth differentials (IRGDs) into negative
territory in many economies, thus helping to reduce their debt/GDP burdens.
Although favorable for debt dynamics in the medium term, negative IRGDs
usually come with their own hazard. First, as previously noted, a negative IRGD
implies that it is proﬁtable to borrow continuously, as intake will always rise faster
than borrowing. Thus, the IRGDs ultimately need to turn positive because, so long
as the IRGD is negative and the debt/GDP is falling, rational agents will have the
incentive to borrow at low interest rates, ﬁnance higher consumption, and roll over
debt. This situation is unsustainable in the long run. Second, as Chapter 2 argues,
a negative IRGD may be the result of ﬁnancial repression, where ofﬁcial interest
rates are kept artiﬁcially low. This leads to a distortion in the price of capital and,
hence, to a misallocation of capital. Thus, the IRGDs may turn positive, forcing
governments to take stringent austerity measures and deeply revise their ﬁscal
targets that were previously deemed sustainable. For these reasons, it appears
unavoidable that Asian economies will experience a structural narrowing of the
IRGD over time and a sign reversal eventually. Whether any given country will
experience this reversal before 2016 (the year to which forecasts are made in this
book) is an open question. Further, when public debt is denominated in foreign
currency, the IRGD is vulnerable to exchange rate changes.
Given such trends, Chapter 3 applies various DSAs to subregional averages
and selected individual economies. The aim is to assess the prospect of debt
sustainability in developing Asia over a medium-term horizon. The DSA
conducted was based on the latest macroeconomic forecasts of probable domestic
and global macroeconomic developments as well as ﬁscal policy assumptions for
each economy under consideration. Although the DSAs are unlikely to depict the
exact projection of the debt/GDP ratio with a reasonably high probability of being
the actual outcome, they are useful for providing the likely scenario to which
future public ﬁnances might evolve under the assumptions used in the analysis.
On average, the analyses suggest an overall tendency for public debt to be
sustainable in the Asia and Paciﬁc region. This comment does not necessarily hold
for each economy individually, but certainly all ofAsia’s subregions are associated
with declining or stable debt paths up to 2016, assuming continuing strong growth,
low interest rates, moderate inﬂationary pressures, and the gradual normalization
of ﬁscal policy after region-wide expansion in the aftermath of the 2008/09 GFC.
In general, this assessment holds true based on a comparative analysis of applying
a standard DSA to eight economies in the region. The ﬁndings from the standard
DSA are also broadly in line with the results from applying a stochastic DSA,
hence validating the realism of the baseline assumptions underlying the former.
The stochastic simulations, however, highlight the presence of a large spectrum
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of likely outcomes, not all of which are compatible with the stable or declining
debt ratios suggested by the baseline assumptions. The implication for economies
with higher risk proﬁles of public debt is thus to revise their ﬁscal positions to
accommodate future macroeconomic outcomes that may be less favorable than
what is reﬂected in their baseline assumptions.
However, this conclusion is contingent on accepting the reported revenue,
expenditure, and debt ﬁgures at face value. As indicated in Chapters 2, 4, 5, and 6,
because the ﬁscal positions of several economies lack transparency, the results of
the DSA tests are biased toward sustainability.
Issues with assessing debt sustainability in developing Asia
Assessing public ﬁnances for the case of developing Asia is a daunting challenge
due to huge difﬁculties in assembling a comprehensive set of ﬁscal and public debt
data for all the countries. Familiar problems include occasional missing observa-
tions over time and across economies. Further, consistent and comprehensive ﬁscal
data, particularly about the exactmagnitude of public debt obligations are seriously
lacking for some economies. In addition, consistent data on interest payments on
debt are also not generally available for the actual interest rates on public debt
and the extent to which debt may be serviced at concessional or market interest
rates. Consequently, ﬁscal sustainability analysis is based, for the most part, on
published data, which may under-report liabilities and hence create a bias toward
sustainability.
How to deﬁne the coverage of the public sector when analyzing public ﬁnance
is another issue. While the coverage should encompass all public sector activities,
such comprehensive data are rarely available and the coverage of ofﬁcial ﬁgures
is typically narrow. This narrowness masks the full extent of public debt that may
actually pose a serious threat to a country’s ﬁscal sustainability. Examples are
provided in Box 7.1 on the Republic of Korea, and in Chapter 5 on India, which
discuss the effects of the “below-the-line” items that are not included in the ofﬁcial
ﬁscal data and their implications for estimating an economy’s debt proﬁle.
Getting adequate and appropriate information on hidden (off-balance-sheet)
liabilities and their associated contingent liabilities is also a problem. Such
liabilities are often the source of “ﬁscal shocks” occurring during economic
downturns and become the key factors in affecting ﬁscal sustainability over time.
The realization of these shocks is, in many cases, closely related with unfavorable
economic outturns. For example, much of the deterioration in ﬁscal positions
during the AFC was associated with the realization of contingent liabilities in the
form of bailouts of distressed banks and other ﬁnancial institutions and cyclical
factors. The omission of hidden or contingent ﬁscal liabilities implies that theDSA
approach adopted in deriving conclusions about sustainability arguably represents
the “best case,” because accounting for these liabilities would likely lead to higher
rather than lower future debt/GDP ratios, and potentially greater threats to ﬁscal
sustainability.
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Box 7.1 Government ﬁnance statistics of the Republic of Korea∗
The Republic of Korea’s ﬁscal situation is known to be relatively sound with
its consolidated government primary balance consistently positive at about 2.5%
of gross domestic product (GDP) on average during 2000–10.1 Nevertheless, the
country’s ﬁscal data need to be taken with caution as the coverage of government
ﬁnance is complicated, there is inconsistency between the ﬁscal balance and the
national debt statistics, and various quasi-ﬁscal activities of public enterprises
potentially enlarge the country’s indebtedness when taken into account.
Coverage of national debt
The scope of government ﬁnance in the Republic of Korea is deﬁned on the
basis of accounting and fund units that include only the General Account, Special
Accounts, and Funds. In contrast, following the Government Finance Statistics
Manual of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), major advanced countries
deﬁne the government sector on the basis of institutional units, which cover not
only accounts and funds of central and local governments but also “all nonmarket
nonproﬁt institutions (NPIs) that are controlled and mainly ﬁnanced by government
units” (IMF 2001: 10).
In addition, the Republic of Korea compiles ﬁscal statistics on a cash accounting
basis rather than the accrual accounting basis used in the major advanced countries.
Consequently, the country’s stated national debt only includes government bonds
and borrowings and is thus less comprehensive than that of countries that include
accrual accounting items such as build-transfer-lease projects, payables, advances,
and withholdings. For these reasons, the scope of government ﬁnance needs
redeﬁning in order to facilitate international comparisons.
Inconsistency between the ﬁscal balance and national debt
Most of the annual changes in the Republic of Korea’s national debt are unexplained
by its ﬁscal balance ﬁgures. During 2000–10 the country’s national debt/GDP ratio
increased from 31.8% to 36.7%.Not all of the change, however, is explainable by the
formula for ﬁscal debt dynamics that is governed by the consolidated government’s
primary balance, interest rate–growth differentials and exchange rate depreciation.
The residual, which is the difference between the actual and the computed change
in debt according to the formula was about 5.2% on average during the period. This
discrepancy arises as the country’s ﬁscal balance and national debt ﬁgures cover
different items.
As summarized in Table B7.1.1, some items are covered by ﬁscal balance
but not by national debt, and vice versa. In particular, ﬁscal balance excludes all
ﬁnancial liabilities backed by counterpart assets,2 whereas national debt excludes
all liabilities of civilian funds run by nonmarket nonproﬁt institutions in the
government sector. Deﬁcit ﬁnancing liabilities (to be repaid through taxes) in the
∗ Box provided by Kiseok Hong, Ewha Womans University, Republic of Korea.
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Table B7.1.1 Coverage of national debt and ﬁscal balance statistics in the
Republic of Korea (coverage as of 2010)
National debt Fiscal balance
General Account (1)
Special Accounts (18)
All are covered All are covered
Funds (64) 40 government funds are
covered; 24 civilian
funds are not
52 deﬁcit-ﬁnancing funds
are covered; 12 ﬁnancial
liabilities are not
Source: Author’s compilation.
general account and government funds are covered in both ﬁscal balance and
national debt statistics. This difference in coverage can account for a substantial
part of the aforementioned residual in debt dynamics.
To illustrate, the foreign exchange stabilization bonds, which are ﬁnancial
liabilities issued by the foreign exchange stabilization fund, are covered in the
national debt but not in the ﬁscal balance. The social security balance is a main
component of the primary balance of the consolidated government, but has no
direct effect on the magnitude of the national debt. Except for small items such
as payables and ﬁnancial derivatives, all assets of social security funds are classiﬁed
as capital rather than debt. Consequently, a surplus in social securitywill improve the
consolidated government balance, but with no signiﬁcant change in national debt.
The conversion of government guaranteed bonds of the Korea Asset Management
Corporation andKoreaDeposit InsuranceCorporation into government bonds,while
directly increasing the national debt, is excluded from the ﬁscal balance statistics for
most purposes (including the IMFs 2004 debt sustainability analysis for the Republic
of Korea).
When appropriately combined, the three aforementioned factors—foreign
exchange stabilization bonds, social security balance, and the conversion of
government guaranteed bonds—account for most of the discrepancy between the
actual and the computed change in debt (the residual). The residual and the sum
of the three factors are plotted in Figure B7.1.1, which shows a high correlation at
0.83. For 1998–2010, the average value of the residual is 4.5% and for the sum of
the three factors it is 3.6%.
Quasi-ﬁscal activities of public enterprises
Public enterprises’ activities in many countries, including the Republic of Korea,
often carry de facto ﬁscal implications. These quasi-ﬁscal activities may hide the
government’s true ﬁscal risk. For example, Korea Land and Housing Corporation
and Korea Water Resources Corporation are heavily indebted from government-
initiated large-scale development projects, and currency stabilization bonds issued
by theBankofKorea aremainly used to support interventions in the foreign exchange
market in essentially the same way as the foreign exchange stabilization bonds are
used. Yet, these activities are not included in the government debt statistics.
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Figure B7.1.1 Debt dynamics residual and adjustment factors.
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Source: Author’s calculation.
While such factors may not pose an immediate risk to the country’s ﬁscal
sustainability, attention to them is needed regarding the ﬁscal coverage of various
funds and social security balances. In particular, it will be important to keep track of
alternate measures of ﬁscal debt that are deﬁned more comprehensively, in addition
to the ofﬁcial ﬁgures. The Korea Institute of Public Finance (2008) study claims
that the country’s ﬁscal risk, when broadly deﬁned to include the unfunded liability
of the social security system and various contingent liabilities, amounted to about
75% of GDP in 2007, more than twice the ofﬁcial national debt ﬁgure.
Encouragingly, a government-led task force announced in January 2011 a
proposal to revise government ﬁnancial statistics to extend the scope of the general
government to cover more funds and public institutions in accordance with the IMF
2001 GFS Manual (KIPF 2011). This is a clear improvement over the previous
scope of government ﬁnance, although a few issues remain, including the treatment
of various quasi-ﬁscal activities of public enterprises.
Box endnotes
1 Author’s calculations based on the ﬁscal statistics provided by the Digital Budget and
Accounting System of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance.
2 These liabilities are repayable through loan recovery and asset liquidation.
Sources:
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2001) Government Finance Statistics Manual,
Washington, DC: IMF.
Korea Institute of Public Finance (KIPF) (2008), “Government Debt Management in Korea,”
mimeo, in Korean.
——— (2011) “Proposals for National Public Finance Data,” Monthly Public Finance Forum
176, February, pp. 46–56, in Korean.
Lee, Rhee, and Sung (2006), “Fiscal Policy in Korea: Before and After the Financial Crisis,”
International Tax and Public Finance, Volume 13, No 4.
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Hidden government liabilities
Chapter 4 discusses the implications of hidden liabilities on public debt sustain-
ability at length, with particular reference to the case of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). The chapter identiﬁes sources for hidden liabilities and discusses the
way to go about incorporating them into a standard DSA. The PRC case suggests
that the ofﬁcial numbers may understate the magnitude of the economy’s actual
public debt burden, thus exposing the government to ﬁscal risks of a potentially
increased debt in the future. The ﬁgures, however, still appear to be sustainable, as
the government’s ﬁscal position provides adequate space for handling reasonable
risks and its asset position provides an additional cushion, should more extreme
risks materialize.
There are at least two issues in relation to accounting for hidden government
liabilities in conducting DSA: their sources and the extent to which they should
be counted as debt. The sources of government obligations that have often been
referred to as hidden liabilities are as follows:
• Arrears—part of debt that is overdue after one or more required payments
is missed—are often considered as part of the government’s hidden liability,
with some certainty in terms of amount due but less in terms of payment
timing. However, arrears could occur on the revenue side as well.
• Contingent liabilities—which arise from explicit guarantees, deposit insur-
ance, and the like, and must be honored if triggered—tend to be uncertain in
terms of both amount and timing.
• Contractual obligations—such as government and social security pensions
or the purchase of services under public–private partnership arrangements—
may be associated with a government intention of honoring them in full but
with some policy discretion to alter such intention.
• Implicit guarantees—or “stand behind obligations”—arise when a govern-
ment is forced to step in to bail out the ﬁnancial sector, state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), or subnational governments, or to provide disaster relief. Although
experience suggests that governmentswill step in, these obligationswill never
be made explicit due to moral hazard concerns.
• Constructive obligations—which are at the soft end of government
obligations—refer to the services that government is conﬁdently expected
to provide, but for which there is no contractual backing.
The extent of government obligations for the liabilities just listed is uncertain,
except for arrears. Nevertheless, all these liabilities imply ﬁscal outcomes thatmay
differ from government plans The deviations from plans may relate to potential
sources of future ﬁscal stress, especially contingent liabilities and off-budget ﬁscal
activities. Uncertainty with regard to both the amount and timing of these potential
sources of stress also poses difﬁculties for determining the extent to which the
liabilities should be included in adjusting a standard DSA.
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Determining which hidden liabilities should be included in DSA is essential in
order to gauge their impacts on debt ratios during times of ﬁscal stress. Using the
PRC as an example, Chapter 4 discusses a possible way of incorporating hidden
liabilities into DSA. To do so, hidden liabilities have to be identiﬁed and the nature
of the ﬁscal risks they pose determined. Some of the liabilities may have ﬂow
implications, mainly in the form of higher spending (e.g., to honor guarantees),
while others may have only stock implications (e.g., if a bailout involves an
assumption of debt). One issue is whether ﬂows should in fact be converted to
stocks, so that the expected future ﬂowcosts of contingent liabilities are discounted
to the present and included in an augmented debt ﬁgure for DSA purposes.
While turning hidden debt into an equivalent amount of actual debt may
be appealing, it would be better to work with a debt measure that meets
statistical standards, such as the IMF’s Global Financial Statistics, and to treat
the consequences of hidden liabilities as exactly what they are, expenditures or
stock adjustments. In this way, the liabilities can be incorporated into a modiﬁed
DSA baseline and used for conducting similar sensitivity tests. This is the sense in
which DSA looks at a wider range of ﬁscal risks, such as errors in macroeconomic
and ﬁscal forecasts and policy uncertainty.
More reliable and accurate information regarding ﬁscally related government
activities will help the process of identifying the appropriate size of the debt
augmenting hidden liabilities. For that reason, improving ﬁscal transparency is
highlighted as a priority reform area for better gauging the ﬁscal risks that hidden
liabilities entail. Prior to this, however, budgetary reform (in particular, a shift
away from cash accounting) is essential before more accurate ﬁscal accounts can
be prepared.
Macroeconomic environment, ﬁscal vulnerabilities,
and debt management
Chapter 5 analyzes prospects for sustainability of India’s public sector debt in the
medium term, that is, until 2016. Despite India’s persistently large ﬁscal deﬁcits,
it has thus far managed to maintain its debt/GDP ratio at a stable though relatively
high level. India does not have the problem of incompleteness of budgetary
accounts on the same scale as the PRC. The chapter underscores the importance
of maintaining debt sustainability and a sound debt position in view of India’s
high current account deﬁcit and the high risk of having large public debt in the
aftermath of the GFC. Mainly as a consequence of a negative IRGD (itself a
consequence of ﬁnancial repression), the chapter predicts that public debt/GDP
ratio will fall from 64.1% in 2010 to 61.2% in 2016. India developed its domestic
government securities market intensively in order to tap cheap funds and to reduce
the vulnerability to external sentiments in managing and sustaining its public debt.
As a result, the total public debt is mainly internal debt, which is a major factor in
containing India’s vulnerability to unfavorable external developments. In addition,
this strategy helps lengthen debt maturities and allow more market-determined
yields in domestic public debt issuance. A large negative IRGD has been another
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major contributory factor in making public debt sustainable. Debt servicing in
India is less risky than in many other countries because a predominant share of
public sector debt is internal and is held by public sector ﬁnancial institutions.
However, the costs of ﬁnancial repression are the misallocation of capital and
foregone growth opportunities.
TheDSAprojections inChapter 5 suggest that this optimistic outlook for India’s
debt sustainability could be undermined if therewere a substantial primary balance
shock or an adverse growth shock. Thus, policymakers should not assume that the
debt/GDP ratio will continue to fall. The chapter argues that the key to addressing
ﬁscal vulnerabilities would rest on developing effective ﬁscal institutions that
promote government capabilities to take on major ﬁscal corrections whenever
necessary. This includes the ability to create adequate ﬁscal space (by initiating
policies that raise the tax and nontax revenue/GDP ratio), and greater outcome
orientation in expenditure policies to cover liabilities that might arise from ﬁscal
surprises. To address ﬁscal risks and vulnerabilities tomaintain debt sustainability,
a comprehensive approach would also require fostering ﬁscal transparency, to
bring in more reliable and accurate information regarding the government’s ﬁscal
activities and facilitate effective ﬁscal planning.
Chapter 6 argues that, in the aftermath of the Doi Moi reforms of the late 1980s,
Viet Nam enjoyed both good economic performance and good ﬁscal discipline.
However, beginning in the late 2000s, and partly as a result of its response to
the GFC, the country’s ﬁscal situation deteriorated and public debt climbed to
about 50% of GDP. Hence, there is a need to reduce the ﬁscal deﬁcit at the
margin.
Analysis based on ofﬁcial data indicates that the Vietnamese ﬁscal situation
is already responding to this challenge. However, the analysis does not fully
incorporate the several risks and uncertainties that characterize Viet Nam’s ﬁscal
situation. As in the PRC case, Viet Nam has issues pertaining to the inadequate
treatment of several budget items, such as contingent liabilities and, as in India, has
a large and artiﬁcial negative IRGD that shows up in a formal DSA as sustainable
debt. Hence, although Chapter 6 indicates a sustainable public debt for Viet Nam
the number of risk factors indicates no room for complacency in the effort to
stabilize the debt.
Realization of ﬁscal contingencies is closely related with macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial instabilities faced by an economy. This is true not only of countries with
a high debt burden, but also of those with relatively low and decreasing debt.
Emerging markets have defaulted with relatively low debt/GDP ratios owing to
risky debt structures as they engaged mainly in borrowing for the short term and
in foreign currency, thus exposing them to interest and exchange rate risks. A
benign trend in the debt/GDP ratio can suddenly be reversed due to sharp ﬁscal
deterioration caused by severe internal and external macroeconomic instability.
Hence, the structure as well as size of the debt matters.
A striking example is the case of Indonesia around the time of the AFC in
1997/98. The country’s total public debt ratio was on a declining trend in the ﬁrst
half of the 1990s before reaching its lowest point at nearly 23% in 1996. The debt
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ratio spiked at the onset of the AFC, peaking at 95% in 2000, as the nominal
exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of home currency) rose
dramatically and the IRGD narrowed. In addition, the crisis forced the Indonesian
government to bail out its banking sector to prevent its ﬁnancial system from
collapsing; thus, it had to fund a huge amount of its “stand behind obligations.”
This “ﬁscal surprise” had a devastating effect on the country’s budget and took
signiﬁcant government effort to clean up.
Chapter 6 provides an in-depth analysis of the risks that macroeconomic
instability and contingent liabilities pose to debt sustainability, using the case of
Viet Nam. The chapter questions the practicality of the baseline DSA assumptions
on the grounds of possible ﬁscal slippages in response to the less favorable
macroeconomic conditions that the country is currently facing, a possible sustained
weakening of Viet Nam’s real exchange rate, and the narrowing gap between the
country’s interest rate and economic growth. The analysis shows that Viet Nam’s
debt prospects are vulnerable to negative shocks on the macroeconomic variables,
particularly to deterioration of the exchange rate, asVietNamhas a high proportion
of its debt in foreign currency. Such shocks couldmaterialize due to the conﬁdence
crisis that the country is facing. Thus, the chapter analyzes some of the key
areas of vulnerability that policymakers need to consider, including provision
of a comprehensive allowance for ﬁscal contingencies; the robustness of the
underlying behavior of public expenditures and revenues in the budget positions;
and the exposure of the ﬁscal position to market risks, including reﬁnancing and
exchange rate risks.
This discussion suggests that the government could face risks of adverse ﬁscal
surprises related to the emergence of signiﬁcant (unfunded) contingent liabilities.
Such risks are particularly associated with the banking sector, especially the
large state-owned banks and some of the newer joint-stock banks, as the budget
currently does not explicitly account for such contingent liabilities. Vulnerabilities
also come from both the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget, as the
revenue is highly dependent on unsustainable revenue sources such as the oil
and gas sectors, SOEs, trade tariffs, and land fees. On the expenditure side, the
commitment to introduce universal health and social insurance could to increased
future expenditure quite signiﬁcantly. High amounts of spending on subnational
infrastructure and public investment projects (which is also the case for India)
also add to potential budget vulnerability. These ﬁscal vulnerabilities on both the
revenue and expenditure sides call for further tax reform and broadening of the
revenue base.
Short-term market risk could derail the ﬁscal outcomes from plans through
unexpected changes in interest rates, exchange rates, and market liquidity
conditions. With debt becoming more sensitive to market risk, prudent practice
would require taking into account both the size and the maturity structure of the
public debt in considering the ﬁscal vulnerability issues. When the proportion
of foreign currency denominated debt is high, signiﬁcant currency and maturity
mismatches in public debt must be avoided.
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If the risks eventuate, Viet Nam could be trapped in persistent ﬁscal deﬁcits,
which is not conducive to keeping public debt in check. To cope with the potential
ﬁscal risks, countries’ abilities to manage their debt effectively are important,
implying a need to strengthen the structure of ﬁscal institutions and approaches
taken to fulﬁll the requirements for ﬁnancing development.
Debt sustainability issues for small, isolated countries:
the case of Paciﬁc Island economies∗
The DSA discussions throughout the book have focused mainly on economies
that are able to access the market to raise debts for ﬁlling their ﬁnancial gaps.
Although most of the DSA implications are applicable to small and isolated
countries, some differences need to be taken into account when analyzing their
debt sustainability issues. For example, narrow export baskets heavy in natural
commodities, external price shocks and natural disasters, and limited access to
international credit markets are typical sources of vulnerability for the small island
economies of the Paciﬁc, with a signiﬁcant bearing on public debt sustainability.
Some of these vulnerabilities are stylized in this section, with main focus on
the smallest among Paciﬁc Islands,4 less so on Papua New Guinea and Timor-
Leste, which are comparably large economies in the subregion, endowed with
signiﬁcant natural resources and with better access to the international capital
markets.5
Economic vulnerability
The geographic and physical characteristics of the Paciﬁc island economies are a
major factor in the evolution and sustainability of sovereign debt in this subregion.
Paciﬁc subregion economies are small and isolated; the largest country in terms of
population is Papua New Guinea with 7 million people; Nauru and Tuvalu have
only about 12,000 inhabitants. Further, many of the countries in the subregion are
fragmented and consist of a large number of small islands, sometimes separated
by substantial distances, which presents major transport and communication
challenges.
These characteristics make them extremely vulnerable to external shocks.
Increases in oil and food prices almost immediately result in inﬂationary pressures
to the extent that economies are net importers of these commodities. Earthquakes
and typhoons damage farms, roads, ports and towns, requiring large amounts of
discreet ﬁnancing to rehabilitate and large spikes in imports of capital equipment
and materials for reconstruction. In some years, damage in the Paciﬁc has been
catastrophic, for example, amounting to an equivalent of more than 30% of GDP
in Samoa andVanuatu. The small market size of countries in the subregion implies
∗ A background note underlying this section was contributed by Paul Holden, The Enterprise Research
Institute, Washington, D.C.
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that there is limited opportunity for economies of scale and the majority of what
is consumed must be imported.
Further vulnerabilities arise from the dependency of many Paciﬁc island
economies on remittances, which in some countries amount to as much as
40% of GDP. The global economic crisis provided a stark illustration of what
occurs when remittances decline as a result of the shrinking growth in the
economies where migrants are employed. The GDP of several Paciﬁc island
countries experienced negative growth as a result, tax revenues fell sharply, and
associated budgetary problems arose. Macroeconomic imbalances translated very
quickly into budget and balance-of-payments deﬁcits, which must be ﬁnanced
through debt.
Three countries in the subregion have a special association with the US: the
northern Paciﬁc economies of the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau and
the Republic of the Marshall Islands receive large Compact grants from the
US. (Compact grants for the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic
of the Marshall Islands will expire in 2023, and Palau’s will expire in 2024.)
Grants account for 50%–60% of the overall revenue of these countries under the
Compact Agreement and amount to about $250 million. Without the grants, the
three countries’ ﬁscal deﬁcits would amount to 15%–30% of GDP. The overall
public sector accounts for more than half the economy in each of the three
countries. Signiﬁcant ﬁscal adjustment will have to be made before the grants
expire. The scale of adjustment is mitigated by the existence of trust funds,
which had been put in place with the intent of replacing the grants at the end
of the Compact Agreement. However, ﬁscal adjustment is widely perceived as
necessary for the case that trust fund returns were not sufﬁcient to fully replace
the grants.
The state ownership of utilities, shipping, airlines, and other services adds to
debt problems in Paciﬁc island economies. In some countries, the state operates
companies in direct competition with the private sector. While some activities
(such as power generation) are natural monopolies, the inefﬁciencies of many
SOEs often result in substantial losses that must be ﬁnanced through direct
budget support or debt guarantees. The extent of the problem in some countries
is illustrated by the fact that government expenditure constitutes the majority of
spending; for example, in Kiribati it is over 80% of GDP and in Tuvalu it is close
to 100%.6 These countries are especially vulnerable to declines in revenue, which
concomitantly can easily lead to debt sustainability issues. A factor that is often
not considered in assessing the indebtedness of Paciﬁc subregion economies is the
contingent liabilities associatedwith government guarantees of SOE indebtedness.
In many cases, the SOEs’ accounts are in such poor condition that it may be very
difﬁcult to calculate what the liabilities are.
These particular characteristics of Paciﬁc island economies make them espe-
cially vulnerable to issues of debt sustainability. IMF Article IV consultation
reports routinely raise issues of external debt sustainability for many Paciﬁc
countries. In addition, several of the smallest among the Paciﬁc island economies
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Figure 7.1 Aid per capita: selected Paciﬁc island economies.
LI = low income, LMI = low middle income, PNG = Papua New Guinea, UMI = upper middle
income
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
would face unmanageable debt burdens without the foreign aid on which they rely
for budget support. In contrast, Papua NewGuinea has just received an upgrade on
its debt sustainability analysis by the IMF and is not ﬁscally dependant on foreign
aid ﬂows. Although their share of the overall aid envelope is lowest among the
world regions, on a per-capita basis, the Paciﬁc islands subregion receives the
world’s highest amount of development aid (Figure 7.1).7
Reducing debt through faster growth
One of the major factors behind debt sustainability problems in many Paciﬁc
countries has been a low rate of GDP growth for an extended period. Productivity
growth has been low or negative, often because of the large state presence in
these economies. In a number of countries a substantial proportion of the capital
stock resides in SOEs, which earn low or even negative rates of return. A recent
AsianDevelopmentBank (ADB) study,which compared the performance of SOEs
in ﬁve Paciﬁc island economies, found that even in Tonga, which had the best
performing SOEs, 30% of the country’s capital stock was controlled by SOEs but
they contributed only 6% to economic growth (ADB 2011b). Divesting inefﬁcient
SOEs, or at least putting them on a commercial basis, entering into public–private
partnerships, or at least requiring them to earn positive rates of return, would
substantially improve productivity and growth rates, which in turn would beneﬁt
debt sustainability.
Another factor thatwould contribute to faster growth and stronger debt positions
is promoting private sector development in the Paciﬁc island economies. Many of
the subregion’s faster growing economies that do not have external debt problems
have undertaken reform programs oriented to the private sector.
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Sound macroeconomic policies
Sound macroeconomic management is a major determinant of maintaining debt
within manageable limits. A number of Paciﬁc island countries had been making
progress in debt management prior to the GFC. Inﬂation had declined and budget
deﬁcits were falling. However, the GFC led to a reversal of the improvement, and
the impact was especially strong in countries that rely heavily on remittances.
In some countries, public sector payrolls took an increasing portion of
government expenditure, which has led to ﬁscal imbalances. Such countries also
face debt sustainability issues. Restoring ﬁscally sound budgetary policies is an
urgent priority for ensuring debt sustainability.
An important policy for supporting better debt management is the imple-
mentation of medium-term budget frameworks. Such frameworks bolster ﬁscal
discipline and stability, promote the strategic allocation of ﬁscal resources in line
with priorities, identify future ﬁnancing needs, and incorporate debt planning
into the formulation of ﬁscal policy. This has knock-on effects, because the
frameworks require improved national accounts statistics and macroeconomic
forecasting, which are also an essential element of debt management. External
ﬁnancing organizations should both encourage and assist Paciﬁc island economies
to implement medium-term budget frameworks based in effective annual budgets,
as currently pursued by many countries in the region.
Better debt management
With a few exceptions, debt management in many Paciﬁc island economies is
not very efﬁcient, usually because of weak public debt management institutions.
Although many countries do have a debt management unit within their Ministry
of Finance, which is indeed tracking debt closely, their analysis is not integral
to decision making on new debt. Some countries track their external debt less
carefully or fail to pay much attention to debt schedules that stretch far into
the future. Moreover, debt levels appear in annual budgets in the majority of
countries, but there is generally little pressure from civil society or political
opposition that would raise concerns and promote alternatives to practices they
deem ineffective.
An essential component of well-formulated debt management policy is to
calculate the net present value of sovereign debt obligations. This is especially
important for countries that receive concessional loans. Currently, one failing of
debtmanagement in the subregion is the tendency to believe that loans on favorable
terms, with low interest rates and principle moratoriums, do not add to the burden
of indebtedness, at least for the foreseeable future; therefore, analyzing repayment
schedules takes a backseat to problems that are seen as requiring more immediate
attention. In many cases, the Paciﬁc island countries have few opportunities to
reduce debt accumulation through diversifying revenue sources because customs
collections constitute themajority of receipts, and the small size of their economies
means that income tax collections have very high transaction costs.
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However, it is difﬁcult to identify with any precision an optimal level of
debt. Typically, several indicators of indebtedness are used, but none has perfect
predictive capabilities because of variable lags, the exposure to shocks, and the
structure of Paciﬁc island economies. Standard indicators that involve exports are
of little use in a subregion where remittances, tourism and external assistance
are important elements of foreign exchange inﬂows. Ratios involving GDP are
inferior to those using gross national income or gross national product.
The vulnerability of Paciﬁc island economies makes this exercise particularly
difﬁcult. The trade-off between investing for the future and ensuring that the
level of debt will not balloon out of control in the event of a natural disaster, to
which the countries of the subregion are especially vulnerable, is a difﬁcult policy
decision, for which there is no single, correct answer. To an extent, aid agencies’
grant response to natural disasters softens the debt impact of natural disasters and
thereby helps to maintain sufﬁcient ﬁscal space to allow government a level of
comfort in dealing with external shocks. This highlights that the role of funding
agencies in the subregion will continue to be essential to compensate for extreme
events and to provide assistance to promote faster growth.
Policy lessons and implications
Whereas this chapter has concentrated on how the Asia and Paciﬁc region
fared with respect to ﬁscal sustainability in the aftermath of the GFC, an
important consideration is how the region will cope with the current sluggish
economic growth, particularly in the eurozone with possible spillovers to the US.
This issue is considered in some detail by ADB (2011), simulating alternative
recession scenarios in Europe and the US, and their impact on economies in
developing Asia.
Among the ﬁndings is that the readiness of those economies to respond to
downturns in Europe and the US depends on their individual ﬁscal positions
and abilities to use low interest rates and other monetary policy measures to
stimulate their economies. In the short term, governments need to take steps to
maintain ﬁnancial stability and prevent market conﬁdence from deteriorating.
If the US and the eurozone both go into recession, a more accommodating
monetary policy may be called for. Unfortunately, the scope for this may
be limited because of high inﬂation in the region, which has necessitated
policy interest rate hikes by several central banks. In addition, because sluggish
growth in Europe and the US may persist for some time, the Asia and Paciﬁc
region’s economies need to rebalance toward domestic consumption with lower
reliance on exports and greater reliance on interregional trade. Countries in
the region may again have to resort to putting in place targeted ﬁscal stimulus
packages.
As various chapters in the book indicate, over the medium term, debt in most of
the key developing economies in the Asia and Paciﬁc region is sustainable. Thus,
there is still some latitude to put in place ﬁscal stimulus packages. However,
in view of the current high levels of debt, there is only limited opportunity to
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exercise this optionwithout running into issues of insolvency and questioning debt
sustainability. Regarding sovereign debt sustainability, this book has highlighted
the importance of factoring in uncertainties when analyzing the likely debt paths—
uncertainties due tomacroeconomic vulnerabilities, both externally and internally,
and the lack of knowledge about the ﬁscal risks from the off-budget ﬁscal activities
that cause vulnerabilities during hard times.
To better cushion the impact of external negative shocks, a government can
promote a healthy and liquid domestic government bonds market to tap internal
sources of fundingwhen necessary. This will help shield the country from external
vulnerabilities. A policy to develop a sound domestic government debt market,
however, will also have to be balanced with the need to maintain macroeconomic
stability and to manage the domestic debt market optimally to avoid crowding out
the private sector.
The success of a domestic government bonds market depends critically on a
country’s ability to maintain the macroeconomic stability that underlies market
conﬁdence. Macroeconomic instability will directly undermine a country’s ﬁscal
soundness, hence increasing ﬁscal vulnerabilities that hinder successful debt
market development. Thus, maintaining prudent policies that promote economic
growth while minimizing the risk for macroeconomic instability is another natural
policy implication for promoting debt sustainability in Asia.
An effective domestic government bonds market could crowd out domestic
private investment and hamper growth if it constrains the private sector’s
capacity to expand its activities. Such a market could also tend to pull up
the effective interest rate, with both the government and the private sectors
competing for funding. This would increase the IRGD, exerting pressure on
the overall government debt and worsening the country’s medium-term debt
prospects. Striking a balance for the role of government debt to support economic
development and stability is equally important for debt sustainability. Therefore,
improving the debt management institutions is important, and involves promoting
government capabilities to execute ﬁscal corrections when necessary, fostering
ﬁscal transparency to enhance the government’s ﬁscal planning capacity, and
anticipating the potential liabilities arising from ﬁscal surprises.
Developing Asian economies cannot afford to be complacent in their approach
to public debt. This book has emphasized several key areas where governments
need to take a proactive approach:
• assuring that the revenue and expenditure accounts of government include all
relevant items (e.g. noncontingent liabilities) and maintaining complete and
well-managed ﬁscal accounts;
• placing high on the agenda the improvement of expenditure management,
reforming of SOEs, and strengthening of debt management institutions and
processes; and
• enhancing efforts to augment tax revenue within an overall program of tax
and expenditure reform in these countries.
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Notes
1 One aspect of the problem was that not all countries were able to spend their way out of
recession reasonably quickly.
2 Although the assessment holds on average, it may not apply equally to all economies in
the region. An in-depth analysis is needed for more detailed pictures of each individual
country.
3 A related concept is that of ﬁscal risk used to describe a situation in which the
government runs the risk of not meeting its ﬁscal policy objectives. Hemming and Petrie
(2000) consider four aspects of such vulnerability: incorrect speciﬁcation of initial ﬁscal
position, vulnerability of short-term outcomes to risk, debt nonsustainability in the long
run, and structural and institutional weakness affecting the implementation of ﬁscal
policy.
4 Apart fromPapuaNewGuinea and Timor-Leste, theADB’s Paciﬁc developingmembers
include:Cook Islands; Fiji;Kiribati; Republic ofMarshall Islands;Micronesia, Federated
States of; Nauru; Palau; Samoa; Solomon Islands; Tonga; Tuvalu; and Vanuatu.
Due to constraints of space, this section does not touch upon a number of relevant
DSA issues for small island economies: (i) how to sensibly deal with the signiﬁcant
difference between GDP and gross national income, given substantial offshore revenues
from ﬁsheries etc; (ii) how to treat trust funds which are multiples of GDP in DSA;
(iii) reliance on domestic debt instead of use of international debt; (iv) risks associated
with single or limited institutional holders of government debt, eg., provident funds;
(v) exchange rate risk, particularly with increasing level of debt to the PRC.
5 It should be noted, however, that also other countries in the region have been able raise
ﬁnance on the international markets. Fiji, for example, has been accessing markets since
2006. Other countries with potential access include Cook Islands, Vanuatu, and Samoa.
However, these countries tend to raise debt domestically as there is an expectation that
thiswill be a cheaper source of ﬁnance and it also typically proves to be scale-appropriate,
particularly when amounts of under $10 million or so are being sought.
6 However, this ratio is substantially lower in terms of gross national income, which could
be argued to more accurately measure the ﬁnancial ability of government to repay debt.
7 It may be argued, however, that a lack of aid would not be completely ﬁlled by debt, in
which case investment projects would just be delayed or dropped.
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